In 2/16/980

1980—THE TRAGEDY IN INDOCHINA CONTINUES: WAR, REFUGEES, AND FAMINE

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 11; MAY 1, 6; AND JULY 29, 1980

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PREFACE

During 1980 the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs held three hearings, herein published, to examine the present refugee crisis, the future of Cambodian famine relief and the intentions of North Vietnam in light of their incursion into Thai territory on June 23, 1980.

Witnesses on May 1 included representatives from international relief agencies and a doctor who participated in a medical team sent to Thailand by Georgetown University Hospital.

On May 6, the administration responded to concerns raised about "black markets," medical conditions, and the future of the international relief effort for the people of Cambodia.

The American Ambassador to Thailand, the Honorable Morton Abramowitz, testified on July 29 on the June 23 incursion by Vietnam, the current status of the border-feeding operation, and the upcoming vote in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on the seating of Democratic Kampuchea.

In September, the UNGA voted to continue to seat the Pol Pot representatives in the General Assembly. Members of ASEAM supported this vote because they felt to vote negatively or abstain would condone Vietnam's invasion into Kampuchea. The United States supported the ASEAN view and voted for the continued seating of Democratic Kampuchea.

Since the beginning of the crisis in Indochina, the subcommittee has taken an active role in bringing this crisis to the attention of the world, in spearheading the effort by the United States to contribute to the international relief effort for Cambodia and in discussing alternative solutions to the problems with the countries in the region.

With the publication of these hearings, it is hoped that the Congress and the American people will continue to focus their attention on the problems in Indochina and will set the stage for continued examination of these concerns in the coming months.

LESTER L. WOLFF,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

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1980—THE TRAGEDY IN INDOCHINA CONTINUES: WAR, REFUGEES, AND FAMINE

Refugee Border Encampments Between Thailand and Kampuchea

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1980

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester L. Wolff (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

[Prior to consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 274 the subcommittee welcomed executive branch witnesses to testify on economic and security assistance in Asia and the Pacific for fiscal year 1981.]

Mr. Wolff. The Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs has been asked to examine a resolution on Cambodia, which is in your folders, House Concurrent Resolution 274. Perhaps I should read the description.

The resolution essentially asks the United Nations to establish an international presence in the refugee encampments on the border between Thailand and Kampuchea. It is a humanitarian gesture under which we are trying to set up some sort of a neutral zone so at least the refugees are not hit from both sides. This would provide an area immune from the attacks which are being made from various elements in the region; and as well to find some way of supplying them with the necessities of life.

Now, we do not have a quorum present. The only thing that we can do is to really make a recommendation on this. The full committee wants to move fairly rapidly, and it follows the policy lines we have been suggesting in this subcommittee for the past 2 years. Our committee has visited many thousands of Indochinese refugees in more than a score of camps in Thailand, Hong Kong, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia. Nowhere is the tragedy greater than in Cambodia where the active policies of the occupying contending forces there continue to cause death, starvation, and disease even to those who have escaped the fighting.

INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEM

This resolution is designed to draw up the outlines for an international settlement of the problems along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Whether it can help lead to a broader settlement in Kampuchea remains to be seen. But in any event, the situation along the border is of sufficient magnitude so that we must act now before it gets entirely out of hand. Forces for a renewed disaster are rapidly assembling at the border area, and a U.N. presence may well represent the sort of international buffer which has been needed for so long.

Mr. **Guyer**. I might just say, Mr. Chairman, that the full knowledge of this particular crisis is not well known—as to the dimensions or proportions—throughout the country. What is happening in Kampuchea may well go down as an even more vicious holocaust than even in Europe and some of the other parts of the world in the past.

The eyes of America, I am sure, are focused on this part of the world right now, as evidenced by the uneasiness of our young people. The apprehension of armed conflict and the fear of people in all ranks of life as to whether or not a full-blown nuclear war could result from this intrusion.

I think this is a highly important area of the world, and it may be history-making in itself. I am looking forward with a great deal of enthusiasm and subjectivity to the witnesses today, that they might be informative and help us being brought up to date on what is going on because the eyes of the world are on this part of the world.

Mr. **Wolff**. Thank you. Mr. Hall?

Mr. **Hall**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would move that this subcommittee recommend passage of House Concurrent Resolution 274.

Mr. **Wolff**. Thank you. Since we do not have a quorum present, all that can take place here is a recommendation. Since Mr. Guyer has already spoken for it and since Mr. Hall has spoken for it, and I am one of the cosponsors of it, I think we can take the vote for this resolution and pass it on to the full committee.

All in favor say "aye."

[Chorus of "ayes."]

Mr. **Wolff**. Opposed?

[No response.]

Mr. **Wolff**. There being no dissenting votes, the resolution is passed along with a recommendation to the full committee.

[Whereupon the subcommittee proceeded with consideration of economic and security assistance in Asia and the Pacific for fiscal year 1981.]

1980—THE TRAGEDY IN INDOCHINA CONTINUES: WAR, REFUGEES, AND FAMINE

THURSDAY, MAY 1, 1980

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:42 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester L. Wolff (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Goodling [presiding]. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for attending.

Today marks the first time in 1980 that the subcommittee has met to consider the future of the Indochinese refugee program and the international Cambodian famine relief effort.

During 1979, the subcommittee held a total of 12 hearings and briefings on the crisis in Indochina. Today we begin a series of hearings to look at the future of the situation as well as food distribution in Kampuchea and present medical, food, and living conditions along the Thai-Kampuchea border.

In 1979 we were concerned with the immediate problems facing the boat people from Indochina as well as the horrors of famine faced by the Cambodians. Today, however, the need to examine prospects for a long-term solution must replace the present Band-Aid approach.

Despite the generous response by the international community to the famine, the threat of mass starvation is once again a real possibility in Kampuchea. Reports of food distribution are mixed, and there are fears that the rice seed needed to avert future famine will not be available to many of the farmers.

In Thailand, thousands of refugees along the Thai-Kampuchea border are being moved to other camps and new camps are being built in preparation for the monsoon season. However, these plans should have been put into action months ago. There is nothing wrong about responding with immediate aid to a crisis, but there is something very wrong in not planning ahead to prevent the same crisis from returning.

SUBCOMMITTEE CONCERNS

The purpose of our hearing is to explore three areas of concern to the subcommittee:

First, to examine the U.S. commitment to assist the countries of first asylum in light of our own budgetary cutbacks, and what the international implications of these cutbacks might be;

Second, what is the present and future U.S. commitment to the international famine and medical relief effort for the people of Cambodia;

And third, how can we deal with the problem of effectively monitoring food distribution?

In the letter of invitation, we requested your testimony to address specific questions. I would like to repeat some of those questions and add a few which have come to our attention in light of recent events:

First. What effects will the change in the Thai Government have on refugee policy and administration?

Second. How do you account for the disparate reports of food distribution?

Third. What are the medical, food, and living conditions like in the camps along the Thai-Kampuchea border and what improvements are needed?

Fourth. What proposals can be made for monitoring food along the Thai-Kampuchea border and within Kampuchea?

With these questions in mind, we welcome our witnesses today, Mr. Robert DeVecchi, director of the Indochina program of the International Rescue Committee, Mr. Mark Schomer, director of Action for Relief and Rehabilitation in Kampuchea, and Dr. John Harvey, group leader of the Georgetown Medical Relief Team.

Before we hear our public witnesses, Congresswoman Heckler has asked to testify. Mrs. Heckler would like to speak concerning House Concurrent Resolution 310, a resolution expressing the deep concern of the Congress over the plight of the Cambodian people and its strong support of humanitarian assistance for those people and a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Kampuchea.

Mrs. Heckler, we welcome you before the committee this morning.

Mr. Palmer. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that we declare a short recess and await the arrival of the other members.

[Brief recess.]

Mrs. Fenwick. We have a quorum call so before I speak I would like to go there anyway.

I would like to speak if I may. Is that all right?

Mr. Palmer. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Goodling. Mrs. Fenwick. Never let me be the one to deny you the right to speak.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Mrs. Fenwick. I do not know how one approaches this problem of hunger in Cambodia. It is complicated by so many elements, the great power rivalry between China and the Soviet Union, the arms that we know are coming into the area still held by Pol Pot, the former really ferocious Communist dictator, and the arms quite openly being sent every day over the roads that are held to be impassable for food but seem to be entirely passable for guns, ammunition, and other military supplies, including poison gas.

So that I see no hope really except that the resolution is going to come before the committee, for some kind of international intervention in this hideous situation.

I do not know how many of you have read the reports in the Times and other newspapers. Even the occupying Vietnamese army authorities report that they are dissatisfied with the actions of the Heng Samrin government which they themselves installed in Phnom Penh. The fact is that the food is not getting out and they say so. The fact is that people of good will are sending food daily, weekly; the fact is that when 20 trucks arrive from East Germany they are hailed and reported by the government, and when 150 in the same shipment come from the West, nothing is said about their origin.

It is perfectly clear what is happening. The poor Cambodian people are caught in the most hideous political struggle, the ugliest of all mankind's struggle, the struggle for power, naked power. Nobody cares apparently about what is happening to these humble people. I have never seen people so dehumanized as I saw in Sa Keo camp in Thailand; terrible, terrible; children look at you dully; they don't move or smile; mothers who don't even know that the child they are carrying in their arms is dead.

SPIRIT OF GENEROSITY

All I can say is that I hope that the spirit and generosity which has been traditional in this country will not fail us now. I do not know how all of you feel, but I do not care that some of the food that goes into Kampong Som and Phnom Penh is probably going to the Vietnamese troops; I do not care that some of the food that is going into Thailand is probably being smuggled across the border to what remains of the Pol Pot guerrillas; I do not think we ought to care. This is not a moment for the niceties of bookkeeping. This is a moment for responding in what, I am happy to say, is the tradition of the American spirit; where there is starvation and suffering we must respond.

Herbert Hoover went to Communist Russia when we did not even recognize the Soviet Union, in 1921 or 1922, carrying food. We have never cared who sat in the palaces of the world, we have always been concerned about who is starving in the streets. In the same way when I was a child in the village church in Bernardsville, when there was a flood in the valley of the Yellow River in China, a special collection was taken up, I did not even know where it was. Nobody asked what government was sitting in the capital, it was enough that there was starvation.

The same thing happened when we were living in Spain, there was a flood in Cuba; the American colony rallied; people working in the telephone company, then American, collected $10,000. This was in the twenties, and nobody asked who was in the government in Havana.

This is the way we must respond, I think, to this particular situation, recognizing what we are up against, which is one of the ugliest elements of human nature, the determination to seize power by two separate powers who really don't care what happens to the millions in the process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Pritchard, do you have any statement?

Mr. PRITCHARD. No thank you. Where is the chairman?

Mr. GOODLING. He is still coming.

Mrs. FENWICK. We might just talk about this resolution; I reall think it is the least we can do.

If those of us who are free and have money don't respond b words and help in the way of food, what good is all our freedom i it does not make it possible for us to do this? This resolutio certainly indicates that we feel international action is needed an it expresses what I hope will be the overwhelming majority opinio of the House.

Mr. GOODLING. The important thing about this resolution is tha it is being presented by those who were there. It is not dependen upon second, third, or fourthhand information. This bipartisa group of courageous women went to see exactly what was happening firsthand and can report from that knowledge. We do appreciate their efforts.

We will now recess until more committee members appear.

[Brief recess.]

Mr. PRITCHARD. We will resume the hearing. The chairman will be along very shortly.

We welcome Mrs. Heckler, who has a statement. You go right ahead.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARGARET M. HECKLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mrs. HECKLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to commend the committee and express my appreciation to the committee for their continuing concern about the nightmare in Cambodia. The committee's ongoing efforts to focus attention on the problem have been very helpful in building awareness and public understanding in the United States. It has brought to the attention of the world community the desperate plight of the Cambodian people.

Late last fall, several other members of the Congresswomen's Caucus and I visited Cambodia and saw with our own eyes what had happened to a country and its people. All of us were appalled by the sights which we observed. The conditions are difficult to describe because they are outside—apart from our experience.

As a result of that visit and the information which continues to pour in about the plight of the refugees and especially of the Cambodian people, a majority of the Congress have introduced House Concurrent Resolution 310, which is before you today for action. It has several purposes.

Before describing the bill itself, I ask unanimous consent—to insert in the record a statement, a formal statement on this issue by Congresswoman Mikulski.

Mr. PRITCHARD. There is no objection.

[Ms. Mikulski's statement follows:]

STATEMENT BY HON. BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate being given the chance to submit testimony here today in favor of Congresswoman Heckler's House Concurrent Resolution 310, and I regret not being able to appear personally to testify. This legislation, among its goals, urges continued support for humanitarian assistance for the people of Kampuchea and reiterates Congress earlier call for the convening of an international conference on Kampuchea to end the fighting and aid the refugees. I am gravely concerned about the tragedy which has befallen the Cambodian people. Since 1971, 4 million Cambodians have died as a result of the violence in Indochina—half of that nation's population. Those Cambodians still alive are suffering from famine, war, disease, and malnutrition. I am particularly disturbed that the level of hunger and death within the next several months could sharply increase—even to the level which existed last fall. Within several weeks, the crops from the spring harvest will be depleted. At that time, if enormous new amounts of food have not arrived, the results will be disastrous. In my view, we are seeing the destruction of a whole people while much of the world stands by doing nothing.

The civilized world, in particular the United States, has a moral obligation to save the Cambodian people from extinction. America must take the lead in working to end the Cambodian nightmare. We must insure that sufficient humanitarian aid is sent to the Cambodian refugees. Our Government must pledge its support and urge the support of other nations during the upcoming pledging conference in May. America must continue to accept adequate numbers of refugees for resettlement. Our Government must act to protect the well-being of those Cambodians both in Cambodia and along the Thai-Cambodian border by preventing any forced repatriation of refugees into Cambodia. Finally, we must work for the convening of an international conference on Cambodia designed to end the fighting and bring about the establishment of a representative government in that land.

I am strongly in support of Congresswoman Heckler's resolution because I believe that it describes the vital goals which our Nation must pursue in helping to bring about and end to the Cambodian nightmare. It is my great hope that your subcommittee and the whole Congress will approve this resolution in time to help end the Cambodian horror before it becomes even more tragic.

THAI BORDER PROBLEMS

Mrs. **Heckler**. Let me begin by reading a paragraph from a recent letter received by Tippi Hedrin of the Cambodian Crisis Center. The letter dated and postmarked from Cambodia on March 28, 1980, describes the continuing problem along the Thai border. The writer says:

> As for me here in Khao I Dang, we have many worries now, worries of the coming trouble which will be dangerous for us. The Thai authority is very strict about everything. The situation on the war-torn border is getting worse and worse. New Khmer refugees who try to get into the camp at night have been shot to death nearly every night. Among the victims were children, ladies with babies, and old people. Some children have tried to cut wood from the mountain for their cooking fire but they were also shot to death, not very far from the Food for Hungry feeding center. We feel very much upset and frightened when we hear about the voluntary repatriation. What is voluntary repatriation?

Mrs. **Fenwick**. Who wrote that?

Mrs. **Heckler**. A correspondent of Tippi Hedrin from the Cambodian Crisis Center. You will hear more of this. It was signed by a number of Thai members and a gentleman whose name I cannot read but I would be happy to submit for the interpretation of your experts on the committee. It was a personal letter to her written on March 28.

The facts on Cambodia are fairly well known. We recognize the problems along the Thai border. We recognize there are about 140,000 refugees living in the Thai camps and in very make-shift arrangements.

I would like to report from personal observation, the really fine cooperation and contributions of the relief agencies who are selfless, generous, and effective and dedicated beyond any call of duty in their care of the refugees. Despite their gallant, ongoing efforts, the situation continues to be a very desperate one.

INCREASE IN FOOD DELIVERY

Spearheaded by UNICEF and OXFAM, and I think as a result o the Congresswoman's meeting with the Heng Samrin government the distribution of food, the delivery of food to Cambodia or Kampuchea has increased. From October of last year until mid-April o this year approximately 69,000 tons of food have been delivered to the ports of Cambodia.

An additional 81,000 tons have arrived by way of the oxcart bridge. In addition, there have been three flights a day bringing food and medical supplies to Phnom Penh. The plus of the delivery of food—constant and increasing—is offset by the problem of the actual distribution of the food to the population. It appears from all that we have learned that a significant portion of the food is not reaching the people.

Of the 64,000 tons unloaded at the Port of Kampong Som, which was one of the agreements the Congresswoman secured from the Heng Samrin government, 39,600 tons have been delivered and can be verified. That this is certainly encouraging and the fact that the planting season is now beginning is also hopeful. The rice planting season ends at the beginning of June. Then the rains come. There is a danger at the present time, however, that clouds our hope. The danger is that the families eat the seed rice instead of planting it.

To avoid this, the relief agencies are trying to maintain their delivery of food aid while simultaneously supplying the necessary seed rice. This very morning on public broadcasting from Thailand, reports indicated that the famine had already begun again in Cambodia, so that the question of the potential of the rice crop may become an academic issue.

CHILDREN'S PERCEPTIONS

The perception of the crisis in Cambodia can best be understood by reading this week's copy of Newsweek, which contains on page 10 a series of drawings by children in Cambodia. These drawings reflect the perceptions of the children and life that they are living. Seventy percent of the drawings depict scenes of murder, starvation, and of intolerable human conditions. The eyes of the children see the realities and transmit them to us as drawings—a record of their day to day life.

POLITICAL SOLUTION

Having been to Cambodia, having dealt with the problem, and with all due respect and great commendation for the relief agencies, I think the long-range answer to the problem surely hinges on political answers. The major powers of the world are really the major factors in what has become a chess game and unless the major powers are brought into an international conference which will deal with the political problems, the long-term solution will continue to evade us.

The Khmer Rouge still constitute a potent though depleted force centered in the Cardoman Mountains. The Khmer Serie, remnants of the former Lon Nol regime, have also developed a military force based in the refugee camps straddling the Thai-Kampuchea border. Vicious firefights have erupted in these camps between Khmer Serie and Khmer Rouge for the control of food supplies. That coupled with the Vietnamese determination to destroy the Khmer Rouge with periodic offenses, presents an unfriendly environment in which the Khmer people can reestablish their lives.

One of the most vivid impressions I received in Phnom Penh was the sight not only of a devastated city formerly beautiful, a city modeled on France's lovliest, with broad avenues, beautiful boulevards. But the grace, the charm was gone; total devastation was everywhere. Ironically, there were bright red banners hung across the streets of Phnom Penh, one of the few evidences of new arrivals, new information.

I asked my interpreter what the banners said. I was told they were received from Russia and they said support the October revolution.

RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT

The Russian involvement and presence is palpable in other ways. Vietnamese soldiers are on the streets in Cambodia, and readily visible, the Vietnamese involvement in the government is quite clear, the Russian involvement includes little red scarves which children have received at the schools in Cambodia.

The schools had been closed for 6 years. We visited one of the first reopened schools; they are without teachers, books, pencils, because all of these things had been destroyed. The Russians, in responding to their needs, sent the little red scarves which were quite irrelevant to the practical needs of the Cambodian people, but were a constant reminder of the Russian involvement.

The Chinese support of the Pol Pot forces creates a refuge and a source of weapon supply. Indeed China is the other major chess player; the pawns are the Cambodian people.

There are short- and long-term needs. They have received too little focus and sustained attention because the plight of the Cambodian people has not been on the world's priority list. Few speak for them. The situation in Iran and Afghanistan has dominated public attention in the United States. We have been distracted by those more dramatic crises. Yet, the loss of a whole society continues to occur. That Cambodia nightmare is what our resolution seeks to address.

I commend the committee again for their attention over the past months to this not terribly dramatic—in American media eyes—but terribly real and heart rending crisis in the world.

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 310

The basic thrust of our resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 310, first of all, tries to focus attention on the problem; second, it urges the continuing support by the United States for assistance to the refugees. We have recently pledged $8 million to assist and I would hope that—it is my understanding and it is my certain wish and my most sincere request to the committee that we respond on a continuing basis and meet the $20 million quota which the U.N. has asked of the United States.

The third purpose of the resolution is to reiterate the support of the Congress for an international conference on Cambodia, akin to that request as expressed by the U.N. General Assembly in November. Such a meeting would involve the participation of U.N. members in an effort not only to address the humanitarian needs, but to deal with the political situation in Cambodia as well.

It is also an opportunity to deal with the human rights problems of the people of Cambodia which have been totally ignored for far too long.

This resolution calls upon the United States and calls upon the nations of the world to concentrate on the Cambodian nightmare. Its thrust would establish and convene an international conference to deal with the political realities as well as the immediate problems of Cambodia. And it seeks to deal with the human rights questions of the Cambodian people. Favorable treatment by your very sensitive and very thoughtful committee will insure adoption of the resolution. It's really one of the ways, perhaps the only plea for action which will bring the major players of the chess game, the Russians, the Chinese to the conference table.

I ask for favorable and prompt support of House Concurrent Resolution 310 and again commend you and the members of the committee for your continuing interest in this major problem.

[Mrs. Heckler's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARGARET M. HECKLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. Chairman, let me express my deep appreciation to you, Mr. Guyer and the other members of the subcommittee for your continued interest and concern over the desperate plight of the Cambodian refugees.

Your efforts have played a major role in continuing to focus the attention, not only of the United States, but of the world on the grave plight of these desperate people. Because you have been so involved and are so knowledgeable in this area, I will keep my remarks brief.

The basic intent of H. Con. Res. 310, which is before you today and which I introduced with a majority of the Congresswomen's Caucus, is to maintain this focus and attention.

Mr. Chairman, it is a sad fact, but a fact that must be faced that the plight of the Kampuchean people slipped off the world's priority list. The eyes and thoughts of the world have focused on Iran and Afghanistan. Those problem areas and our own Presidential campaign have kept the media spotlight off the ongoing plight of the Kampuchean people. But the facts of hunger, disease and death have not changed. And, if in the next few months positive ameliorative steps are not taken, the horrors of this past winter, a winter without a harvest, will return.

The present situation in Kampuchea has improved slightly because of the onset of the planting season. But the situation is still precarious.

PRESENT CONDITIONS

There now are 140,000 refugees living in established UN-Thai camps a few miles inside Thailand. Best estimates tell us that there are another 150,000 refugees in the makeshift camps that straddle the Thai/Kampuchean border. That figure is supplemented weekly by another 100,000 refugees who arrive at the camps to receive food and return with it to Kampuchea via the "ox-cart bridge." Another 500,000 refugees who are grouped along the border are fed in this manner.

Spearheaded by UNICEF and OXFAM, the delivery of food and rice seed continues into Kampuchea. From October of last year until mid-April of this year approximately 69,000 tons of food has been delivered to the ports of Kampuchea. Another 81,000 tons has arrived via the ox-cart bridge. In addition 3 flights a day bring food and medical supplies into Phnom Penh.

While the delivery rate has remained constant, the problem of the actual distribution of the food to the populace remains. The Vietnamese backed government of Heng Samrin has consistently refused to allow the relief agencies to control the means of distribution. It does appear however, that a significant portion of the food is reaching the populace. Of the 64,000 tons that has been unloaded at the port of Kampong Som, 59,600 tons have been delivered.

While the arrival of food aid into Kampuchea is—per se—encouraging, the people of Kampuchea are in the midst of the all important planting season. The rice planting season ends at the beginning of June. Then the rains come. If a crop is not planted before the rainy season, Kampuchea will face a famine—the consequences of which will dwarf what happened in Kampuchea in 1979-80. The danger is that families have been eating the seed rice instead of planting it. To avoid that danger, the relief agencies are trying to maintain their levels of food aid while simultaneously supplying the necessary seed rice.

The prospect of an insufficient harvest later this year and the necessity of continued foreign aid bodes ill for the international relief agencies that are already strapped for funds.

As a result of the two United Nations sponsored donors conferences $297 million has been received by the relief agencies; of that sum, the United States has contributed $87 million. The relief agencies have committed themselves to spending $350 million from now through June. At the last donors conference only $24 million was raised. Countries are reluctant to provide more aid until they see some definite improvement in the situation. A vicious circle ensues.

POLITICAL SITUATION

Resolution of the problems of the Kampuchea people hinge on the resolution of the political situation. The Khmer Rouge still constitute a potent though depleted force centered in the Cardoman Mountains. The Khmer Serie, remnants of the former Lon Nol regime, have also developed a military force based in the refugee camps straddling the Thai/Kampuchean border. Vicious fire fights have erupted in these camps between Khmer Serie and Khmer Rouge for the control of food supplies. Coupled with the Vietnamese determination to destroy the Khmer Rouge with periodic offenses, hardly presents a friendly environment in which the Khmer people can re-establish their lives.

The people of Kampuchea have endured an incomprehensible nighmare for the past 10 years. When my colleagues and I visited Kampuchea and the refugee camps last November we saw a whole people in shock. Children—in years and in body—had the eyes and faces of old people who have seen a lifetime of tragedy. Newsweek has captured, graphically, this terrible psychic toll—a series of drawings by Kampuchean children. Children draw what they see and feel—things that have made an impression—the reality and experience of their own brief lives. Almost 70 percent of the children's drawings were of subjects similar to those Newsweek reprints: People starving, being executed, fleeing from battle. These drawing come from wounded hearts and minds that have been warped by terror and tragedy. These pictures are a call to action.

PURPOSE OF RESOLUTION

The resolution before you today has a series of purposes. The first, of course, is to continue to focus attention on the thousands of starving and displaced persons—men, women, and children who, without our assistance, will face a bleak future, if indeed they face any future at all.

This is a problem which is not going away. On the contrary, all reports indicate that the next few months may be even more crucial to the survival of the people of Kampuchea than the past months.

The second urges continuing support by the United States for assistance to the refugees. We recently pledged $8 million to assist and it is my hope and understanding that we will continue to respond to the United Nations appeal to meet the $20 million which was requested of us.

The third purpose is to reiterate the support of the Congress for an international conference on Kampuchea akin to that called for by the United Nations General Assembly in November.

Such a meeting would involve the participation of U.N. members in an effort to address not only the humanitarian food and other needs but the political situation in Kampuchea as well which has certainly exacerbated the human rights and refugee problems in that country.

The fourth purpose is to call the withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea, again in keeping with the original United Nations resolution and the more recent action by the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Such a withdrawal is essential if crops are to be planted and if the citizens from Kampuchea are to be afforded the opportunity to return to their homelands. It is essential if the culture and heritage of the Cambodian people are to survive.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, this resolution urges the President to support U.N. actions on behalf of protecting the fundamental human rights of the people of Kampuchea.

The United States cannot end the crisis in Cambodia. The answer must lie in an effort by the U.N. nations. The United States is, however, a principal contributor to the United Nations and its agencies and as such should play a vital role and be a prime mover toward action.

It is for these reasons, Mr. Chairman, that I urge your adoption of this resolution.

Mr. WOLFF [presiding]. I want to thank the gentlelady for a very comprehensive statement, one that reflects the great concern of the American people for this problem, and assure her of this commitment.

I also want to apologize for not being here at the start of the session. I thank my colleague Mr. Pritchard and other colleagues here on the committee for taking over. I was one of the hosts for the Prime Minister of Japan. We have 7 minutes remaining, therefore, the committee will stand in recess.

Mr. PRITCHARD [presiding]. We will go ahead with the hearing. I think it is obvious to everyone that this is a particularly difficult time right now with Congress. The budget is on the floor. Things are even more hectic than usual and we are trying to do a number of things at one time. We will continue the hearing for the record and for questions.

We will start with Mr. DeVecchi.

I think we will take each statement and then go back and have some questions. I would be interested in comments you would have on the total subject. So if you would go ahead.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. DeVECCHI, INDOCHINA PROGRAM DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

Mr. DEVECCHI. Thank you very much, Congressman Pritchard.

My name is Robert DeVecchi, Indochina program director for the International Rescue Committee.

It was only 7 months ago that the world became aware of what had happened in Cambodia during the 5 years of the Pol Pot regime. At that time there was a massive outflow of generosity from the world community, international organizations, private voluntary agencies, groups around the world that formed together in broad coalitions and individual efforts to try to alleviate in part the sufferings of the Cambodian people. As a result of this, a very large and complicated international food and relief aid program was established and literally hundreds of volunteers and professional voluntary agency staff people, primarily medical doctors, nurses, nutritionists, sanitation engineers, and so on, flocked to Thailand to assist the refugees who had found sanctuary in Thailand or along the Cambodian border

RENEWED FAMINE

However, here we are 7 months later and even the most optimistic accounts predict that there will be or that there already is a severe renewed famine inside Cambodia. The meager winter harvest has been used up. The present level of international food aid is not sufficient to meet the basic needs of the people.

Despite the substantial efforts to bring seed rice into Cambodia for the next planting cycle, it appears that the quantities brought in will also not be sufficient to provide for a harvest adequate to meet the basic needs of the people in the next cycle.

Health conditions inside Cambodia are dismal. One of the most unfortunate decisions of the authorities in Phnom Penh or Hanoi, or both, has been the consistent refusal to permit Western medical personnel, doctors, nurses, medical supplies, and medicines in any significant quantity into Cambodia, despite numerous offers of assistance.

Much of this can be attributed to the continuing instability inside the country. It is clear that the Vietnamese occupying forces have not been able to pacify the country. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia is now 16 months old and indeed, after its initial successes and the liberation of major cities, insecurity has actually grown in certain areas of the country during this period, and the long-range prognosis for security or for any type of pacification inside Cambodia is quite dim.

It is equally clear that efforts to improve the distribution of international aid inside Cambodia and to permit more than token monitoring of distribution and to permit desperately needed medical personnel into the country simply have a low priority in the minds of the Heng Samrin government and the Hanoi authorities. Thus one cannot count on a substantial improvement in the situation inside Cambodia in the months ahead but must expect a worsening, given the declining food balance, the shortage of seed rice, the declining level of health among the population and the continuing military instability.

CRISIS ON THE BORDER

There is a second major crisis area, which is the Thai-Cambodian border, the concentrations of refugees there and the de facto land bridge that has been established. Here irony and tragedy compete. The large concentrations such as those at Ban Mak Mun and Nong Samet have been allowed to fester and the rot has proven to be lethal.

Armed brigands and soldiers of fortune, posing as "Free Khmer"—the term really has no political validity—have established warring fiefdoms, competing for acceptance by the refugees through the crudest kinds of coercion and protection. Their objectives are clearly venal in nature. Those who control the internationally provided rice supplied from Thailand hold the power, for in an economy that has no currency, rice is the equivalent of money.

The chaotic instability and fighting between rival groups is resulting in the increasing isolation of the refugees there.

The International Committee for the Red Cross medical teams working on the border have been reduced because of the physical insecurity to the people involved. At the same time Cambodians on the border are not being permitted to seek asylum in Thailand and are threatened from the rear by Vietnamese forces and from the north and from the south and through infiltration by Khmer Rouge forces.

The health and sanitation conditions in the border enclaves have deteriorated badly. There have been outbreaks of cholera and other diseases. Little can be done to prepare these camps and these enclaves for the forthcoming rainy season when, by all predictions, they will be partially submerged and simply devastated.

The most successful of the border enclaves and the most corruption-free is the camp at Nong Chan where thousands of Khmer come from as far away as 400 kilometers, by oxcart, bicycle, or foot, to receive food assistance. As a result of its success, it has become a prime target for attack by neighboring enclave guerrilla soldiers. The Thai military forces stationed along the border are increasingly apprehensive about the stability of the border enclaves. Their existence has created a huge and largely uncontrollable black market from Thailand, which increases the instability of the area as well.

VIETNAMESE ATTACK

The prospects of a Vietnamese attack on the enclaves, which were predicted even to the day back in December and January, have not materialized but cannot be completely discounted. Any such attack or major outbreak of infighting between the groups on the border would cause a massive flow of refugees into Thailand, and there remains the possibility of a bloody massacre.

The third element of the present Cambodian situation are the holding camps in Thailand with a population of some 140 to 150,000 displaced persons. The largest of these camps at Khao I Dang has over 12,000 refugees. These are the displaced persons permitted to enter Thailand, starting last October, on the basis of the open door policies announced by Prime Minister Kriangsak, on the understanding that their stay would be temporary and they would return to Cambodia if and when conditions improved.

PHYSICAL AND MEDICAL CAMP CONDITIONS

The physical conditions of the holding camps have in general been improving since last October when the first center opened at Sa Keo, with the results that we all witnessed, the dying, the sick, the starving. These improvements in large part are due to the work of international organizations and private voluntary agencies who have been providing medical nutritional, educational public health teams on a continuing basis.

I believe there are over 400 medical doctors, nurses, and paramedics working in the holding camps and along the border areas. Again I can't help but think of the tragedy of not permitting medical teams inside Cambodia when the Cambodian authorities themselves say there are only 50 doctors left in the entire country and here in neighboring Thailand there are 400 medical personnel, many of whom would be eager and anxious to go into Cambodia to practice their profession.

HOLDING CENTERS

There are several major concerns about the holding centers and the refugees who live there. While the new Government of Thailand under General Prem has not repealed the open door policy of its predecessors, the refugees are still not fully guaranteed against repatriation and indeed many of them fear it. There are as many as 10,000 refugees in Khao I Dang who are survivors of the forced repatriation of last June and who recall what that experience entailed.

I would say parenthetically that it was thanks to this subcommittee and to its chairman that the story of that repatriation came to the world's attention, and it was an honorable act of this subcommittee.

The refugees in the holding centers, with very few exceptions, are not being given the opportunity to seek permanent resettlement in third countries. This is a decision of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, of some of the resettlement countries, and I believe expresses the desires of the Thai Government. Thus they live in a state of perpetual uncertainty and fear of the future, over which they have no control.

Another element of concern in the holding centers, especially Khao I Dang and Sa Keo, is, they will not be able to survive in their present state in the rainy seasons which are to come within months. Plans are now in motion to move refugees to other camps and to improve some of the housing in the camps such as Khao I Dang before the rainy season, but time is getting very short.

All this points to a deepening of the crisis, with events in any one area affecting all the others. For example, a severe renewed famine in Cambodia will, no doubt, precipitate a new wave of refugees to the border. This in turn could create a situation which may not be containable but could spill over into Thailand. This could create, in turn, a changed attitude in Thailand regarding its open door policy. One cannot predict precisely what will happen but one can state that we are in for a prolonged period of tension and incipient turmoil, with a massive potential for tragedy.

Given this lack of equilibrium, it is most important that the relief efforts, which have accomplished much despite frustrating problems, not flag at this point. Indeed, they must be strengthened and made more effective. This is true for both the efforts of the international organizations and the private voluntary agencies. There must also be a continued commitment on the part of the resettlement countries to offer refugees opportunities for permanent resettlement to rebuild their shattered lives.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION

The international community must provide sufficient funds to continue and augment the international relief efforts both within Cambodia and on the border. At the same time the relief agencies must insist on a more thorough monitoring of food distribution as well as press for new access routes for international aid. There must also be renewed efforts to bring foreign medical personnel to Cambodia, as well as the needed medicine and medical supplies.

There must be a stronger international and private voluntary agency presence in the border enclaves to insure greater security for the refugees there and a more equitable distribution of relief supplies both to the inhabitants of the camps and to the transient population who come from the interior in search of food.

The Government of Thailand must be encouraged to continue its policy of providing temporary asylum to Cambodian refugees seeking to enter Thailand. At the same time, they should be urged to reaffirm that as a matter of policy there will be no involuntary repatriation of Cambodian refugees.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the private voluntary agencies must continue to provide the financial, technical, and human resources necessary to assure that the holding centers in Thailand are maintained in a manner sufficient to meet the basic needs of the refugees. This requires urgent action before the rains begin later this spring. Essential public health, sanitation, and medical aid must be assured, not only for the present population but in anticipation of larger numbers which may come.

Cambodian refugees in Thailand desiring resettlement in third countries must be given this opportunity. This will require a willingness on the part of receiving countries to open their doors and to accept Cambodian refugees in their midst.

As part of an overall resolution of the Indochinese refugee crisis, a matter I know the subcommittee discussed previously, we must make increased efforts to identify and realize durable solution projects. That is large-scale resettlement opportunities for Indochinese refugees, not only for Cambodians but for refugees from Laos and Vietnam as well.

These projects will require the willingness of countries to accept refugees as well as the international financial technical assistance needed to assure success.

Mr. Chairman, while none of the above will resolve in its entirety the plight of the Cambodian people, they are all within the power of people of good will to realize. The time is late. Nonetheless, the effort must be made. If it is not, we will all have to answer to history as to why the Cambodian people cease to exist.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. DeVecchi's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. DEVECCHI, INDOCHINA PROGRAM DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

It was only seven months ago that the world became aware of the true depth of Cambodian tragedy. Not until the images of the sick, the starving and the dead had become engraved on the collective conscience of mankind was there a true realization that an entire race was in danger of extinction.

The western world, shaken by the parallel to the holocaust, responded by sending food and assistance, while hundreds of rescue workers, among them many doctors and nurses, came to assist the refugees who had fled to Thailand or clustered on the border. While Cambodia refused to admit western medical teams and while there is disagreement as to the use that has been made of the relief supplies, there is no disagreement that, inside Cambodia, the worst may be still to come.

By even the most optimistic accounts, there will be a renewed severe food shortage inside Cambodia in the months ahead. The meager winter harvest has been consumed and the present level of international food aid, even if it were being distributed in an equitable and expeditious manner, is not sufficient to meet the needs of the people between now and the next harvest.

Despite a substantial effort to bring seed-rice to Cambodia for planting before the rains begin in June, the amounts again do not seem sufficient to guarantee an adequate crop to sustain the population to the next crop cycle and to dispel the spectre of famine. The health conditions of the people of Cambodia do not appear to have improved in any significant way and there continues to be desperate lack of medicines and medical personnel.

INSTABILITY

Much of this can be attributed to the continuing instability in the country. It is clear that the Vietnamese occupying forces have been unable, since the invasion 16 months ago, to "pacify" the countryside. It is equally clear that any effort to improve international aid distribution inside Cambodia, to permit more than token monitoring of distribution and to permit desperately needed medical personnel into the country simply have a low priority in the Vietnamese and Heng Samerin government's mind. Thus, one cannot count on a substantial improvement in the situation inside Cambodia in the months ahead, but must expect a worsening, given the declining food balance, the shortage of seed-rice and a declining level of health among the population.

The second major crisis area is the Thai-Cambodian border, the concentrations of refugees there and the de facto "land bridge" that has been established. Here irony and tragedy compete. The large concentrations such as those at Ban Mak Mun and Nong Samet have allowed to fester and the rot has proven to be lethal. Armed brigands and soldiers of fortune, posing as "Free Khmer", have established warring fiefdoms, competing for acceptance by the refugees through the crudest kinds of coercion and protection. Their objectives are clearly venal in nature. Those who control the internationally provided rice supplied from Thailand hold the power, for in an economy that has no currency rice is the equivalent of money.

The chaotic instability and fighting between rival groups is resulting in the increasing isolation of the refugees there. International medical teams have been cut back. The refugees are not permitted to seek asylum in Thailand and are threatened by Vietnamese forces to the rear. Health and sanitation conditions in the border enclaves are deteriorating. There are indications of cholera and other diseases. Little can be done to prepare the camps for the forthcoming rainy season, when they will be devastated. The most successful of the camps, and most corruption-free, is that at Nong Chan. Thousands of Khmer peasants from as far away as 400 kms come there for food. As a result, Nong Chan continues to be a prime target for attack by the neighboring enclave guerilla soldiers.

THAI MILITARY

Thai military forces stationed along the border are increasingly apprehensive about the border enclaves. Their presence has created a huge, and largely uncontrollable, black market which increases the instability of the area. The prospects of a Vietnamese attack on the enclaves cannot be completely discounted. Any such attack or major outbreak of infighting between the groups could cause a massive flow of refugees into Thailand and there remains the possibility of a bloody massacre.

As for the holding camps in Thailand, they currently house some 150,000 displaced persons. The largest of the camps at Khao I Dang has over 112,000 residents. These displaced persons were permitted to enter Thailand on the basis of the "open door" policy announced last October by Prime Minister Kriangrak, on the understanding that their stay would be temporary, and they would return to Cambodia as conditions improve.

Conditions in the holding camps have, in general, been improving since last October when the first such center opened at Sa Keo. This is in large part due to the work of international organizations and private voluntary agencies who have been provided medical, nutritional, educational and public health teams on a continuing basis. There are several major concerns, however, about the holding centers and the refugees living in them. While the new Thai government under Gen. Prem has not repealed the "open door" policy of its predecessor, the refugees are not guaranteed against repatriation, and indeed many of them fear it, especially those who survived the forced return which took place in the spring of 1979. The refugees in the holding centers, with very few exceptions, are not being given an opportunity to seek permanent resettlement in third countries. Thus, they live in a state of perpetual uncertainty and fear becoming pawns in any moves over which they would have no control. The present holding centers, especially Khao I Dang and Sa Keo, will not be able to survive the rainy season in their present condition. There are plans to move the refugees to other camps, as well as to improve some of the housing, but time is getting very short.

DEEPENING OF CRISIS

All this points to a deepening of the crisis—with events in any one area effecting all the others. For example, a severe renewed famine in Cambodia will, no doubt, precipitate a new wave of refugees to the border. This, in turn, could create a situation which may not be containable but could spill over into Thailand. This could create, in turn, a changed attitude in Thailand regarding its "open door" policy. One cannot predict precisely what will happen but one can state that we are in for a prolonged period of tension and incipient turmoil, with a massive potential for tragedy.

Given this lack of equilibrium, it is most important that the relief efforts, which have accomplished much despite frustrating problems, not flag at this point. Indeed, they must be strengthened and made more effective. This is true for both the efforts of the international organizations and the private voluntary agencies and there must be a continued commitment as well on the part of the resettlement countries to offer refugees opportunities to rebuild their shattered lives.

SPECIFIC ACTIONS

There are specific actions which can and should be taken now. These include:

1. The international community must provide sufficient funds to continue and augment the international relief efforts both within Cambodia and on the border. At the same time, the relief agencies must insist on a more thorough monitoring of food distribution as well as press for new access routes for international aid. There must also be renewed efforts to bring foreign medical personnel to Cambodia, as well as the needed medicine and medical supplies.

2. There must be a stronger international and private voluntary agency presence in the border enclaves to ensure greater security for the refugees there and a more equitable distribution of relief supplies both to the inhabitants of the camps and to the transient population who come from the interior in search of food.

3. The Government of Thailand must be encouraged to continue its policy of providing temporary asylum to Cambodian refugees seeking to enter Thailand. At the same time, they should be urged to re-affirm that as a matter of policy there will be no involuntary repatriation of Cambodian refugees.

4. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the private voluntary agencies must continue to provide the financial, technical and human resources necessary to assure that the holding centers in Thailand are maintained in a manner sufficient to meet the basic needs of the refugees. This requires urgent action before the rains begin later this spring. Essential public health, sanitation and medical aid must be assured, not only for the present population but in anticipation of larger numbers which may come.

5. Cambodian refugees in Thailand desiring resettlement in third countries must be given this opportunity. This will require a willingness on the part of receiving countries to open their doors and to accept Cambodian refugees in their midst.

6. As part of an overall resolution of the Indochinese refugee crisis efforts must be increased to identify and realize "durable solution" projects through which groups of refugees can be resettled in specially designated areas. Such projects will require the willingness of countries to accept as well as the international financial and technical assistance needed to assure success.

While none of the above will resolve in its entirety the plight of the Cambodian people, they are all within the power of people of good will to realize. The time is late. Nonetheless, the effort must be made. If it is not, we will all have to answer to history as to why the Cambodian people ceased to exist.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you.

I have a number of questions, but I think we will go down the panel and then we will come back.

Mr. Schomer, you are free to summarize if you wish. All of your statement will go into the record.

STATEMENT OF MARK SCHOMER, DIRECTOR, ACTION FOR RELIEF AND REHABILITATION IN KAMPUCHEA (ARRK)

Mr. SCHOMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss with you the future of Cambodian famine relief from the perspective of a private organization directly involved in relief operations based in Phnom Penh. I represent a coalition of American, private, voluntary relief and development agencies which was formed in December 1979 under the name, "Action for Relief and Rehabilitation in Kampuchea." Our present membership includes six agencies: CARE, Church World Service, Heifer Project International, Lutheran World Relief, Meals for Millions/Freedom from Hunger Foundation, and the National Board of YMCAs.

RECENT VISIT TO CAMBODIA

I was in Cambodia in late February and early March at the same time that six of the top executives of our member agencies visited

Vietnam and Cambodia. I am going there again Saturday night. We have had staff people in Phnom Penh since November of last year.

Presently there are two people working for us, Americans, living in Phnom Penh. Much of the information which comes to me is through them. There is a consensus among all of us who are involved in relief work that Cambodia is entering a very critical period and many commentators in the West, and in this room I might add, are expressing feelings of outrage, impotence, or cynicism, and seeking parties to blame for this latest tragedy. Under such circumstances it should not be surprising that there are many searching questions being asked about the effectiveness of the relief programs, and particularly those carried out in cooperation with the authorities in Phnom Penh.

SCARS OF POL POT

One point I would like to make is that we should never underestimate the scars which the recent Pol Pot experience has left in the minds of the people of Cambodia. We may say things are getting bad and there is an impending famine now, but there are many people in Cambodia who are survivors and consider themselves lucky that they were able to survive those recent years, and are perhaps more fearful of a return of Pol Pot to power than of the famine conditions about which the international relief agencies are so concerned at present.

There is a lot that needs to be done and, despite the obstacles, the spirit in which I would like to leave this testimony is that everything that is humanly possible must be done to provide not only the relief necessary in the immediate future, but the sort of conditions that will enable the refugees presently in Thailand, not necessarily to seek new homes in other countries, but to find in Cambodia those conditions which would attract them back to more stable lives.

FOOD IN KAMPUCHEA

There have been a number of questions put to me by the committee and I would like to attempt to respond to them, recognizing that this is only one source of information.

The first question is, "Can enough food and relief supplies get into Cambodia?" Kampuchea has two ports that are used for the bulk of the commodities entering the country so far—the ocean port of Kompong Som and the river port of Phnom Penh.

In early April there were 16 ships at Kompong Som and 8 at Phnom Penh being unloaded very slowly. This congestion was due to the simultaneous arrival of numerous shipments rushed to Cambodia before the June rains. Also, the partial collapse of the wharf in Phnom Penh slowed down the unloading and there was a lack of discipline among port workers.

Our field staff report in a recent telephone conversation that this port situation has improved slightly but that it still may take 3 weeks before ships that arrive can be unloaded in Phnom Penh. So there have been several additional port facilities that are being made available for unloading shipments, one of which is 6 kilometers to the north of Phnom Penh. I understand Vietnam has agreed to make available two of its ports for relief supplies sent into Cambodia. Several provincial capitals can be reached by river barge. This may prove to be one of the most effective ways of importing food during the rainy season when the roads become too muddy for trucks.

Our organization sent a barge to Phnom Penh last December which included 800 tons of rice; 620 of those tons were unloaded directly onto lighter barges and taken upstream to two provincial capitals for distribution there. I was able to observe on March 1 four river barges being unloaded in Kompong Cham, a provincial capital. It was a very difficult process, but during the rainy season this may be one way to get food into the country.

Air transport to Phnom Penh has been generally effective, but only for limited quantities of high value goods. Most of the nonfood supplies that our organization sent in the first part of this year arrived by airplane from Singapore.

Since April 5, a U.N. airlift has brought 116 tons of floating rice seed per day from Bangkok to Phnom Penh and this has been carried out very efficiently. Our field staff report that rice seed is taken from the airplanes, directly on to trucks, which then take it to trains bound for Battambang Province, one of Cambodia's main rice-growing areas.

I believe that relief operations would be greatly improved if flights to provincial airports were allowed, but so far the authorities in Phnom Penh have given no response to such proposals.

We have heard already from Mr. DeVecchi about the de facto land bridge that has been established for certain supplies coming in from the West to Khmer people who might not otherwise be reached by the aid channelled through Phnom Penh. Let me just say that these operations, though seemingly justifiable on humanitarian grounds, are being loudly condemned by the Phnom Penh authorities, who see such aid as inherently destabilizing.

On the other hand, U.N. sources indicate that there are greater amounts of aid now entering Cambodia from Vietnam by a different land bridge, including oxcarts, trucks, bicycles and barges, and that among the supplies being brought in by oxcart are 10,000 tons of rice seed.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Let me just interrupt. That is a second bell for a vote. We are not in complete control of our own destinies around here. I think we will have to adjourn. I hate to do this but I think we had better walk over and then walk right back.

[Recess.]

Mr. PRITCHARD. Gentlemen, we will resume the hearing.

Let me again say that all the complete texts will be put in the record. We apologize for interrupting your testimony but that is part of the system here. Won't you continue now?

Mr. SCHOMER. Yes; thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was explaining how to get food and supplies into Phnom Penh, and in that connection, that there is aid coming in through Vietnam. On March 1, a delegation of six executives of private agencies affiliated with our coalition traveled over land from Ho Chi Minh City to Phnom Penh and they saw many trucks bringing food from Vietnam going across that particular route.

But I agree with the others who have spoken that the quantities of food and relief supplies getting into Cambodia from all sides are insufficient to meet the projected needs, and even that takes into account sizable shipments from socialist countries. Therefore, this underscores in the long run the need for Cambodia to develop its domestic agricultural economy so as not to continue depending on external aid.

DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENTS

Now the second question which was put to me by the subcommittee was, "What arrangements for distribution of relief supplies have been made with the authorities in Phnom Penh?" Each agency works in its own way, but in similar ways. I will limit my comments to our organization's own experience.

Shipments of food and relief supplies are only sent to Cambodia in response to specific requests by our field staff who are based in Phnom Penh. These requests are formulated in consultation with specific institutions or Government ministries which propose a plan for utilizing the materials to be imported.

Once the shipments arrive, the nonfood shipments from humanitarian organizations are received by a central reception committee which is responsible for unloading and transporting the goods to the entity for whom they were intended. In the case of food shipments such as rice, these are received by the Ministry of Commerce, which is responsible for all food distributions to the civilian population in Cambodia.

Our own experience is based largely on nonfood shipments so far, and we are satisfied that of the things we have sent, they have at least in the first instance arrived from the ports or airport to the proper Government ministry for which they were destined.

FAIR DISTRIBUTION

The third question asked by the subcommittee was: "Is aid being distributed fairly?" That is, what happens after the government ministry receives it? United Nations sources indicate that the city of Phnom Penh received 16,000 tons of a total of 40,000 tons of food provided by the Joint UNICEF-International Committee of the Red Cross relief program and for which they have reports on distribution.

In the absence of money, Government employees have been paid in rice, and they in turn barter their rice for other necessities in local markets. Rice eventually finds its way to consumers, even if it passes through intermediaries. We have heard how several warlords on the Thai border in areas not controlled by Phnom Penh are perhaps more notorious for blatantly profiteering from foreign aid.

I would like to refer to my written testimony, which includes several specific instances that confirm that at least some food is reaching the needy in rural areas. I will not go into detail at this time regarding these points. They are there for the record. They include trips in February and March by our field staff and by the executives of agencies who belong to our coalition, in which they saw some significant distribution of resources that were donated from abroad.

Their examples of distribution are only intended to moderate certain categorical statements made by some Western observers that food is being deliberately withheld from the needy, resulting in widespread malnutrition. There is some aid getting through that is documented, but this will not convince the skeptics. The larger pattern still indicates there is not enough getting through.

IMPROVING DISTRIBUTION

The fourth question is: "How can monitoring of distribution be improved?" The number of foreign staff persons from Western and international relief agencies based in Kampuchea is now over 60, according to a report submitted to the United Nations donors meeting on March 26. This number 60 does not include personnel from Vietnam and other socialist countries, who have somewhat greater freedom of movement.

International relief workers are able to go almost anywhere in the country provided they are accompanied by Foreign Affairs Ministry interpreters when visiting officials and provinces.

This, of course, limits their ability to make random verifications of aid distribution. The government in Phnom Penh, in trying to establish its own authority is reluctant to allow Western foreigners to take too active a role in managing the country's affairs.

Some of the reasons for what is perceived as a more restrictive government attitude toward relief agencies are quite practical. The support and control of the present number of foreign technicians and relief agency personnel requires considerable efforts by the host government. Adequate lodging and transportation are difficult to find. There are two hotels in Phnom Penh which accommodate most of the Westerners there, and, especially, badly needed government personnel such as guides, translators, and drivers must be provided as well.

You should recall that during the years of Pol Pot, a lot of those who were educated, who were able to speak foreign languages, were systematically exterminated. This left very few trained cadres, and whenever you bring in foreigners you need to put some of these cadres at their disposal. The Government, therefore, must be convinced that the benefits to be derived from admitting more foreigners outweigh the cost of supporting them, and that more will be gained than lost by relaxing some of the restrictions on movement of foreign staff.

U.S. insistence on greater verification by international agencies of food distribution should be accompanied by an offer of substantial additional resources for those programs which prove to be effective in meeting human need. Otherwise, the concern for verification will yield only resentment on the part of the government in Phnom Penh and some embarrassment on the part of the relief agencies which are not able to verify to the extent they would wish.

The insistence on greater verification of distribution should also apply not only to the relief programs in Phnom Penh but to the unofficial cross-border operations from Thailand, to avoid having a humanitarian concern that the aid reach the needy be perceived as politically motivated; namely, to discredit the government in Phnom Penh and its Vietnamese backers.

AVERTING ANOTHER FAMINE

We now turn to the fifth question, "How can another famine be averted next year?" There has been a lot of concern about the need to rapidly increase food production in Cambodia so as to avoid a prolonged dependence on somewhat unreliable outside aid.

Our organization is focusing its program on agricultural rehabilitation, having recently purchased a thousand tons of rice seed and 300 irrigation pumps to be used in Kompong Speu Province. We are also initiating a pilot livestock vaccination project to safeguard the health of draft animals such as oxen and water buffalo, which are vital to the country's rice production.

Measures such as these need to be multiplied and carried out on a large scale. They need to be directed and carried out by the authorities in Phnom Penh with the assistance of whatever outside aid can be obtained.

Rice seed has been highly publicized as one of the most urgent needs. The floating variety of rice seed which needs to be planted by mid-May has been in particularly scarce supply, largely because funding commitments by donor governments came very late, obliging the FAO to resort to an expensive but efficient seed airlift from Bangkok to Phnom Penh.

I was told that some 13,700 tons of rice seed have been brought into Cambodia across the Thai border; that about 10,000 tons are coming in from Vietnam, and that the FAO, OXFAM, and other relief agencies have plans to bring in as much as 42,000 tons together. However, it is possible that much of the rice seed needed will arrive too late, if at all, which will prevent the 1980 wet season harvest in December from being adequate, even if it is better than last year's harvest which was devastating.

I should point out that there are other varieties of rice seed which can be planted as late as June and early July, and that we have sent 1,200 tons of this kind of seed.

Other agencies may be better equipped than I am to provide more accurate data on the seed needs in Cambodia.

LONG-TERM MEASURES

The sixth question, "What long-term measures are needed to restore normal life to Cambodia?" The relief efforts, however essential at present, can be no substitute for a political solution to the conflicts in Cambodia which will enable the Khmer people to focus their energies more fully on the pressing tasks of national reconstruction.

We have heard a lot about the political dimensions of the Kampuchea conflicts. Let me simply say that the United States could contribute to peace and stability by offering trade and recognition to Vietnam, in exchange for greater autonomy for Cambodia, and reduced tensions with China. We have a role to play as a nation in resolving these tensions. But such political actions are beyond the realm of competence of a relief agency, even though they may contribute greatly toward the creation of those conditions which will make life in Cambodia a more attractive option for the many who have fled to Thailand. In the meantime, from my perspective, the top priority must be to save human lives and build the material base on which a renewed society can be built.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Schomer's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Mark Schomer, Director, Action for Relief and Rehabilitation in Kampuchea (ARRK)

I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss with you the future of Cambodian famine relief from the perspective of a private organization directly involved in relief operations based in Phnom Penh. I represent a coalition of American, private, voluntary relief and development agencies which was formed in December 1979 under the name "Action for Relief and Rehabilitation in Kampuchea". Our present membership includes six agencies: CARE, Church World Service, Heifer Project International, Lutheran World Relief, Meals for Millions/Freedom from Hunger Foundation, and the National Board of YMCA's.

A FIELD PERSPECTIVE

I had the privilege of visiting Kampuchea recently, and will be going there again the day after tomorrow. The top executives of our coalition's six member agencies were also able to visit Vietnam and Kampuchea from February 25 to March 1, 1980. Our coalition's program has been developed by American staff based in Phnom Penh since November 1979. We presently have two staff persons there who keep us informed of the situation in Kampuchea and the relief programs undertaken by the ARRK coalition and other agencies. When I was in Kampuchea February 24 to March 3, 1980, I was able to visit many parts of Phnom Penh as well as Kompong Cham province, five hours to the North by road, and spoke with a variety of government officials and relief workers.

KAMPUCHEAN RELIEF UNDER FIRE

There is consensus among relief agencies that Kampuchea is entering another critical period in which lack of food may mean starvation for many during the next five months. Many commentators in the Western press are publically expressing feelings of outrage, impotence, or cynicism, and are seeking parties to blame for this latest tragedy. Under such circumstances, searching questions are being raised about the effectiveness of relief efforts, particularly those carried out in cooperation with the authorities in Phnom Penh.

It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of present relief programs without taking into account the brutal destruction of life and property which took place during the Pol Pot regime from 1975 to 1978. Painful memories of mass kilings and deprivations remain very vivid in the minds of most of the people I spoke with. I could better understand those feelings after walking through open trenches with thousands of skeletons near Kompong Cham and visiting a Pol Pot torture prison museum in Phnom Penh. Many survivors in present-day Kampuchea consider themselves lucky, and fear a return of Pol Pot as much if not more than the impending famine conditions about which international relief agencies are so concerned. These attitudes may help explain—but not justify—what some foreigners consider an insufficient sense of urgency on the part of the authorities in Phnom Penh with regard to famine relief efforts.

Although considerable progress has been made since last year, the needs in Kampuchea remain critical, and greater efforts will be required to reduce the number of victims of starvation this year and avoid future famines by strengthening Kampuchea's ability to become once again self-sufficient in food. International aid—from the West as well as from socialist countries—must continue to be provided generously and used effectively for the sake of saving human lives and building a more viable future for the Khmer people. My organization has recently committed itself to provide a minimum of $7.3 million and hopefully up to $12 million for specific relief and rehabilitation programs in Kampuchea in 1980. But greater resources are needed from Governments to support the larger UNICEF/International Red Cross program, whose role we fully support as the major entity presently responsible for coordinating international aid to Kampuchea.

The availability of needed resources will depend to some extent on answers to questions such as these:

1. Can enough food and relief supplies get into Kampuchea?

The major points of entry for food and relief supplies have been the ocean port of Kampong Som and the river port of Phnom Penh. In early April, there were 16 ships at Kompong Som and 8 at Phnom Penh being unloaded very slowly. This congestion was due to the simultaneous arrival of numerous shipments rushed to Kampuchea before the June rains, the partial collapse of the wharf in Phnom Penh, and a lack of discipline among port workers. My field staff report that the port situation has improved slightly but that it still may take three weeks before ships that arrive can be unloaded. Two 45 meter square barges have been sent from Singapore to act as floating wharfs at Phnom Penh, which should increase the port's unloading capacity from 4,000 to 7,400 tons per month, according to OXFAM staff. These barges are to be leased for five months while the original dock facilities are being repaired. A second river port six kilometers north of Phnom Penh was made available for relief supplies in late March, and it is my understanding that Vietnam has also agreed to make two of its ports available for relief supplies for Kampuchea.

Several provincial capitals can be reached by river barge, and this may prove to be one of the most effective ways of importing food during the rainy season when roads become too muddy for trucks. My organization sent a barge to Phnom Penh last December which included 800 tons of rice. 620 tons were unloaded directly onto lighter barges and taken upstream to Kompong Cham and Kompang Luong for distribution at provincial levels. On March 1, I observed the unloading of four river barges at the provincial port of Kompong Cham. Two barges contained Vietnamese rice and one contained World Food Program rice. Men had to carry individual bags across a narrow gangplank and up seventy flights of stairs to waiting trucks. The introduction of a few cranes could greatly improve the speed of this operation.

Air transport to Phnom Penh has generally been effective for limited quantities of high-value goods. Most of the non-food supplies sent by my organization in the first months of 1980 arrived by airplane from Singapore, and were promptly delivered to the institutions to which they were designated. Since April 5, a United Nations airlift has brought 116 tons of floating rice seed a day from Bangkok to Phnom Penh to be planted by mid-May. Although criticized for its cost—actually $600 per ton according to U.N. sources—this operation has been carried out efficiently. My field staff report that rice seed is taken from the airplanes directly onto trucks, which then take it to trains bound for Battambang Province, Kampuchea's main rice-growing area. Relief operations could be greatly improved if flights to provincial airports were allowed, but so far, the authorities in Phnom Penh have given no response to such proposals.

Pressures from the West to officially allow aid to enter Kampuchea through the border with Thailand continue to be resisted by the authorities in Phnom Penh, who fear this would benefit guerrillas from the ousted Pol Pot regime who continue to operate near that border. Although limited quantities of aid are unofficially entering Kampuchea from Thailand through the "human bridge", reaching people who might not receive aid from Phnom Penh given present political realities, these operations are being loudly condemned by the Phnom Penh authorities. On the other hand, U.N. sources indicate that greater amounts of aid—including 10,000 tons of rice seed—are now entering Kampuchea from Vietnam by oxcart, truck, bicycle, and by barge. On March 1, a delegation of six top executives of private agencies affiliated to the ARRK coalition traveled overland from Ho Chi Minh City to Phnom Penh and witnessed many trucks bringing food from Vietnam.

Although aid is getting into Kampuchea through all of the channels indicated above, most observers agree that the quantities are insufficient to meet projected needs, despite sizable shipments from socialist countries. This underscores the need for Kampuchea to develop its domestic agricultural economy so as not to continue depending on external aid.

2. *What arrangements for distribution of relief supplies have been made with the authorities in Phnom Penh?*

Most of the agencies operating in Phnom Penh work in similar ways, but I will limit my observations to our own organization's experience. Shipments of food and relief supplies are only sent to Kampuchea in response to specific requests by our field staff based there. These requests are formulated in consultation with specific institutions or Government ministries, which propose a plan for utilizing the materials to be imported. These proposals are consolidated into an over-all 1980 program proposal for each agency, which requires the approval of the Foreign Affairs Ministry prior to implementation.

All non-food shipments from humanitarian organizations are received by a central reception committee, which is responsible for unloading and transporting the goods to the entity for whom they are intended. Usually, our field staff advises all offices concerned by letter of the imminent arrival of shipments and ensures that they are represented at the airport or the docks to follow-through with deliveries. For example, we sent 30 tons of intra-veinous solutions in six air shipments which were received by the reception committee and turned over to the Kampuchean Red Cross. Within a few weeks, the Kampuchean Red Cross submitted detailed distribution reports to our field staff, who were able to verify that such distributions had taken place in several of the medical centers indicated on the reports.

Bulk food shipments such as rice are usually received by the Ministry of Commerce, which is responsible for all food distributions to the civilian population in Kampuchea. Rations are established by government authorities, not by relief agencies.

3. Is aid being distributed fairly?

United Nations sources indicate that the city of Phnom Penh received 16,000 tons of a total of 40,000 tons of food provided by the joint UNICEF/ICRC relief program. In the absence of money, government employee have been paid in rice, and in turn barter their rice for other necessities in local markets. In a socialist society such as present day Kampuchea the State includes many more civil servants than elsewhere. Rice eventually finds it way to consumers, even if it passes through intermediaries. Several "free Khmer" warlords on the Thai border have been more notorious for blatantly profiteering from foreign aid.

Given the volume of food entering Kampuchea from all sources, and the limited number and mobility of relief agency personnel based in Phnom Penh, only fragmented evidence can be given to confirm that at least some food is reaching the needy in rural areas. Such evidence should serve to moderate categorical statements made by some Western observers that food is allegedly being deliberately withheld from the needy, resulting in widespread malnutrition.

(*a*) On February 2–3, 1980, field staff from ARRK, UNICEF/ICRC, and OXFAM made an overnight field trip to Svay Rieng province and witnessed the delivery of 15 tons of donated materials by the Kampuchean Red Cross to a hospital and an orphanage in that devastated Eastern province.

(*b*) On February 11–12, 1980 while travelling from Phnom Penh to Kompong Chang province, ARRK field representative Steve Collins took photographs and reported on the following observations: "Upon our arrival at the Kompong Luong ferry crossing we came upon twenty-five trucks lined up and waiting to cross the Mekong river. They were bound for Kompong Cham and loaded with milk, sugar, rice and other relief supplies * * * We passed hundreds of bicycles loaded with 100–150 pound bags of rice that was being transported in the provincial areas. We also saw scores of traditional oxcarts carrying rice and driven by peasant Khmer * * *." He visited an orphanage which had received rice, milk, sugar, sleeping mats, blankets, mosquito nets, and clothes from the government. He also noted that food rations had been delivered to and distributed at the provincial hospital, factory, and schools. His report continues: "During our drive back to Phnom Penh, we passed on the road between 45 and 50 trucks loaded down with supplies and bound for Kompong Thom."

(*c*) While travelling from Ho Chi Minh city to Phnom Penh by road on March 1, six American voluntary agency executives related to the ARRK coalition saw two major food distribution points. Peter Davies, President of Meals for Millions/Freedom from Hunger Foundation, noted in his report: "About 10 kilometers after Prey Nhay, we came to a large open area with a courtyard and institutional buildings crowded with empty bullock carts, waiting their turn to load up. We realized this was a major distribution point for food supplies and stopped. I have many movies of this. The bullock carts were being loaded with sacks of maize and rice then transported to the surrounding villages * * * As we proceeded down the road, we came upon another central distribution point where, again, there were many bullock carts loaded with sacks of food."

When I was in Kompong Cham, I asked the representative of the Ministry of Commerce how rations of rice were established. I was told that Government workers usually get about 18 kilos a month, though people undertaking strenuous labor could get as much as 23 kilos. The rest is said to be distributed to the population on the basis of need. Leaders of each village were responsible for determining which persons were in greatest need of rice, and these needs were to be communicated to district and provincial levels. Interestingly, farmers were considered to have access to rice of their own and often received lower rations. This criterion, combined with over-all tight supplies, may explain why so many people in Kampuchea complain that they are receiving insufficient food.

4. How can monitoring of distribution be improved?

The number of foreign staff persons from Western and international relief agencies based in Phnom Penh is now over 60. This does not include personnel from Vietnam and other socialist countries, who have somewhat greater freedom of movement. International relief workers are able to go almost anywhere in the country, provided they are accompanied by Foreign Affairs Ministry interpreters when visiting officials and provinces. This limits their ability to make random verifications of aid distribution. The Government in Phnom Penh, in trying to establish its own authority, is reluctant to allow Western foreigners to take too active a roll in managing the country's affairs. Some of the reasons for what is perceived as a more restrictive government attitude towards relief agencies are quite practical: The support and control of the present number of foreign technicians and relief agency personnel requires considerable efforts by the host government. Adequate lodging and transportation are difficult to find, and badly needed government personnel such as guides, translators, and drivers must be provided as well. The Government must be convinced that the benefits to be derived from admitting more foreign personnel outweigh the cost of supporting them, and that more will be gained than lost by relaxing some of the restrictions on the movement of foreign staff.

U.S. insistence on greater verification by international agencies of food distribution should be accompanied by an offer of substantial additional resources for those programs which prove to be effective in meeting human need. Otherwise, the concern for verification will yield only resentment on the part of the Government in Phnom Penh and embarrassment on the part of the relief agencies.

Insistence upon greater verification of distribution should apply with equal force not only to relief programs in Phnom Penh but also to unofficial cross-border operations from Thailand to avoid having a humanitarian concern be perceived as politically motivated.

5. How can another famine be averted next year?

A lot of concern has been expressed about the need to rapidly increase food production in Kampuchea so as to avoid a prolonged dependence on unreliable outside aid. My organization is focusing its program on agricultural rehabilitation, having recently purchased 1,000 tons of rice seed and 300 irrigation pumps to be used in Kompong Speu province. We are also initiating in a pilot livestock vaccination program to safeguard the health of draft animals such as oxen and water buffalo which are vital to the country's rice production. Measures such as these need to be multiplied and carried out on a large scale.

Rice seed has been highly publicized as one of the most urgent needs. The floating variety, which needs to be planted by mid-May, has been in particularly scarce supply largely because funding commitments by donor governments came very late, obliging the FAO to resort to an expensive but efficient seed airlift from Bangkok to Phnom Penh. I am told that some 13,700 tons of rice seed have been brought into Kampuchea across the Thai border, that about 10,000 tons are coming in from Vietnam, that the FAO, OXFAM, and other relief agencies has plans to bring in as much as 42,000 together. However, it is possible that much of the rice seed needed will arrive too late, if at all, which will prevent the 1980 wet season harvest in December from being adequate, even if it is better than last year's. Other agencies may be better equipped to provide more accurate data on the seed needs in Kampuchea.

6. What long-term measures are needed to restore normal life to Kampuchea?

Relief efforts, however essential at present, can be no substitute for a political solution to the conflicts in Kampuchea which will enable the Khmer people to focus their energies more fully on the pressing tasks of national reconstruction. Since Kampuchea is the battleground of a wider conflict involving China, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and the United States, steps must be taken to ease the tensions which sustain the conflict in Kampuchea. The reconstruction of the national economy and society must be done by the Khmer people, with tactful assistance from the outside. The United States could contribute to this process by offering trade and recognition to Vietnam in exchange for greater autonomy for Kampuchea and reduced tensions with China. Such political actions are beyond the realm of competence of a relief agency, but may contribute greatly towards the creation of conditions which will make life in Kampuchea a more attractive option for the many who have fled to Thailand. In the meantime, the top priority must be to save human lives and build the material base on which a renewed society can be built.

Mr. **Pritchard**. Thank you, Mr. Schomer.

Dr. Harvey.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN COLLINS HARVEY, GROUP LEADER, GEORGETOWN MEDICAL RELIEF TEAM

Dr. HARVEY. Mr. Pritchard and Mr. Bingham, I thank you very much for the opportunity to come here this morning to be with you. I might say you certainly don't need to apologize to us. I know I speak for my conferees. We understand the business of the House and we are in no way inconvenienced at all by waiting for you to vote. So don't worry about that. After all, we are worrying about a problem that is so great, such a tragedy and such a difficult problem, a minor inconvenience is meaningless.

I will summarize my statement. Before that I want to say a couple of things. What Mrs. Fenwick said and what Mrs. Heckler said is absolutely true. Some people may think they are exaggerating a bit. They are not. I support fully what they say.

What is said here is important. This committee, this subcommittee and its parent committee, through these hearings really serve as a voice to the world. It is important that we have a chance to say and put on the record the things that we have observed firsthand.

I will summarize my statement for you and then make several suggestions.

I am Dr. John Collins Harvey, professor of medicine in the Georgetown University. I had the privilege of leading the first Georgetown Medical School's relief team to Thailand in early December to assist in the care of the Cambodian (Kampuchean) refugees. The team was sponsored by the International Catholic Migration Commission of Geneva, Switzerland, and the Conference of Roman Catholic Thai Bishops through their Committee for the Emergency Relief of Refugees. The team was composed of another physician—one pediatrician—eight nurses, two senior medical students, one medical social worker, and one physician's assistant.

KAMPUT CONDITIONS

We were assigned to work at Kamput, a camp on the Cambodian border in southeast Thailand. I had opportunity to visit Sa Keo, Kao-I-Dang, and the other border camps, and even to get into Cambodia to see and observe firsthand some of the activities.

We also observed and visited and gave some care at the Vietnamese refugee camp at Laru Sing, and the Queen's refugee camp at Trot and the Khmer camp at Mai Rut. I have had opportunity to see a wide variety of camps and refugees.

The medical problems in the camps now are far different than what they were in the beginning. The death rate has been reduced. The immediate problems of starvation, total caloric deprivation or marasmus and specific protein deficiency or Kwashikore have been corrected.

The frightful loss of life from malaria, particularly cerebral malaria, has been reduced. But this problem has by no means been straightened out as yet. The severe disabling epidemics that can sweep through a camp, still occur, but in general the medical situation in the holding camps is better than it was.

CARE OF THAI CITIZENS

There is one problem: The Thai Government can certainly not be expected to take over and support this work. It has neither the financial nor medical resources to do this. There is a very important additional fact which I think is important for you to understand. The Thai Government, through its rural health services and the Thai Red Cross, cannot provide to the Thai citizens in the rural areas the same kind of care that the refugees are getting in the camps. This is creating a real political problem for the Thai Government. The local citizenry is jealous of the care given to refugees. This has led to some local attempts to burn camps down.

In giving medical aid, I think, we must not impose our own ideas, yet we must still promote human rights. I want to highlight in my statement one fact. The Thai Government, through its agencies which are running the camps, the supreme command, had apparently made a decision in our camp and I only can speak now about in Kamput for it is the only camp in which I know this occurred because I saw it, but it may have occurred in other places. The policy was established of giving depoprovera to all the married women in the camp. This is a long-acting contraceptive. I am in no way opposed to the use of contraception. But it should be voluntary. All the married women in this camp were required to take it. I think this type of care should be given with informed consent and on a voluntary basis.

We do not know how depoprovera works. It has not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration in our country because we don't know enough about it as yet. It is being used, I know, in Kamput, I do not know about the other camps; I would not want to lead you astray on that.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE

The second highlight in my testimony is the fact that we need to think not only in terms of the medical but psychological care. We need habilitation of these people in the holding camps to regular living.

We are creating in my mind another Gaza Strip. Babies are being born, men and women are going on with life; they are going to have to resume activities in their life. They must continue education and get on with some work. In the camps they are just sitting, and twiddling their thumbs. These people, when we first arrived, were totally without affect. Psychologically they were deadened. The tragedy they had gone through was unimaginable. It was only when we were throwing around a frisbee one day that we got some of the men and some children interested. Now I am a reasonably old man, I do not have a great deal of energy to throw so I got the refugees to throw it. That was the beginning of their coming to life. We started some educational programs going, particularly in public health measures. We began to ask for and seek out those refugees who were educated. They gradually emerged from the horde of black pajama-clad people in our camp. Those who did speak some English or French, were able to be used as interpreters. We started them on the educational process. I think this is an important thing to keep in mind.

There are six general points I would like to make to the committee which I think are important.

REHABILITATION

One I have already alluded to, we must get on with habilitation, get on with the seeing that these people in the camps go on living, working and we must get on particularly with the education of the children. The problem of the orphans is terrible. There were 300 orphans in our camp. There is another large orphanage up at Sa Keo. Three of the sisters, nurses from our team, went up there and ran the orphanage at the request of the ICRC.

The pictures Mrs. Heckler showed you this morning are absolutely true. The children have severe psychological damage. This is going to be something to overcome. The orphans are being cared for as best they can be, by the Thai social workers assigned to the camp. This leaves much to be desired. This is not a criticism of what the Thai social workers are doing; it is just an impossible task for three women to take care of about 300 children.

Third countries must certainly accept those refugees that wish to leave but we must not deplete the camps and deplete the country of Cambodia and take away all the educated and motivated people that can go back to their homeland and start life anew. I think this is very important. While America could take every one of these—yet our immigration policies won't permit us to do this. There is such redtape, yet America has been billed as a land of immigrants; we should open our arms to anybody, in my opinion—we must not take everyone who is educated from that area and leave the country of Cambodia stripped of all but poor ignorant farmers who have not been educated and can't really rebuild their country.

Many of the people in our camp were poor, uneducated farmers; all they want to do is get back to their farms. Somehow, perhaps through the resolution that Mrs. Heckler brought to your attention this morning and other international pressures, the Vietnamese will be forced to get out of Cambodia and not colonize it. Then the true inhabitants may come back to their farms and get on with the process of living.

Prime Minister Kriangsak did come to our camp on New Year's Day to thank us. I talked with him for 10 minutes. He said they were not going to force repatriation. This is important because the people in the camps are psychologically devastated by this possibility. The threat of being sent back to Cambodia and face uncertainty is dreadful. We need help in stabilizing the voluntary effort.

As Mr. DeVecchi said, the groups who came at the beginning, in large numbers were doctors and nurses. Now the workers are beginning to fade away. The International Committee of the Red Cross deals in emergencies. Since the camps now are stabilized, the ICRC does not consider an emergency continuing. The numbers of doctors and nurses are decreasing. The same is true for the voluntary agencies. Our own International Catholic Migration Commission has run out of money so that the team which could come out from Georgetown as a continuing team is no longer there because there is no money to support the team.

COORDINATION NEEDED

Somehow stability and continuity in the voluntary effort must be brought about, perhaps by better funding and a better kind of coordination. Not that the coordination was bad. Dr. John Nepronice, who headed the effort of the voluntary agencies with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Bangkok, did a super job of coordination. But the continuity and stability of teams is lacking. At Kamput, when I was there, were 9 doctors and 24 nurses. It is my understanding—I have not had this verified—by word of mouth, that there is now only one doctor in that camp, and four nurses. Somehow stability in staffing should be arranged.

Another very important thing is, I think in talking about education, we must not go in as volunteers and do everything and then leave and leave these poor people totally stripped of the care that they have become used to. Our effort really should be education of the people there to take over when the voluntary groups leave. And in this respect I think we should try to encourage many of the educated Kampucheans who already have left and settled in Third World countries such as here in America or France, Cambodian doctors for instance to go back and do volunteer work among their fellow refugees—not return to live, but return for periods of time for volunteer work.

This may be one way to get medical help into Cambodia itself instead of just on the Thai border. I think it is very important that in the programs we devise, we include a large educational component so that the people whom we leave behind will be able to manage and do for themselves.

As you have heard the segment of the population of Cambodia which was educated—doctors, nurses, and so forth—as you well know, have been slaughtered; there is nobody left.

I again stress that in our giving of aid we must recognize human rights. Patients' consent and the voluntary acceptance or rejection of medication and procedures which we may think are good, must be maintained.

GOING INTO CAMBODIA

The last point I would make is somehow we have to think of a way of being able to get teams into Cambodia itself. Certainly medicine is a humanitarian affair. We did get some people in surreptitiously. The international groups, regardless of political business, were able to work well together, doctors and nurses.

I met a Russian Red Cross team inside Cambodia. We did not argue about politics, we argued about what was the best way to take care of the people. The worldwide humanitarian effort must somehow overcome the terrible political fighting and get these humanitarian efforts into Cambodia itself.

Certainly we in the West morally have to give care to these pitiful creatures of God caught up in the tragedy of fratricide and genocide which they can neither comprehend nor combat, but simply and silently accept to their own detriment, destruction, and death. We have to give and give and give.

I would point out, Mr. Chairman, an article which is not mentioned in my written statement. This came across my desk yesterday, an article in the Lancet—which is a very prestigious medical journal published in England—in the April 19, 1980 issue. There is a wonderful article on disaster relief in the border camps of Thailand beginning on page 868. It was written by the four Public Health Service doctors from the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta who were out in the camp from October to February 1980.

Many of the questions that I was asked to answer and which I dealt within in my written testimony which I have submitted are very beautifully answered in this article, and I would recommend that your staff to summarize it and give you the salient features of it.

Mr. PRITCHARD. We will put that article in and read it if you like.

Dr. HARVEY. Yes.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Just submit it. We will put it in.

Dr. HARVEY. Very well.

[Dr. Harvey's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN COLLINS HARVEY, GROUP LEADER, GEORGETOWN MEDICAL RELIEF TEAM

I am Dr. John Collins Harvey, Professor of Medicine in the Georgetown University. I had the privilege of leading the first Georgetown Medical School's relief team to Thailand in early December to assist in the care of the Cambodian (Kampuchean) refugees. The team was sponsored by the International Catholic Migration Commission of Geneva, Switzerland, and the Conference of Roman Catholic Thai Bishops through their Committee for the Emergency Relief of Refugees. The team was composed of another physician (a pediatrician), 8 nurses, 2 senior medical students, one medical social worker, and one physician's assistant. I am proud to report that the team worked long and hard, giving much of themselves to the care of the Cambodian refugees. The team was assigned to Kamput, a refugee camp in Southeast Thailand located about 12 km from the Cambodian border. Three of the nurses were subsequently detatched from the team to go to Sa-Kaeo to run an orphanage there for approximately 800 orphans. The remainder of the team joined two medical Red Cross teams, one from Finland, one from Australia, one surgical Red Cross team from Norway, and a Voluntary Agency medical team of the Baptist Thai Mission, an arm of the Southern Baptist Convention, to operate the 200 bed Hospital and Outpatient Clinic in the Camp. There were a total of 11 physicians, 25 nurses, and some 20 other health care workers. We served until the middle of February when we were replaced by a second team from Georgetown.

Kamput has about 5,000 Khmer Rouge Refugees according to the official statistics released by the Royal Thai Supreme Command, the agency of the Royal Thai government given responsibility for the operation of the refugee camps. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been invited by the Royal Thai government to assist the Royal Thai Supreme Command in operating the camps. The ICRC has been given the responsibility for the Medical Care in the camps, the UNHCR has been given responsibility for the logistical operation and the distribution of food in the camps. Medical supplies were thus furnished by the ICRC. The numerous Voluntary agencies from around the world responding to the appeal of the Royal Thai Government for Assistance organized a coordinating Committee which cooperated with the ICRC and the UNHCR in directing the work of the Voluntary agencies, the Volags. Dr. John Napronick, a vey fine young physician from the State of Louisiana, a trained Obstetric-Gynecologist, but a long time medical worker in third world countries, and with refugee groups, served in Bangkok as the Medical Coordinator for the Volags. There are approximately 100 groups from all over the world among the Volags under specific private, religious, and governmental auspices.

The medical situation at Kamput probably reflects in microcosm the medical situation in all the Camps on the Thai-Cambodian and Thai-Laotion borders. When the refugees first arrived the main medical problem was starvation. Two types of starvation were encountered—marasmus—or total caloric deprivation, and Kwashikore—a specific protein deficiency encountered primarily in children. Unattended war wounds from bullets, landmines, and shrapnel also created great morbidity as did malaria, particularly the dreaded form of cerebral malaria. The death rate from these three conditions initially was in Kamput 15/1000 per week. The death rate was reduced during the two month period we were there to 0.1/1000 per week. Severe anemia usually from ever present intestinal parasites was encountered in almost every refugee. Tuberculosis was prevalent. We uncoverd 82 cases of open pulmonary tuberculosis in the first three weeks of service. Psychologically the refugees were shocked. Having suffered a most dreadful, unbelievable and unimaginable disruption to their lives, they appeared emotionally drained and without affect. The tales of starvation, death, and disintegration of family ties, and struggles for survival gradually unfolded and are beyond belief. Initially in all the camps the public health measures were primitive because of the overwhelming numbers of refugees coming in such a short time.

Direct medical care reduced the death rate. Improvements in the sanitary conditions with employment of modern field public health measures for disposal of human waste and garbage contributed to the general improvement in the health status and reduction in morbidity though upper respiratory disease, intestinal parasitism, and malaria continued to affect most of the refugees. Educational programs in sanitary engineering, public health, tuberculosis control and the like were begun with the help of those Cambodians who gradually emerged from the refugee hordes who were educated and spoke either English or French. The majority of refugees in Kamput however were the poor, uneducated peasant farmers of Cambodia who neither understood nor were concerned with the complex political situations which had so disrupted their lives. They only wished to return to their farms and continue their farming. The educated people who emerged felt that Cambodia was forever lost to the colonizing Vietnamese and they wished to go to their countries and begin life anew.

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE NECESSARY

It is clear that continued medical assistance from around the world is necessary to care for these refugees. The Thai government has neither the financial or, more importantly the medical resources to care for these people adequately. The Thai government cooperates fully in the work. The Royal Thai Marine Colonel in charge of our Camp had spent two years at Quantico. He understood America and Americans and assisted our team and all the foreign national teams in every way. Some teams under Red Cross protection did go to the border to care for newly arrived refugees and casualties of the fighting who then went back into Cambodia. Under quiet tacit agreement of the Kampuchean group controlling the various sites along the border, (Khmer Rouge, Khmer Serai) the Finnish Red Cross Team, and French Voluntary Team—MSF—did to into Cambodian territory under Red Cross protection to give emergency care and food to refugee groups as far as 14–20 Km inside Cambodia. Full cooperation was received. The American nationals were not permitted to do this by ICRC orders.

Long term education in public health measures, sanitary engineering, nursing, and medical care among the refugees are needed if progress is to continue after the foreign groups either lose interest or gradually withdraw. It appears that a new "Gaza Strip" situation is being created on the Thai-Cambodian border. If the refugees are not educated to care for themselves, they will again become victims of the dreaded diseases which have ravaged them to the present time in the terrible tragedy in which they have been caught. It does seem important that in furnishing the means for medical care and education, the countries furnishing such, should uphold the provisions of the United Nations regarding human rights. In our Camp, by action of the Thai authorities, all newly married women were injected with a long acting contraceptive drug, Depoprovera a drug which still has not been thoroughly investigated and proven safe for use. It has as yet not been approved for general use in this country by the FDA. This was given regardless of the wishes of the individual Cambodian woman. Members of our team expressed disapproval of this practice, but were powerless to prevent it.

Long term care is going to be needed in these camps. Habilatative measures are needed. The populations in the Camps have no work, no money, and no incentive. It would appear that they will be there for many years. Education and opportunity to lead normal lives must be provided. Particularly poignant and needy are the orphans ranging in age from 4 to 14. There were about 300 in our Camp who were cared for by three Thai Red Cross Social workers. The orphan's needs are immense not only medically (epidemics of upper respiratory infection, meningitis, head lice would sweep through these populations) but educationally, socially, and most important emotionally. Much, much help is particularly needed for these children, help that the Thai government simply is unable to give but which the affluent countries of the West can and, more importantly in my judgment, morally should give to these pitiful creatures of God caught up in the tragedy of fratricide and genocide which they can neither comprehend nor combat, but simply and silently accept to their own detriment, destruction, and death.

[The article from the Lancet follows:]

Disaster Relief

RAPID ASSESSMENT OF HEALTH STATUS AND PREVENTIVE-MEDICINE NEEDS OF NEWLY ARRIVED KAMPUCHEAN REFUGEES, SA KAEO, THAILAND

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Summary In the disaster relief programme for Kampuchean refugees in Thailand, epidemiological techniques were incorporated into the health-planning process during the first 2 weeks of the refugee influx. The findings influenced not only health care in the first refugee camp but also the delivery of medical services in subsequent camps. The mortality rate in the first week of refugee settlement was 9·1/10 000/day, and fell to 0·7/10 000/day by the fifth week. Children aged 4 and under had the highest risk of death. Fever/malaria was the main cause of morbidity and mortality. Simple epidemiological techniques, if initiated early in the relief effort, can influence medical decisions and lead to more effective use of health resources.

INTRODUCTION

Although epidemiological techniques have proved valuable for the retrospective evaluation of health services in disaster relief, they have seldom been used prospectively. The role of surveillance—that is, data collection, analysis, dissemination, and appropriate action—has often been relegated to a secondary place, something to be initiated after the acute emergency has passed. This neglect has tended to produce health programmes founded more on rumour than on fact and has led to inefficient or inappropriate use of limited health resources.

In the recent disaster relief programme for the Kampuchean refugees in Thailand, epidemiological techniques were incorporated into the health-planning process during the first 2 weeks of the refugee influx. Epidemiologists collected, analysed, and disseminated data in order to assess rapidly the health status and preventive-medicine needs of the Kampuchean refugees. The findings not only influenced health care in the first refugee camp but also affected the delivery of medical services in subsequent camps. In this article we describe the methods of prospective surveillance, document the health conditions in the first Kampuchean refugee camp in Thailand, and demonstrate how simple epidemiological techniques, if initiated early in the relief effort, can influence medical decisions.

BACKGROUND

In October, 1979, the Government of Thailand agreed to give refuge to the Khmer population displaced by the war in Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia). Reports of poor health and many deaths among the estimated 600 000 Kampucheans along the Thai border led the United Nations and others to provide food, shelter, and medical relief to the Kampucheans.

On Oct. 24, an estimated 31 000 Kampuchean refugees crossed into Thailand and were encamped in a 33 acre field near Sa Kaeo. On arrival, they were given food, cooking utensils, and shelter. A 1050-bed field hospital was built, staffed, and administered by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a number of volunteer agencies. The poor health of many of the refugees and the chaos of setting up a large relief effort overnight focused international attention on the plight of the Kampucheans. Their situation also underscored the need to anticipate problems to be faced with the precipitous influx of Kampucheans that might follow.

Within a week of arrival of the first refugees ICRC invited epidemiologists from the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC) to identify the principal causes of death and severe illness so that the need for public-health interventions (e.g., mass treatment of malaria) could be assessed. They were also asked to identify specific problems in the delivery of health care and to implement programmes to improve the health of the refugees. This report summarises activities at the Sa Kaeo camp from Nov. 4 to Dec. 12, 1979.

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*On assignment from the Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A.

FACILITIES

Selection of Campsite

The site chosen at Sa Kaeo offered a moderate climate with little rain and a moderate breeze. The site is located near a main highway leading to Bangkok and has access to electric power. The refugees were initially crowded into a small area (average 2·7 m^2 per person), but in December the camp was enlarged.

Water, Sanitation, and Vector Control

Water was initially carried by truck to the camp and stored in aluminium drums. Three deep wells drilled during the second week were eventually connected with a network of pipes providing water distribution throughout the camp. A trench latrine was dug around the periphery of the camp. The Thai provincial health authorities provided insect and vector control by draining stagnant water and spraying DDT.

Hospital Services

A hospital, set up originally in large tents, was moved to 10 wards constructed of bamboo with gravel floors. One ward each was designated for acute malnutrition, obstetrics, and pediatrics; the others handled general medical problems. Each ward had 100–150 beds and was staffed by physicians and nurses from a single voluntary agency. At the beginning of the second week, an admission ward was set up to make the criteria for admission more uniform and to ensure that prompt attention was given to true emergencies. This ward maintained a log in which were recorded the name, age, sex, and diagnosis of all patients admitted. A record card for each patient noted identifying information, diagnosis, treatment, and laboratory information. During the second and third weeks, three outpatient clinics were set up in the camp, each staffed by a physician, nurses, and interpreters.

A blood bank was set up during the second week to type and cross-match blood for transfusion. On Nov. 9 a clinical laboratory was added, with bacteriological support provided by the Provincial Health Department laboratory in Prachin Buri.



Fig. 1—Deaths in Kampuchean refugees in and outside hospital, Sa Kaeo, Oct. 26–Dec. 5, 1979.

SURVEILLANCE AND FINDINGS

Mortality

Burial data collected from Thai health authorities indicated that 54% of the 281 deaths in the camp between Oct. 28 and Nov. 5 occurred outside the hospital (fig. 1). This observation encouraged us to expand a programme which had been begun earlier to seek out severely ill persons in the camp and bring them to the hospital. A tent-by-tent search for patients requiring admission to hospital, begun on Nov. 6, brought many new referrals.

On Nov. 7, a register of all hospital deaths was begun: this included data on age, sex, and diagnosis. The crude death rate for the total population during the first 5 weeks of the disease surveillance effort fell from 9·1 to 0·7 deaths/10 000 population/day (table I). Children under 1 year and adults over 44 were at greatest risk of death (table I). The sex-specific rates were examined during the first 3 weeks: for women the relative risk of death was 1·7 times that for men (95% confidence interval 1·1–1·4). The prime causes of death in the hospital in the first week were fever/malaria and malnutrition (table II). Deaths from malnutrition, diarrhœa, and pneumonia fell weekly during the first month. Prematurity was listed as a consistent minor cause of death throughout the period.

TABLE I—AGE-SPECIFIC MORTALITY RATES AT SA KAEO REFUGEE CAMP, OCT. 28 TO DEC. 5, 1979

Age group (yr)	Estimated population	Deaths/10 000/day*				
		Oct. 28 to Nov. 7	Nov. 8–14	Nov. 15–21	Nov. 22–28	Nov. 29 to Dec. 5
<1	1200		10·7 (9)	6·0 (5)	4·8 (4)	4·8 (4)
1–4	1500		7·6 (8)	4·8 (5)	3·7 (3)	0·0 (0)
5–14	7900	(345)	2·0 (11)	2·1 (12)	0·2 (1)	0·0 (0)
15–44	19 100		2·2 (29)	1·0 (13)	0·7 (9)	0·3 (4)
45+	2200		3·2 (5)	7·1 (31)	3·9 (6)	3·2 (5)
Unknown*	..	(175)	(23)	(14)	(6)	(2)
Total	31 900	9·1 (320)	3·8 (85)	2·7 (60)	1·3 (29)	0·7 (15)

Actual number of deaths in parentheses.
*Out-of-hospital deaths.

Morbidity

The chief physician of each ward submitted data on hospital admissions, discharges, and bed occupancy to

TABLE II—PRIMARY CAUSES OF DEATH AMONG PATIENTS AT SA KAEO FIELD HOSPITAL, NOV. 8 TO DEC. 5, 1979

Diagnosis	No. of deaths				
	Nov. 8–14	Nov. 15–21	Nov. 22–28	Nov. 29 to Dec. 5	Total
Fever/malaria	19	8	7	4	38
Pneumonia	10	13	3	0	26
Malnutrition	13	6	0	1	20
Diarrhœa	7	4	4	1	16
Prematurity	4	3	2	2	11
Other	9	12	7	5	33
Total	62	46	23	13	144

the medical director at a daily meeting. The logbook of the admitting team was surveyed daily for four diagnoses—fever/malaria, malnutrition, pneumonia, and diarrhœa; meningitis and anæmia were added later. The daily number of outpatient visits was recorded, but initially no attempt was made to classify the chief complaints of these patients.

The Sa Kaeo field hospital averaged 1042 (± 104) inpatients and 89 (± 29) admissions per day in the first month (fig. 2). During the entire first month, the number of hospital admissions, hospital occupancy rate, and outpatient clinic visits did not decline, and approximately 13% of all the camp's population were seeing a doctor or nurse daily. Fever/malaria, pneumonia, anæmia, and malnutrition were the first four causes of hospital admissions (table III). An outbreak of meningococcal meningitis identified on Nov. 8 and confirmed by spinal-fluid culture several days later prompted us to include meningitis in the surveillance record and to investigate this outbreak separately (see below). No other acute disease outbreaks were identified from the morbidity register during the first month.



Fig. 2—Hospital statistics, Sa Kaeo, Oct. 28—Dec. 5, 1979.

Community Survey

During the second week, we conducted a survey to evaluate the need for specific health interventions in the refugee community. We chose a survey technique that selected a representative sample.[1] From a map of the camp, 11 of the 15 residential blocks were selected at random. A landmark was identified on the edge of each of these blocks, and occupants of the 6–8 tents adjacent to this landmark were included in the survey. We recorded the age and sex of all persons who had slept under each tent the previous night. Children under 110 cm tall were weighed and examined by a physician who looked for signs of vitamin deficiency and other medical problems. People needing medical attention were treated or referred to the hospital.

TABLE III—PRIMARY CAUSES OF ADMISSION TO SA KAEO FIELD HOSPITAL, NOV. 11—DEC. 5, 1979

Diagnosis	Nov. 11–14	Nov. 15–21	Nov. 22–28	Nov. 29 to Dec. 5	Dec. 6–12
Fever/malaria	112	150	304	306	317
Pneumonia	63	52	60	49	47
Malnutrition	24	67	23	27	23
Diarrhœa	20	21	20	13	20
Meningitis	20	10	3	0	0
Anæmia	28	41	43	43	47
Other	23	173	133	172	205

Anthropometric information was analysed as a percentage of the median reference weight-for-height. This measure was chosen because it is independent of the child's age, relatively easy to use, and sensitive to recent food deprivation.[2,3] Every fourth person was tested for malaria with thick and thin blood smears, asked about recent use of antimalarial drugs, and examined by a physician for splenomegaly and fever. Smears were made and read by a senior technician from the malaria unit at the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences in Bangkok. Because of the small number of children examined in the survey, a physician and two nurses weighed, measured, and examined a larger but non-representative sample group of children who were housed in adjacent tents or were bystanders.

There were relatively few older adults and children under 5 in the population; most children were under 6 months of age (table IV). Of the 41 children under 110 cm tall included in the survey who were available for the anthropometric measurement, only 4 (10%) were less than 80% of the reference median weight-for-height (table V); 24 (18%) of the non-representative sample of 136 children were undernourished by these criteria. None of the children in either sample showed clinical evidence of vitamin or other nutritional deficiencies.

30 of the 80 people examined for malaria had either gametocytes alone (10) or ring forms with or without gametocytes (20) on their thick smears; on thin smear, all were *Plasmodium falciparum* except 1 (*P. vivax*). Although nearly a third had already been given a fixed-combination tablet of pyrimethamine and sulfadoxine ('Fansidar'), the smear results of the treated group were not significantly different from the rest. Only 6 people in the entire group had palpable spleens; 2 of these had

TABLE IV—AGE AND SEX OF SYSTEMATIC SAMPLE, KAMPUCHEAN REFUGEES, SA KAEO, THAILAND, NOV. 8, 1979

Age	Male	Female	Total	%
<1	9	3	12	4
1–4	10	5	15	5
5–9	12	19	31	10
10–14	24	24	48	15
15–24	54	68	122	38
25–34	19	24	43	13
35–44	12	14	26	8
45–54	6	6	12	4
55+	5	5	10	3
Total	151	168	319	100

TABLE V—NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF CHILDREN 50–110 CM TALL, FROM REPRESENTATIVE AND NON-REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES, SA KAEO, NOVEMBER, 1979

% of median weight-for-height	Samples*			
	Representative (n=41)		Non-representative (n=136)	
110	7		19	
90	18		52	
80	12		41	
70 } Under-	3 }	10%	21 }	18%
60 } nourished	1 }		3 }	

*The difference in the percentage undernourished in the two samples is not significant.

negative smears, 2 gametocytes alone, and 2 gametocytes with ring forms. Fever was a significant predictor of positive malaria smears and was found in 9 of 20 patients with ring forms, 7 of 10 with gameteocytes alone, and 9 of 41 patients with negative smears ($p<0{\cdot}05$).

Laboratory Surveillance

Logbooks in the laboratory were monitored for the results of sputum examinations for acid-fast bacilli, stool examinations for parasites, cerebrospinal-fluid (CSF) examinations for cells and organisms, malaria smears, and typing and cross-matching of blood used for transfusion. Because of limitations in the number of specimens that could be processed each day, wards were asked to submit sputum specimens only from patients with cough and fever for more than two weeks, stools from patients admitted with severe or bloody diarrhœa, and blood from patients either severely anæmic (type and cross-match) or with complications of malaria (e.g., cerebral malaria); the CSF of all patients admitted with meningitis was examined.

During the third and fourth weeks, 236 sputum specimens from inpatients with a history of chronic cough and fever were examined for acid-fast bacilli; 54 (23%) were positive, indicating the presence of tuberculosis. In the same period 63 stool speciments from inpatients with severe or bloody diarrhœa were cultured at the local health department and examined for parasites. 9 (14%) smears examined contained *Entamœba histolytica* and 6 (10%) had hookworm (*Ankylostoma*) ova. Ova of *Ascaris* (2), *Strongyloides* (2), and *Enterobius* (1) were also identified.

During the first five weeks, more than 500 patients received blood transfusions. *P. falciparum* malaria and malnutrition were apparently the primary causes of severe anæmia; chloramphenicol, the most commonly prescribed antibiotic, may have delayed the return of a normal number of red cells in many anæmic patients.[4] Glucose-6-phosphate-dehydrogenase deficiency and hæmoglobinopathies (thalassæmia and hæmoglobin E), known to occur in the Kampuchean population, were not identified among those with anæmia (B. J. Stoll, J. Prag, and P. Wasi, personal communication).

Investigation of Outbreak of Meningococcal Meningitis

On Nov. 8 a 3-year-old boy with meningitis and an ecchymotic rash died shortly before being brought to the hospital. His CSF contained 19 000 leucocytes; no organisms were seen on gram staining. Next day, 5 more patients were admitted with meningitis: 4 had a rash, and 3 had purulent CSF. The laboratory identified *Neisseria meningitidis* on culture. Because facilities for serotyping and sulpha-susceptibility testing were not then available, field workers were recruited to give sulphadiazine to people living in tents adjacent to patients with diagnosed meningitis and rash or a purulent CSF. We could identify no clustering of cases by location of the patients or their activities.

Admitting clinicians were asked to collect spinal fluid for examination and culture from all persons presenting with symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of meningitis and to provide immediate treatment. Between Nov. 8 and Dec. 1, 116 specimens were cultured; 20 were positive. 18 of the 20 cases occurred between Nov. 8 and 18, and only 2 cases occurred after that time; both of these had onset on Nov. 24, suggesting that the outbreak had subsided. 7 patients died, including 6 of 8 children aged 9 or under, and 1 of 12 patients aged 10 or over. Only 2 patients died after admission to hospital.

DISCUSSION

The rapid collection and analysis of basic medical information early in this disaster relief effort influenced health planning at Sa Kaeo and in the newer refugee camps of Kamput and Khao-I-Dang. Our epidemiological approach at Sa Kaeo was directed at identifying medical priorities and assessing the usefulness of specific health interventions. The results of the surveillance system were made available to the medical coordinator so that appropriate action could be taken. A fortnightly surveillance report was distributed to keep those providing health services informed of existing surveillance activities, important findings, and interventions in the camp.

The close relationship between surveillance and timely health-intervention measures can be appreciated from the decline in the mortality rate. Registration of all deaths in the camp showed that initially a large percentage of people who died had not sought medical attention. This led to an intensification of the tent-by-tent search for severely ill persons at Sa Kaeo and to the recommendation to triage all severely ill refugees upon entry to the newer camps. Within days of the tent-by-tent search, the percentage of out-of-hospital deaths fell significantly. Review of the death register revealed the rapid decline in mortality rates and the decrease in the number of deaths from malnutrition and malaria, problems which had been identified as priorities early on. Although little could be done to reduce the number of deaths associated with prematurity, a prenatal clinic was organised to provide supplementary feedings and antenatal care for pregnant women at Sa Kaeo; in the newer camp at Khao-I-Dang, all pregnant women will be enrolled at a prenatal clinic upon entry to the camp.[5]

Response to questions about epidemic disease required similar coordination of surveillance data with the implementation of proper control measures. Surveillance for meningitis began when the first suspected case of meningococcal meningitis was diagnosed. After 10 days the outbreak had subsided, and only 2 cases appeared in the next 2-week period. No outbreaks of diarrhoeal illness, typhoid, or cholera were noted in the camp, and laboratory results and clinical observations supported this finding. These negative data were useful in assessing water quality, sanitation, and the personal hygiene of the people, all of which were good, and in reasoning against the need for cholera and typhoid vaccines.

The community survey allowed us to determine the need for several other public-health intervention measures. Measles vaccination has been recommended in dealing with a malnourished population of children,[6] but in our survey the small population at risk, the difficulty of identifying them in a disorganised community, and the absence of any measles-like symptoms made this a secondary priority during the first weeks; measles vaccine was stored until the outpatient system was sufficiently organised to gather the groups of children at highest risk.

The absence of vitamin deficiencies obviated the need for an immediate supplementation programme. The representative and non-representative samples of our community survey identified only 2 children who required intensive supplemental feeding. All children in the representative sample below 80% of the reference median weight-for-height were already receiving supplementary foods. This suggested that the most severely undernourished children had been successfully identified and admitted to hospital in the first week of the camp.

P. falciparum malaria and/or fever were identified as the main health problems of the refugees—i.e., the major cause of death and admission to hospital. The organism was present in 38% of the community surveyed. Since a third of this group had already been treated with antimalarial drugs and 13% of the camp's population was seeing a physician or nurse daily, we felt that the logistic difficulties of treating the population en masse would be greater than allowing them to seek attention through already established channels. Furthermore, the weekly decline in the number of deaths and admissions for malaria indicated that this policy had already been quite successful. As outpatient services at Sa Kaeo are improved, a policy for malaria screening and treatment is being planned in coordination with the malaria team from the Thai Ministry of Health. For new camps mass treatment of Kampuchean refugees with fansidar upon their entry to the camp was recommended.[7] Moreover, further random surveys among the incoming refugees can determine whether malaria is as much of a health threat in other camps as we found in Sa Kaeo.

Tuberculosis was a potential problem at Sa Kaeo when the camp opened, but uncertainties about how long the refugees would remain at Sa Kaeo and early limitations of hospital space and laboratory support made tuberculosis diagnosis and treatment of secondary importance initially. When the laboratory was opened, limited diagnostic facilities encouraged us to begin a programme to screen only inpatients with symptoms most characteristic of tuberculosis—i.e., chronic cough (>2 weeks) and fever. Within several weeks, 236 patients had been screened and more than 50 sputum-positive cases identified. A ward staffed by volunteers was set aside to treat tuberculosis patients with the three-drug regimen recommended by the Thai Red Cross. Further screening is being carried out in the outpatient department, and children under 12 (including neonates) are being vaccinated with BCG. With the guidance of the Thai Ministry of Public Health and the help of Kampuchean workers recruited from among the refugees, an extensive outpatient tuberculosis programme is underway. A programme to screen and treat the large refugee population expected to arrive in Thailand is being considered by representatives of the Thai Ministry of Public Health and the Thai Red Cross.

For the Kampuchean population at Sa Kaeo, as for the victims of previous disasters,[8] blood transfusions were an important life-saving measure. Both *P. falciparum* malaria and malnutrition had resulted in a high prevalence of severe anæmia, and a large number of the group required transfusion. Separate efforts by the Siriraj Hospital, Bangkok, led to the provision of blood from volunteers during the first month of the camp's existence. Additional sources of blood may be needed if more refugees enter Thailand.

The use of surveillance has allowed rapid development of health measures directed at eliminating preventable causes of death and severe illness.[9] When these goals have been achieved, data collection and analysis will be required to address the problems observed both in the heavily populated outpatient departments and in the refugee community as a whole. Moreover, our surveillance at Sa Kaeo has enabled us to gain an insight into refugee problems which may lie ahead.

We thank the many medical volunteers at Sa Kaeo Camp whose daily help was vital to these surveillance activities. We also thank Dr J. P. Hingel and Dr M. Grahn, ICRC; Dr Sinit, Thai Red Cross; Dr Sambasivan, United Nations High Commission on Refugees; and Dr W. Foege, Dr E. Brink, Dr D. Hopkins, Dr S. Thacker, Dr R. Feldman, Dr W. Bulle, and Mr J. Giordano of CDC. Dr R. Williams, AFRIMS, provided laboratory support for malaria screening; and Dr P. Ennamara, provincial chief medical officer, provided microbiological support. The following voluntary agencies provided direct medical care at Sa Kaeo during the interval covered by this report: International Rescue Committee, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Médecins Sans Frontières (French), World Vision Foundation of Thailand, Catholic Relief Service, Catholic Office for Emergency Relief to Refugees, the Save the Children Fund (British), Israeli Medical Team, Thai Red Cross Society, and Foundation for Children (German).

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Mr. **Pritchard**. Thank you, Doctor. Let us go back now.

Do you have some questions you would like to——

Mr. **Bingham**. I am just a guest of the committee. You go ahead.

NEEDING STABILITY

Mr. **Pritchard**. Let's just the two of us ask questions together and you break in when you feel like it.

That is a quorum notice and I believe we can ignore it for a while.

You talked about the camps. It seems we are in a quandary here. The ones who can immediately bring some order to bear in those camps are the Thai Government and Thai officials. We don't have any power. At the same time, if we bring more pressure on the Thai Government, we might jeopardize the whole program. I think we would all agree they are bearing a disproportionate share of the load.

What would you suggest or what can be done in those border camps to bring more stability? How can we do this without hurting the one force in there, the Thais, who are absolutely essential?

Mr. **DeVecchi**. I believe that an effort is underway right now to create a new border enclave. I learned this only yesterday.

The two largest camps at Mak Mun and Nong Samet have all but wiped each other out physically. Mak Mun is about a third destroyed, the International Red Cross hospital has been destroyed.

Let me quote briefly from the most recent International Red Cross bulletin on this, dated April 14:

> The last fortnight has been marked by increased outbreaks of fighting in the border area around Mak Mun and Nong Chan. It began 14 April and resulted in the closure of the camp by the Thai army. According to press reports, 40 people were killed and up to 200 wounded. One-third of the camp has been burned and the remainder, including the International Committee for the Red Cross Hospital and four clinics, were looted and destroyed.

Now it is my understanding that a new center, sort of starting from scratch as it were, with close collaboration between the international organizations, Red Cross, UNHCR and Thai authorities and others will be created in the same general area, but will have the kind of international presence that we have felt has been necessary all along.

One of the difficulties has been that these border enclaves kind of grew like Topsy as it were and we were behind the curve all the way. I am hopeful that this plus a reinforcement of the very admirable camp at Nong Chan, which has been the most corruption-free and strife-free of the camps, will provide a new atmosphere and new climate.

The great fear of course has been alluded to, that we are creating in a sense a new Gaza Strip and I do not know how to deal with that or to answer that.

GUERRILLA SOLDIERS

Mr. **Bingham**. Will the gentleman yield?

Right along that line, I was curious about your statement on page 3, at the end of that first paragraph. In it you say, as a result of the fact that Nong Chan is the best camp, it continues to be a prime target for attack by the neighboring enclave guerrilla soldiers. Can you explain that apparent perversity? Why is it that it is a prime target because it is doing well as a camp?

Mr. DeVecchi. Because the neighboring border camps have, up until now, been controlled by guerrilla or bandit armies who have been able to use the international food being delivered to their camps as currency and have been able to use it for resale purposes. It has been a profitable enterprise. Nong Chan has been a nonprofit organization and therefore successful and has attracted more refugees. The physical security has been better, therefore it has been a target of envy for its neighbors.

Dr. Harvey. I might add, a well-run hospital is a prime target too because all medications are very useful as currency. A capsule of penicillin or erythromycin or an anti-worm remedy can get a great deal of food.

Mr. Pritchard. What seems to be such a difficult problem here is that I am sure the Thai Government is most anxious that the refugees continue to be taken out of the traditional camps. I am sure, for a variety of reasons but also internal politics, there are various reasons that we draw down the numbers of those camps and people in the country see those camps are not permanent and they are leaving.

DEPOPULATING CAMPS

Now that is going on. I suppose that the Thai Government is very sensitive to anything that would take away from that action and start drawing people, allowing people to come out of the holding camps, because then they would be going back on what is a fundamental desire of theirs to get the original camps down.

Mr. DeVecchi. That is correct.

Since the U.S. quota was raised to 14,000 a month, which is for the whole region, including boat people, and so on, 7,500 have been leaving from Thailand, predominantly land people.

Mr. Pritchard. That is right.

Mr. DeVecchi. Matching the 7,500 departures plus the departures to other countries, I believe the estimate is between 10,000 and 12,000 a month have been leaving Thailand. The inflow, particularly from Laos, has been bout 3,000 a month. There has been a net drawdown therefore of 7,000 a month from Thailand since the end of 1979 and it is beginning to be quite noticeable in camps like Nong Khai, Ubon, Loei, and others.

Mr. Pritchard. That is right. It is terribly important for maintaining the Thai effort that that policy be maintained, otherwise, if those camps do not go down, at the times I have talked with them, all bets are off, that is fundamental. But with that, that means you can't relieve the pressure. People have talked here about it, I think you did.

Mr. DeVecchi. Yes.

RESETTLING CAMBODIANS

Mr. Pritchard. We have to get some resettlement spots for those people coming out of Cambodia. That runs counter to our established agreed-upon policy with the Thais. How do we do this?

Mr. DeVecchi. I would hope for an enlarged overall world resettlement response. I alluded to the durable solution idea, particularly for Hmong refugees. A large contingent resettled in a third country with international financing would take a substantial bite out of the Hmong population.

Mr. **Pritchard**. We have made some real efforts along that line. Some things look promising, then they have sort of——

Mr. **DeVecchi**. Petered out.

Mr. **Pritchard**. Yes, petered out.

Of course you are aware that in this country and in other countries there is quite a bit of resistance to large numbers of refugees coming in. I put that question to officials in other countries and we have not received the response we want. It seems we are caught between a rock and a hard place.

BOAT PEOPLE ON THE RISE

Mr. **DeVecchi**. I would point out one other thing, Mr. Chairman, which is that, alas, the boat arrivals have picked up again. Whether this is a trend or not, I do not know. But at this moment the two boat camps in Thailand, Songkhla and Laemsing, have the largest population they have ever had. There have been over 2,000 boat arrivals in the last 30 to 45 days. These are predominantly ethnic Vietnamese. These are clandestine escapes.

Mr. **Pritchard**. So you would gather this is taking place because of efforts internally by the people rather than a policy change by the Vietnamese Government?

Mr. **DeVecchi**. So far, yes, although there are consistent rumors that the authorities in Vietnam, feeling their commitment last June was for a moratorium of 1 year, might begin again the organized departure of ethnic Chinese, yes.

Mr. **Schomer**. If I may.

Mr. **Pritchard**. Let me do it this way: Do you have some other questions for Mr. DeVecchi?

NEW DISTRIBUTION ROUTES

Mr. **Bingham**. Yes. Actually, one that I would like to hear from both Mr. DeVecchi and Mr. Schomer. That is your comment at the top of Mr. DeVecchi's page 5:

> Relief agencies must insist on a more thorough monitoring of food distribution as well as press for new access routes for international aid.

I think there is at least some degree of disagreement between the two of you on the practicality of that.

I wondered how you thought that might be done, how more effective monitoring could be realistically achieved, what kind of pressures there are for establishing those new routes, whether it is practical under the circumtances.

I would like to hear from both of you on that.

Mr. **DeVecchi**. Going back a year ago when the departure of the ethnic Chinese from Vietnam reached its height, when upward of 50,000 and 60,000 people a month were being forced out of Vietnam by boat, the world community simply roused itself and said, "Enough, this must stop."

The Geneva Conference resulted and it had two main results. One was a much higher commitment on the part of the countries around the world to resettle refugees, to accept refugees. The other, which is a mixed blessing, was a tacit agreement by the Vietnamese authorities to abandon the policy of forced expulsion.

I believe that a simple protest, a sense of outrage on the part of the world community can be effective. When food is being delivered, when the people of Cambodia are being helped, the world community can extract certain concessions from the authorities in Phnom Penh and Hanoi. There simply must be a way of accounting to the donors of those foods and materials that they are being used for the purpose for which they are being provided.

I think we can extract a higher commitment. I don't think it can be done through concession and appeasement or apology.

Second, I have never fully understood, although there are political reasons, why the provision of food and material aid into Cambodia must be through Phnom Penh or Kompong San or from Vietnam.

Most of the rice is purchased in Thailand. It makes a long and circuitous route into Phnom Penh and much of it ends up quite near the Thai border in Sisophon or Battambang or Siem Reap.

The land bridge which was originally proposed by Senator Danforth and others seems to me to continue to make good sense and that instead of having to truck rice from Phnom Penh to Battambang and back, which takes 4 to 6 days, it can be brought directly across the Thai border in areas that would be acceptable to the Heng Samrin and Vietnamese authorities.

RESETTLING IN KAMPUCHEA

Mr. SCHOMER. Thank you.

I would like to simply respond to two points. I was interested in the discussions about a permanent solution as to where to resettle the refugees. I noticed in the discussion no mention made of resettling them in Kampuchea, their home country.

Dr. HARVEY. I did.

Mr. SCHOMER. In the most recent interchange.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I certainly wouldn't want you to get the idea that I have any other thought than that the vast majority of them should go back to their country. We won't solve anything by taking everybody out.

Mr. SCHOMER. OK. Assuming that political problems can be resolved, practical ways to resettle people need to be developed. I see on the one hand a concern for raising the thermostat, creating pressures, mobilizing world indignation, denouncing and hopefully extracting certain concessions. That is one approach.

The approach of those of us who are working in Phnom Penh and within the constraints of that particular set of dynamics is to try to identify wherever we can, practical opportunities to make a small dent in how we can improve the distribution of food and facilitate the job which any government, whatever its political ideology might happen to be, has to undertake to solve the problems of a country as devastated as Cambodia.

One idea which is not fully developed is a regional integrated development program in part of the country, which, should that idea work out more, could be one place where refugees could be resettled.

This requires a lot more work, but this is one option which I think needs to be worked on practically with not only the full participation and consent of the authorities there, but the tactful and technical involvement of those agencies that have experience in resettlement programs.

MORE ACCESS ROUTES

With regard to the question raised by insisting upon a more thorough monitoring of food distribution and pressing for new access routes for international aid, let me mention that there are some new access routes which have been opened up.

I think I mentioned in my statement the fact that a port 6 kilometers to the north of Phnom Penh which can accommodate two small barges at a time has been made available for civilian goods. It used to be only for military purposes.

I understand there are two additional port facilities that are being made available. It is not clear in my mind whether these are Vietnamese port facilities or somewhere else along the river in Kampuchean territory.

I can find out that information when I go in 2 days. These are small access routes. I agree that the economic dimensions of the land bridge idea make a lot of sense.

It would be cheaper for food that is purchased in Thailand to be trucked across to Kampuchea, but we cannot ignore the political reality that it is precisely at that Thai border where what remains of the Pol Pot forces continue to operate.

UPTIGHTNESS IN PHNOM PENH

We cannot underestimate the degree of "uptightness" in Phnom Penh vis-a-vis the Pol Pot forces. The experience of so many people I spoke with, under the years of Pol Pot, has been such a devastating one—they have lost families, friends, relatives, wives, children—that just the thought of aid reaching Pol Pot and enabling him to hang on a little farther is one that throws up a lot of red flags.

This has been, of course, the major source of objection.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Couldn't the responsibility be that trucks are let in and as long as they deliver their load in Phnom Penh, it isn't a matter of being stopped or what have you.

Mr. SCHOMER. The security conditions on the border are unclear.

Mr. PRITCHARD. That is a responsibility of the organizations taking them in.

Mr. SCHOMER. Yes. There have been proposals discussed by a number of agencies, one of which I have heard, would be to have trucks come up to the border and allow Vietnamese or Kampucheans to take over the wheel and drive them in.

I don't know. My own organization has not been involved in these negotiations. This idea continues to be one that the U.S. State Department at least looks upon with sympathy and is trying to push.

I guess all I would say is let's not put all our eggs in one basket. Let's recognize there are political objections to that, which doesn't mean further efforts to find an acceptable way to carry it out shouldn't be pursued. But let's also recognize and work through those access routes that exist.

MONITORING

The other question is about insisting on monitoring, monitoring could be done by the foreign agencies with more staff to get around in order to do it. I have indicated some of the practical difficulties of accommodating more staff in Phnom Penh given the present setup.

On the other hand, more reporting on where food was sent by the government itself, with freedom for agency staff to make random spot checks, is another approach which doesn't necessarily require large numbers of additional staff.

One dimension that we are exploring is the possibility of having more technical staff such as veterinarians, agronomists, and people like that, working in our programs, who, being in various provinces, can at the same time make spot checks of food distribution, even if it is not staff specifically assigned for that purpose.

At the present time all the relief agencies eggs in Phnom Penh are protesting what they feel is more restrictive attitudes on the part of the authorities there. It is a very delicate situation, but I think you should be aware of it.

This is partly due to the fact that there are more and more foreigners now and there is a very limited capacity to cope with all these foreigners, given the manner in which the Phnom Penh authorities want to relate to these foreigners.

So, we try to find those opportunities to monitor where we can, but obviously more needs to be done. My only concern is that when the U.S. Government presses for better monitoring, the relief agencies don't have the practical means to carry out such monitoring, and so such insistence may generate more heat and resentment than more food reaching the needy.

GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS IN DISTRIBUTION

Mr. PRITCHARD. Mr. Schomer, let me ask you a judgmental question.

How anxious are the local officials in Phnom Penh to get this food out to the people?

Mr. SCHOMER. That is a judgmental question. Let me say that the current regime in Phnom Penh is a very diverse one. It is not a monolithic group of people, cut from a Vietnamese mold, all thinking alike.

That government was put together taking anyone educated who had whatever managerial capacity remaining in the country. A the second level of the government bureaucracy, which is where a lot of our day-to-day contacts are established, there are some ver dedicated people trying to do their best to solve the practical problems the country faces.

The top level of leadership I never have much to do with, personally, nor do my staff. But we have found committed and effectiv leadership in the Kampuchean Red Cross, for example. The President of the Kampuchean Red Cross is a lady who has been in tha function since 1958 under a variety of governments.

That particular entity has been very responsible in getting the medical supplies, blankets, and other things we have given, out to the provinces.

In the Agriculture Ministry we have found some very good people. The Vice Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Kong Som Ol, was educated in Iowa, speaks fluent English, is technically quite competent, as best I can judge, and seems quite anxious to get on with the job. We try to work with people like this.

I understand in the Bureau of Fisheries there is very dynamic leadership as well. Several other agencies have found that they have been able to provide boats, fishing nets, and other such things to improve the protein availability through fish, by working with those dynamic ministries where there are good people.

I guess when you ask me how concerned are the authorities, my question is, "Which ones?"

Mr. **Pritchard.** I guess the ones that make the decisions.

Mr. **Schomer.** I am not prepared to make a judgment on that.

DECISIONMAKING IN HANOI

Mr. **Pritchard.** I don't know. In a government like that it is extremely difficult. I think I would want to ask the other two gentlemen for an impression. What is your impression?

Mr. **DeVecchi.** My answer would be probably simplistic, blunt, and slightly impertinent. But in my judgment the decisions as to what happens inside Kampuchea are being made in Hanoi and, as I said in my testimony, I think the welfare of the Kampuchean people has a lower priority in the minds of Hanoi than the well-being of the 200,000 troops in Cambodia and their ultimate goal of pacification of the country.

Mr. **Pritchard.** Do you have anything to add, Doctor?

Dr. **Harvey.** I really wouldn't be able to speak to that from fact. I have a general impression which is the same impression of which Mr. DeVecchi has just spoken, that the Vietnamese are running things.

ORDER OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION

Mr. **Pritchard.** I think the problem in all of this is we want to be helpful. As far as the delivery of food to the people, it gets very difficult to maintain the effort, whether it is Americans or whomever.

Public opinion in the long run does come to bear on policy in this country. Sometimes we think it doesn't, but in the long run it does. There has to be a feeling that what we are getting there is a reasonable amount that is getting to the problem, or people start saying, "Well, we are not doing this because it is not helpful."

Now, I realize that there is what you call the trickle-down theory. It does get out, it does help. Certainly when you take it in by bicycle across the border, the end result is somebody is going to eat that rice.

But it is a hard thing to sell if the rice is going in there. Those 200,000 troops there have to eat rice. Is it our rice that we are sending in or is it the meager rice that is being grown there?

If there is a pecking order, it is hard for me to believe they are not at the top of the list. I suppose that would be true of any country. If they had troops in there, they wouldn't allow the troops to starve even if the people do.

So, this is a very difficult puzzle. In fact, it seems to me that we are just teetering around on the edge of a calamity there that has even greater proportions than we have now and could also spread to where the Thailand Government would be less able to manage it and you would get, I guess, the whole domino theory.

That is what they are concerned about. I think you would like to respond.

Mr. **Schomer.** Yes.

Congressman Pritchard, I appreciate the discussion mentioning the Vietnamese because very often those of us who work in Phnom Penh are rather reluctant to make many statements about the Vietnamese for understandable reasons.

Let me say that the six executive directors of the member agencies of our coalition went to Vietnam from February 25 through March 1 and then came to Kampuchea.

In the course of meetings with a number of high officials in the Vietmanese Government, they came back with the impression that the Vietnamese Government considers the cost to Vietnam of assisting Kampuchea a very high one and that they are anxious to have aid come from all sides to the country to reduce somewhat this cost.

They came back with the impression that the authorities in Vietnam were anxious for the Kampucheans to take more initiative in running their own affairs.

In fact, I believe in recent articles in the New York Times by Henry Kamm, there was reference to some uneasiness felt by the Vietnamese based in Phnom Penh regarding the effectiveness of physicians of the Government in Phnom Penh. According to Henry Kamm, the Vietnamese felt that the creature that they had created—the Heng Samrin regime—was not doing all it could to solve the country's problems.

VIETNAM FEELING SOME HEAT

This is indicative that the Vietnamese were feeling some of the heat generated in the international community about this. Vietnam has in some sense an interest in having the Kampuchean situation resolved in a way such that the country could be self-reliant and not depend on Vietnamese troops being present there or massive imports of food from Vietnam which itself needs food.

So, there is some degree of Vietnamese national interest in having a stable Kampuchea, that is not a threat to its security, and that is less costly to maintain. I think if we recognize this dimension, there is room for some creative diplomacy.

Mr. **Pritchard.** The bottom line is that we have to give some tacit approval to being in there. That, of course, becomes very difficult for this country to do, such as when you said if we recognize them we would be able to deal with them.

I join the people who say, "I don't see how this country would recognize Vietnam as long as they have an invading army in Cambodia." However, it was handling the country.

I think that is just a fact of life. I don't know any way around that. I don't know how the Vietnamese can, in the way they operate, walk out of there now without losing great face and position, but yet they can't seem to stabilize that country.

So, they are in something where in the meantime the people of Cambodia are really losers. How we help in this situation is something that this committee is concerned about. How do we help?

One of the things that would be in everybody's interest is that they give you more freedom so that the world community is more willing to help, because when you have a large number of people on the outside who seriously question whether what we are doing is really helping, then it makes it very questionable how long that help is going to be maintained.

I think that is what we are concerned about. It is not easy.

RECOGNIZING VIETNAM

Mr. **Schomer.** I would like to refer to the fact that we do have some leverage to the extent that both the Vietnamese and the Heng Samrin regime badly want international recognition and, in particular, if it is possible, recognition from the United States.

This is a card which our country has and can play if there is the political will to attach the right kinds of conditions to the playing of that card.

It seems one of the critical decisions that will need to be taken in September is to decide who will represent Kampuchea in the U.N. There is a lot of bad feeling among the people of the Heng Samrin government, obviously, for the vote of the United States in the U.N. last September, a feeling that if at least Pol Pot could be derecognized in September that would be a step forward.

Your committee would have something to say on what position the United States takes at that time, but it seems that the taking of that position is not simply a technical decision based on recommendations of a credentials committee in the U.N., but something that can have a direct impact on to what extent we will be able to work more freely in Kampuchea.

ASEAN WISHES

Mr. **Pritchard.** You know, in that recognition, a great deal of weight was given to the position of the ASEAN countries. They were attempting to maintain a policy, which is that the borders should be maintained and that irrespective of who is running that country, an outside force can't come in.

We went with the ASEAN countries. I would be surprised if we didn't stay with the ASEAN countries, who are our close allies and for whom we have great feeling.

Obviously, it would be nice if there was some other group that could be put together. I don't see how that can be done.

There are many of us who feel very uncomfortable because following the ASEAN nations put us in the position of being with Pol Pot. That is a bad bunch, no matter how you slice it.

CONTINUING HUMANITARIAN AID

Gentlemen, what you have given us is valuable for the committee, and this is probably not going to go away. We can hope that it won't get worse. We like to think it will get better.

Some of us would almost settle to just keep it even right now because it is probably getting worse. We appreciate the efforts of you people. I would say to you, Doctor, I am sure your life is richer for the experience.

Dr. HARVEY. You are right.

Mr. PRITCHARD. But it isn't something you would want to do day after day.

Dr. HARVEY. It is a sad situation, but we really gained spiritually from it.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I have been in the camps twice, went into all the camps last time, even down into Indonesia. Of course, those areas there, we have taken over a lot of the burden and that has helped greatly in the political end. Indonesia, Malaysia, even Hong Kong. That is getting better, but the border area seems to be getting worse.

Dr. HARVEY. We are morally obligated, however, to continue to bear that burden.

Mr. PRITCHARD. That is correct.

This committee feels strongly. The thing you do find, which kind of makes you feel good about your country, is that we have lots of people who are willing to go over there and participate and work.

That is what is so sad about this. When the country was so anxious to help, it seemed like every roadblock was put in the way, and that is hard for Americans to understand.

Do you have anything else? Thank you, gentlemen. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.]

1980—THE TRAGEDY IN INDOCHINA CONTINUES: WAR, REFUGEES, AND FAMINE

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1980

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 3:08 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester L. Wolff (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. **Hall** [presiding]. On behalf of the Asian-Pacific Subcommittee, I will call the meeting to order. We are waiting for the chairman to come in, momentarily, but until he does, I have been asked to give his opening statement.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for attending today's hearing on the future of the Indochinese refugee program and the international Cambodian famine relief report.

Last Thursday, we began our 1980 series on the tragedy in Indochina and heard testimony from various voluntary agencies concerning the current problems in the field. Today, we will hear from administration witnesses.

In 1979, the subcommittee held a total of 12 hearings and briefings on the immediate crisis. That year was marked by some eventful action by the international community, particularly the Geneva Conference.

Not only did the Geneva Conference help focus world attention on the crisis, but it brought additional pledges of money and resettlement slots from more than 25 nations. Significantly, some cooperation from the Vietnamese was also secured to halt the departures of boat people.

When the call for international support of the Cambodian famine relief effort was made, the international community responded at once with pledges for food and medical relief.

NEW CHALLENGES

Today, we face some new challenges. The commitment to solving the continuing crisis by the United States has been outstanding. However, in light of our own budgetary problems, our financial commitment has been increasingly questioned by the international community and the Thai Government.

Questions concerning adequate distribution of food and medicine to the Cambodian people have reduced the amount of money raised at the last donor meeting in New York. Later this month, another conference is scheduled to raise money for the international relief effort. Its success is imperative to the survival of the Cambodian race.

Thus, despite the best efforts of the international community over the past year, the Khmer people still face the continued threat of mass starvation. And, the monsoon season threatens to destroy the camps along the Thai-Kampuchea border. While preparations for new camps and relocating refugees are being made, I think we will agree that these plans should have been put into action months ago.

MAJOR CONCERNS

I should also mention some concerns which were brought to the attention of the subcommittee at Thursday's hearing.

We heard reports of a huge black market and camps being attacked by guerrilla soldiers which add to the instability of the Thai border area.

The Thai authorities are reportedly becoming more impatient with the present situation, not only because of the real possibility of another "Gaza Strip," but also because their own medical treatment capabilities do not match those being administered by international medical teams to the refugees.

In Kamput, it has been reported that the Thai authorities have ordered all newly married women to be injected with a long-acting contraceptive drug which has not yet been approved for general use in this country and has not been proven safe. Of particular concern, this birth control program is apparently administered regardless of the wishes of the individual.

With these tragic stories and more that have yet to be told, what can we do? What solutions can we offer the world community and the international agencies involved in the famine relief effort to prevent the same tragedies from occurring next year and to relieve the danger which exists today?

We welcome our witnesses today, Hon. Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Hon. Victor Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.

If you would both summarize your statements, without objection, your entire statement will be included in the record, and we are very happy to have you here.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you very much. Ambassador Palmieri is still at the White House and is on his way here and will join us as soon as he can.

I am joined on my right by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, John D. Negroponte, who, I hope, will be able to assist me in answering questions; and on my left is Tom Barnes, the head of the Interagency Working Group on Kampuchea.

I am delighted to appear before this committee, which I think has in the last year, through its public testimony, contributed enormously to the public understanding and appreciation of the tragedy that has been unfolding in Southeast Asia.

I would propose to speak only briefly this afternoon. Let me first turn to the question you raised in the opening statement about a possible cutback in the numbers. As we have said, we view the efforts we are making on refugee resettlement as a vital expression of our concern and support for the nations in the region. The Southeast Asian nations perceive it that way.

I believe that any cut in this or the next fiscal year in the numbers would be a very significant step backward in terms of our commitments to the region and would do great harm to our policy objectives. We would be offering ammunition to those abroad who counsel that U.S. commitments in Asia are waning and that U.S. promises will not be kept. If we diminish the number, we tarnish our image as a nation committed to the resettlement of those who seek refuge from tyrannical and arbitrary systems of government.

Mr. PALMIERI. Excuse me for being late. We had a few other people knocking on our door, seeing if they could get in. Some of them weren't even knocking.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. We would be discouraging the host countries now granting first asylum from continuing that humanitarian policy. The nations in the region themselves simply could not provide for massive Indochina resettlement, and without significant opportunities they would be forced to turn refugees away.

I want to stress that any change in U.S. support for refugees will have an effect and, in fact, I believe a multiplier effect on the efforts of others, and when we doubled our refugee admission levels last July, it was an incentive for massive international increase in both resettlement numbers and money.

The effect on the Vietnamese of any reduction will also be very damaging.

Finally, in human terms we would create massive disheartening and discomfort in the camps and appear, in my view, to be moving away from an American commitment to basic principles which I think underlie our Nation.

We are not insensitive, Mr. Chairman, to the need to trim programs to cope with the problems the economy now faces. But I do believe that the consequences of curtailing this effort would be far worse than continuing to bear the costs, although those costs are genuinely heavy in the next fiscal year.

HUMANITARIAN CONFERENCE

Recently, as you know, the Thai Government has called for a humanitarian conference similar to the one held last July, to deal with refugees. This is a call which the United States has strongly supported. The ECOSOC, the United Nations Economic and Social Council, has voted by a vote of about 41 to 4 to support such a conference. We are currently in intensive discussions inside the U.S. Government, with other countries and with the United Nations Secretariat for the date of such a conference. I would hope it would take place within the next 7 weeks, and that the U.S. representation would be at an appropriate high level.

Mr. Chairman, I will just conclude briefly by commenting on your report about the use of contraceptives in the Kamput camp. To the best of our knowledge, and according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Bangkok, a contraceptive called Depo-provera, was used on some eight women involuntarily in the Kamput camp and administered by the Royal Thai Marine

Medical Team. We have reports on its use in no other camp at this point.

The team responsible was replaced over 1 month ago at the insistence of the UNHCR. The Thai local authorities have long used this contraceptive and do not differentiate between what is available and given to the Thais in the region and what is given to the Khmers.

The drug is not approved for use in this country yet, but WHO has approved it for use, as have the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the UNFPA.

The drug is, as I understand it, good for about a 6-month period, I want to make clear that nothing about this incident involves support or implicit approval by the United States.

That concludes my brief opening remarks. I would be happy to respond to your questions now or at the end of Ambassador Palmieri's statement.

[Mr. Holbrooke's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this Committee again and to join with Ambassador Palmieri, the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, in discussing our commitments to the international relief effort for the devastated nation of Cambodia and our continuing program to support the resettlement in this country of significant numbers of Indochina refugees.

I propose to outline the current military situation in Indochina, describe the impact that the continuing war in Cambodia is having on the region, and set out the actions and policies we and our friends in East Asia and the international community are following to try to deal with the crisis as part of the essential backdrop for our policies in these areas.

Ambassador Palmieri, will be discussing the specifics of the refugee and relief issues involved. Although we discuss these issues separately, they are obviously closely intervined and, as you have noted in your request for this hearing, budgetary changes in our programs could have wide international implications.

Conflict in Cambodia

The conflict in Cambodia continues; Hanoi now maintain 180-200,000 soldiers in Cambodia, 50-70,000 of whom operate along the Thai-Cambodia border.

Over the last several months of the so-called dry season, an intensification of small-scale Vietnamese military sweep operations occurred throughout the country. Action was focussed, however, primarily in western Cambodia near the Thai-Cambodia border, where the largest resistance forces are concentrated.

In these same areas, hundreds of thousands of Khmer refugees have gathered to seek food and medicine and to avoid the fighting. If Vietnamese military operations were to strike at, or even brush against, these refugee concentrations along the border either intentionally or inadvertently they could force tens of thousands of Khmer to flee into Thailand. Such an event would add further to the desperate plight of these people. Moreover, it would test the resources and capabilities of Thailand--a nation whose people deserve great credit for their humanitarian response to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have already arrived on their border--as well as those of the international community as a whole.

We do not have a clear picture of the situation inside Cambodia. Historically, there has been great antagonism between the Khmer and Vietnamese peoples, an antagonism exceeded in its intensity perhaps only by the Khmer people's fear and hatred of the rule of Pol Pot. We know that small-scale, scattered military resistance to the Vietnamese occupation exists throughout much of the country; there are occasional clashes. Most visitors to Cambodia report a pervasive sense of insecurity and a lack of firm military control outside the major towns.

The limited nature of the Vietnamese military drive in western Cambodia and the tenacity and commitment of the Khmer Rouge soldiers indicate that the Khmer Rouge will survive the dry season as a viable fighting force. It appears likely to emerge with roughly 20,000-30,000 troops able to operate effectively in western Cambodia and to a lesser extent, throughout the country.

The failure of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia to engage and reduce significantly Khmer Rouge forces during the current dry season, the hemorrhage of high-ranking Heng Samrin officials who seek refugee in Thailand from Vietnamese domination, and the continuing clashes and insecurity throughout the country ensure during this dry season that Hanoi will be unable to establish full control throughout Cambodia. At this point Vietnam is faced with either a humiliating withdrawal from Cambodia or, in order to maintain control, the maintenance of a large garrison force of soldiers and administrators in Cambodia for an indefinite period. We have seen no lack of resolve from Hanoi in its quest for military conquest and domination of Cambodia. Consequently, we foresee no immediate drawdowns of Vietnamese forces there, which would effectively mean the abandonment of their puppet Heng Samrin to the hands of the resistance. Nor do we see any conscientious effort to seek compromise and negotiated settlement with the nations of the region to find an internationally acceptable solution to the Khmer problem.

China-Vietnam Confrontation

The situation in Cambodia has spawned a larger confrontation between China and Vietnam which remains tense.

In March the Chinese terminated the second round of Vietnamese-Chinese negotiations in Beijing, proposing that talks resume in the second half of 1980. The Vietnamese responded with sharp criticism, but suggested that the talks resume in Hanoi on July 15. There are no assurances that this will be agreed to and certainly no guarantee that anything will transpire to lessen the tensions.

The two rounds of talks have failed thus far to move the two sides toward any sort of accommodation. Vietnam has stressed limited measures to stabilize the border, mutual withdrawal of forces from the border region, creation of a demilitarized zone, and prisoner exchanges, while making only passing reference to the broader range of SRV-PRC relations. Of these only the prisoner exchange has been concluded. The Chinese, for their part, have insisted that "crucial and fundamental problems" such as Vietnam's ties to the Soviet Union, Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and Laos, and conflicting claims in the Parcels and Spratlys will have to be resolved before relations can be improved.

The underlying differences in the two positions appear to offer little hope for rapid resolution. Over the near term, at least, Sino-Vietnamese relations will continue to be characterized by acrimony and distrust.

To launch its attack in February last year, China positioned roughly 500,000 troops along its border with Vietnam; currently we believe there are less than half that number stationed along this border. Vietnam, on the other hand, has considerably strengthened its forces in the border region, roughly doubling the 100,000 it had prior to the Chinese attack last February. Thanks to Soviet assistance, Vietnam has also significantly strengthened the firepower of its forces as well.

Impact of the Conflict

Obviously two of the main ramifications of the conflict have been in the refugee and relief fields, which Ambassador Palmieri will be addressing in specific terms.

Let me state here that the response of the American people and Government to the needs of the refugees expelled from Vietnam, to the pressures such huge numbers of refugees placed on the countries of first asylum, and to the basic human needs of the starving hundreds of thousands of Khmer has reflected the highest values and traditions of our nation. Our efforts in these fields have been recognized by the countries of Southeast Asia as among our most important contributions in East Asia. We can take pride in what we have done, while recognizing that there is much left to be done.

Relief

In addition to acknowledging the contributions of this Congress, the Administration and the American people, we owe a particular debt of gratitude to the magnanimous gesture of the people of Thailand and the Government of former Prime Minister Kriangsak. At a time when thousands of Khmer lay dying at the Thai-Cambodia border, the Thai and their Government offered them food and temporary refuge until they could return home. The new Thai Government under General Prem has maintained this policy despite some criticism, even from leaders in his own Government. We believe he will continue to maintain this temporary refuge.

But, as the questions posed by this Committee indicate, the number of people seeking safety outside Cambodia has not diminished and the costs of relief have been enormous, both for the international community and for the United States at this time of severe budgetary pressures. A further buildup of refugees without adequate international support could create complications for the Government of General Prem.

But, so long as the international community continues to demonstrate its humanitarian concerns to support these displaced Khmer and, along with the Thai and others, works to create conditions for their eventual return to their homeland, we will not see the extinction of the Khmer race. Thus, there is no question in my mind, that the relief effort must continue, not only to save the Khmer people, but also to protect the stability of Thailand.

This does not mean that we must blindly provide assistance or that we should not insist on criteria being met or guidelines being set to measure progress of the international assistance programs. Most importantly, it means that public attention throughout the world must be focussed on the effectiveness of the relief effort and the degree of cooperation it is receiving from the authorities in Hanoi and Phnom Penh, which directly control the life and death of the Khmer people.

We are aware that a debate continues about the relief effort and its effectiveness and the question of stockpiling; these will be addressed by Ambassador Palmieri. Let met say frankly that our information is less than complete, but the evidence does indicate significant stockpiling, albeit more recently in provincial capitals rather than just in Phnom Penh and Kompong Som. An undetermined amount of food has not yet reached the people for whom it was intended and much of what is being distributed provides sustenance for those most directly associated with the Phnom Penh regime. This must be improved and we will continue to press for improvement as we have done in meetings with other donors and the relief agencies in New York these past few months. Nonetheless, the relief efforts must continue;

there is no humane alternative to this program.

There are other victims in East Asia today, and one of the major victims of Hanoi's aggression in Cambodia is the Vietnamese people themselves.

Vietnam

The diversion of economic resources from development to military aggression against a neighbor, the termination or reduction of foreign aid programs, the reconversion of army units which had been shifted to economic reconstruction back to regular military service, the requirement for the average young male Vietnamese to continue to fight and die after four decades of fighting and dying, has produced economic stagnation and popular malaise throughout Vietnam.

We do not see any signs that such difficulties are yet causing a rethinking of Hanoi's course in Cambodia. Hanoi continues to refer to the situation in Cambodia as "irreversible;" there has been no letup in Vietnam's military commitment or any suggestion of interest in a political settlement.

Nevertheless, the current economic difficulties and the popular unease must continue to weigh on Hanoi's mind. Recent changes in the Hanoi leadership, in which Interior Minister Tran Quoc Hoan and State Planning Commission Chairman Le Thanh Nghi were both replaced, suggest that Hanoi is seeking scapegoats for these pressures. Hanoi may eventually come to realize that the interests of its own people can best be served by focusing the energies of the Vietnamese nation on its own development.

The Indochina Refugee Issue

The clearest indication of the bankruptcy of the policies that Hanoi is following is the large number of people who continue to seek the opportunity to leave Vietnam and the other Indochina nations where Vietnamese policies are being implemented. The problem of Indochinese refugees fleeing from Vietnam and Laos by land and by sea remains a substantial problem for the region as well. Again Ambassador Palmieri will discuss the specifics of the refugee flow, but let me assure the Congress, and this Committee in particular, that the international commitment we bolster for the resettlement of Indochinese refugees who have reached temporary asylum in the region is one of the most dramatic and meaningful demonstrations of our support for the nations there. This Committee and its Chairman have played a key role in support of this policy and it deserves great credit for it.

The Committee has properly raised the question of what effect the budgetary review process might have on our ability to sustain the high level of movement of refugees from Southeast Asia. We believe, as we stated above, that it is essential that we not step back from our present level of commitments for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the hardships and death that this would inflict on those seeking to find temporary safety in the region. First asylum is directly or implicitly dependent on steadily declining camp populations. Even though the rates of exit from the camps have been above the arrivals for the past few months, there are still more refugees in camps in Southeast Asia today than there were a year ago. In that time, the resettlement countries have taken in over 230,000 people. The exodus has been on the rise in recent weeks because of favorable weather and the existence of a new route to freedom for Vietnamese across Kampuchea.

Refugees from Laos--both Hmong and Lao--have also been increasing in recent months. This increase may in part be due to the drought conditions, which once again are affecting crop production in the country. It is certainly related to the military campaign being waged against Hmong tribespeople and the communist economic policies of the Vientiane authorities.

There are other factors in our political life in Southeast Asia which would be harmfully affected by any change in our refugee admission numbers. A major reduction in refugee numbers could signal to the Vietnamese that we take the boat refugee moratorium for granted; this could destroy any hope for the orderly departure program and block thousands of family reunifications. Such a resumption would also complicate our relations with the nations of the region, and their own bilateral relations with each other.

Slowing down departures would also mean longer periods of time in the camps in Southeast Asia for those already there and contribute to a "Palestinian" situation. That would be intolerable for both the refugees and for the asylum countries.

Furthermore, camp populations have gone down because the initiative we took in 1979 to increase our refugee intake to 14,000 per month was used as a linchpin for obtaining additional resettlement commitments from some nations and for increased financial contributions from others. Our backing away from these levels at this time, will have an equally negative effect on the other donor and resettlement countries.

We must continue to assist the nations of first asylum--Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Crown Colony of Hong Kong--in dealing with the refugee flood, or some of them may find themselves cracking under the pressures and resorting to draconian measures to deal with the refugees.

Therefore, despite our budgetary problems, it remains vital to our national and our humanitarian concerns to sustain this resettlement commitment to the region.

The Soviets and Vietnam

As is true in certain other regions of the world, the Soviet Union must bear a major part of the responsibility for the human suffering and the increased instability in the region.

The Soviet Union is providing Vietnam essential support for its military activities in Cambodia. Soviet shipments of military equipment to Vietnam more than quadrupled from 1978 to 1979. Soviet support, which costs the Soviets close to three million dollars a day, has included some new sophisticated military equipment, but consists primarily of replacement and resupply for existing weapons, as well as POL and food. Soviet technicians and dock workers have played a key role in the functioning of Haiphong, Vietnam's major port. The Soviets have placed twelve AN-12 transport planes, with Soviet crews, in Hanoi's service. These planes fly extensively between Ho Chi Minh City and western Cambodia bringing in military supplies essential to Vietnam's military activities there.

Without such Soviet support, the Vietnamese would be unable to maintain their effort in Cambodia at anything like its current level.

As a result of their support for the Vietnamese the Soviets have gained access to naval and air facilities in Vietnam. Soviet ships and submarines call at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet long-range aircraft operate out of Danang on an increasingly regular basic. In March a Soviet frigate made a precedent-setting call at the Khmer port of Kompong Som, thus projecting a Soviet naval presence further into Southeast Asia. Through their increased access to these facilities, the Soviets have significantly enhanced their military capabilities, not only in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, but also in the Indian Ocean.

Soviet activities, such as the recent concentration of over ten ships in the South China Sea off Vietnam, introduce a new destabilizing element into Southeast Asia, a region whose nations wish to exclude big-power rivalries and to create a stable system of independent nation states in which all nations could concentrate their energies and resources on nation-building and economic development.

Vietnam's close alignment with the Soviet Union has also served increasingly to isolate Vietnam in the region, in the non-aligned movement, and in the international community generally. The 91-21 vote on the UNGA Resolution concerning the "Situation in Cambodia" last November testifies to Hanoi's isolation. In time such isolation may help bring Vietnam to reconsider the price it is having to pay in terms of its oft-proclaimed dedication to its independence and sovereignty, as well as in terms of its relations with its neighbors, the non-aligned community, and with the rest of the world. That price is felt by the Vietnamese people who see their own hopes for peace and progress mortgaged to Moscow to sustain military objectives which are increasingly costly in real and human terms.

Moscow too has its responsibilities in this equation; the Soviets could make an important contribution to ending the tragedy in Cambodia. The simplest way would be to cut back on the financial and military support which they provide to Hanoi. By their actions, the Soviets are prolonging the conflict and assisting in the demise of the Khmer people. If they wish to follow a constructive policy in Southeast Asia, the Soviets could play an important role in overcoming the current deadlock on political settlement. So far they have refused even to discuss the matter, reiterating Hanoi's statements that the situation is "irreversible." They should reconsider their position in light of Vietnam's inability to bring the fighting in Cambodia to a close in a manner which ratifies the Vietnamese puppet regime's control.

U.S.-Vietnamese Relations

Another reflection of the isolation which Vietnam has created for itself is that movement toward normalization of relations between Vietnam and the United States remains suspended.

Vietnam is the third-most-populous Communist nation and maintains one of the world's largest military establishments. As recent events in Southeast Asia have all too well demonstrated, Vietnamese actions impact directly on the U.S.

We want to be in the best possible position to exert a positive influence on Vietnamese policies and actions. In particular we want to encourage the Vietnamese to act on their pledge to provide the fullest possible accounting of missing U.S. personnel, to implement an Orderly Departure Program to help resolve refugee and family reunification issues, and to move toward the observance of internationally accepted standards of human rights.

At the beginning of this Administration we made clear that in order to put the hostility of the past behind us and to enhance the peace and stability of Southeast Asia, we were ready to normalize our relations with Vietnam. That remains our objective.

From the first meeting in May 1977, we stressed to the Vietnamese that we could not agree to economic aid as a precondition to normalization and that progress toward normalization would inevitably be affected by Hanoi's policies toward its neighbors.

Vietnam's insistence that we agree to provide direct economic assistance as part of any agreement to establish relations blocked progress for a year and a half. In the fall of 1978 Hanoi stated that it would no longer demand a U.S. commitment to bilateral economic assistance as a quid pro quo for normalization and that it would continue its efforts to provide an MIA accounting.

These statements were followed, however, by the massive forced expulsion of the boat people and the December Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

In these circumstances, we halted further movement toward U.S.-Vietnamese normalization as not being appropriate or conducive to regional stability at this time.

While normal situation between our two countries remains our ultimate objective, we cannot move in this direction under current circumstances. The Vietnamese are well aware of our views. We have periodic talks with them on such issues as MIAs, refugees, and the famine and the conflict in Kampuchea to ensure that they fully understand our views and in the hope of moving them to more responsible courses of action. We will continue these contacts and keep Congress fully informed.

Dealing with the Crisis

To recapitulate American objectives in Indochina:

First, an end to the human tragedy and suffering of the Kampuchean people;

Second, a sharp reduction and eventful elimination of the Soviet military role in Vietnam. This will be difficult to achieve and may take a long time, but it is an important goal toward which we must work;

Third, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and an end to the pressure the Vietnamese are now exerting on Thailand;

Fourth, the replacement of the puppet regime of Heng Samrin with a nonaligned government responsive to the will of the Kampuchean people and at peace with its neighbors. Who should be its leader is not for the United States to say. We back no group or people. It goes without saying that neither we nor the people of Kampuchea would favor the return of Pol Pot and his colleagues.

Fifth, the creation of a stable system of independent nation states in the region where all nations can have the opportunity to interact to contribute to the solving of regional problems for mutual benefit.

We have worked closely with our friends and allies to meet the dangers and difficulties posed by Vietnamese and Soviet policies in Indochina and to create the conditions whereby we can achieve our mutual goals.

Reviewing these actions I would note:

-- In response to the pressures and tensions in the region created by the overwhelming number of Vietnamese refugees pouring into the countries of first asylum in the region, last July we doubled our intake of refugees for resettlement in the U.S. to 14,000 a month. Our move stimulated a broad international response, and has significantly eased the tension in the region.

-- We continue to urge the Vietnamese to treat their own people humanely so that they no longer feel compelled to flee, and to stress to the Vietnamese the importance of the maintenance of the moratorium on the government-sponsored mass illegal exodus. We have made every effort, working through the UNHCR, to establish an orderly departure program out of Vietnam which will allow the Vietnamese with ties to the U.S. to leave.

-- Faced with the threat to Thai security posed by Vietnamese military activities along the Thai-Cambodia border, we have expedited deliveries of previously ordered military equipment to Thailand and, with the cooperation of this Committee, increased our FMS credits to the Thai as well.

-- We have publicly stressed the importance we place on Thailand's security and territorial integrity, and noted the continued relevance of the Manila Pact, most recently in the March ANZUS communique.

-- We have contributed over $80 million to the international relief effort to respond to the desperate famine in Cambodia. We are working with international agencies and other countries to pressure the Vietnamese to permit wider distribution of food within Cambodia and greater international access to the country. We are consulting closely also on how to respond to the continuing requirement for large amounts of food and medicine in order to keep the Khmer people alive; the next meeting will be in New York only two weeks from now.

In addition to dealing with these symptoms, we have also sought to deal with the root political causes.

In November last year the United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 91-21, approved a resolution proposed by the five ASEAN and 26 other non-aligned nations on the "Situation in Cambodia."

This resolution:

-- appealed for humanitarian relief to the civilian population of Cambodia;

-- urged all parties to the conflict to facilitate humanitarian relief efforts;

-- called on all parties to observe fundamental principles of human rights;

-- called for a cessation of hostilities and the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia;

-- appealed to all states to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of Cambodia;

-- resolved that the people of Cambodia be enabled to choose democratically their own government without outside interference, subversion, or coercion; and

-- requested that the Secretary General explore the possibility of an international conference on Cambodia.

In addition to the concerns reflected in our refugee policy and relief effort, we have steadfastly supported ASEAN in the face of the insecurity and tension stemming from the Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia and the threat to the region posed by the expanding Soviet access to the region.

In response to these concerns, we have fully endorsed the ASEAN UNGA resolution as providing a base for progress toward peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

The Thai Government has now suggested that a meeting be convened in May to consider the humanitarian situation in Cambodia. Such a conference, in our judgment, is urgently needed. It should include all the parties involved with the problem. We will be urging other nations to join in this effort.

Even as the world grapples with pressing crises elsewhere, we must summon greater international attention to this problem. Its need is justified by the uniqueness of the situation; an entire nation and its people remain threatened with destruction. Without Khmer, there will be no Cambodia. Even in these difficult times, there is no other nation facing extinction. Thus, we must deal with the urgent problem of feeding and supporting the Khmer refugees in Thailand, ensure safehaven for those Khmer civilians who have concentrated close to the Thai border, and address the need for the international relief effort to rebuild Cambodia's agricultural base.

Separately, we and our friends and allies have worked unceasingly to promote a resolution to the crises. In February I visited all the ASEAN capitals and conferred with their leaders. We met with our ANZUS partners here in Washington at the end of February. Australian Prime Minister Fraser, Japanese Foreign Minister Okita and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang have all visited Washington in the past several weeks, as has Prince Sihanouk. I recently met with

President Marcos during his visit to Honolulu. These meetings, which have covered a wide diversity of issues, have also provided the opportunity for intense exchanges of views on the situation in Indochina.

Others have been active as well. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers recently met with the Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community; they reviewed the threat to the peace posed by both Vietnamese/Soviet actions in Cambodia and Soviet aggression against Afghanistan and called for early implementation of the ASEAN UNGA Resolution on Cambodia. The ASEAN leaders have also been traveling to meet with each other and presently await visits from Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach.

We have explored with all how we might proceed toward a political settlement which at a minimum would promote the key goals of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, the emergence of a genuinely independent and neutral Cambodia at peace with its neighbors and with a government which represents its people and respects their rights, and the return to regional stability and balance by the elimination of the Soviet military intrusion in the region.

Although none of the active participants in the fighting yet seem interested in a peaceful settlement of the issues, we will continue to see what role we can play in the promotion of a peaceful and stable Cambodia. Meanwhile, we believe it is vital to persist in our response to the humanitarian needs of the region to the best of our means and abilities--knowing as we all do that the ultimate resolution of the painful and tragic situation however distant, can only come as a result of the mutual efforts of all concerned.

Mr. HALL. Do you have a time problem, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Since I am due at the White House at 4 o'clock, I would appreciate it if I could be excused in time to make that meeting, and if Mr. Negroponte could continue to answer questions beyond that time, as you see fit.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Ambassador, how long is your statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. VICTOR H. PALMIERI, U.S. COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. PALMIERI. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement for the record, and in the interest of the committee's time and in light of the fact that Mr. Holbrooke's statement covers much of the substance of the refugee situation, which he has generously and expertly commented upon, I think I should just be available for your questions.

Mr. HALL. Without objection, the Ambassador's statement will be part of the record.

[Mr. Palmieri's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. VICTOR H. PALMIERI, U.S. COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee and participate with Assistant Secretary Holbrooke in discussing the humanitarian implications of recent political and military developments in Southeast Asia. You have shown consistent concern and support for our Indochinese refugee and relief programs. We welcome this hearing and look forward to working with you as we review our commitments to the international community, and particularly to the beleaguered Southeast Asian nations of first asylum, as part of our effort to improve this grave humanitarian situation.

Mr. Chairman, your letter to me of April 9 raised a number of questions about the U.S. role in Indochinese refugee resettlement and in the Kampuchean relief effort. These are important points, and at the risk of repeating some of what Dick Holbrooke has already covered, I would like to review your questions. Your concern seems to be that we may reduce our commitment and funding for humanitarian assistance in Southeast Asia. Let me assure you that we have no intention of lessening our support for international relief programs in this area. The events of the last nine months are evidence of the effectiveness of international support, particularly with respect to the Indochinese refugee program. The results of the Kampuchean relief efforts have admittedly been mixed, but the bottom line is that internationally donated relief supplies have contributed to staving off, at least temporarily, the massive famine which threatens that community. As you correctly pointed out in your letter, the key here remains the need to ensure that food and seed rice are delivered to needy Khmer in time to prevent further starvation, the need to restore agricultural self-sufficiency to Kampuchea, and the need to strengthen the monitoring system to this end.

STATUS AND FUTURE OF RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

Let me answer your questions about the status and future of the Indochinese resettlement program.

As you know, last June President Carter pledged to double the rate of Indochinese resettlement from 7,000 to 14,000 refugees a month. We made that commitment in response to the plight of those forced to flee the countries of Indochina, as well as in response to the pleas for support from the Southeast Asian countries inundated by mounting waves of refugees. Our intent was also to encourage other countries to make similar commitments to relieve the human suffering and pressures on the first-asylum countries. The lead we took gave momentum to the search for an international solution, and we cannot afford to slacken our efforts as long as the problem persists.

Our humanitarian commitment undoubtedly helped make the Geneva meeting on Indochinese refugees called by UN Secretary General Waldheim in July extremely productive, both in the short and long term. Stimulated by our offer to double Indochinese resettlement, other countries responded generously, and resettlement offers more than doubled from 130,000 to almost 290,000. The meeting also produced some $160 million in new financial commitments to the UN High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR). Of particular significance was Japan's pledge to contribute percent of the UNHCR budget for the 1979 Indochina program. Japan will m that level again this year. Equally important, the Government of the Socia Republic of Vietnam (SRV) informed Secretary General Waldheim that it wo stem what it called "illegal departures" from Vietnam for a "reasonable perio time."

This "moratorium" on assisted departures, which is still in effect, resulted i dramatic drop in boat arrivals in first-asylum countries since last summer. Af leveling off at about 2,000 to 3,000 a month between August and February, the b flow rose to about 5,000 in March and to 6,000 in April with the advent of bet weather and sailing conditions. During the same period, land arrivals from Laos a Vietnam have averaged about 7,000 a month. Interviews with new boat arriv indicate that although there is some local corruption and official connivance, c rent departures are almost entirely clandestine escapes by ethnic Vietnamese, contrast to the high proportion of "assisted departures" of ethnic Chinese before t Geneva conference.

The combination of lower arrivals and increased departures for resettlement third countries has produced a net decrease in camp populations of 140,000 in t nine months or so since Geneva, from a high of almost 370,000 to about 230,000 the beginning of May. The offtake of 20,000 to 25,000 refugees a month for resett ment has had the important effect of reassuring the first-asylum countries international support, encouraging them to grant asylum to new arrivals, a permitting improvement of conditions in the camps.

FUTURE UNCLEAR

But the troubling fact is that the future of this situation remains unclear. W know that there are boats available for refugee use. To date, occasional reports th the Vietnamese are about to resume assisted departures have not proved accurat but there are still large numbers of people anxious to leave the country. Th authorities would probably welcome the departure of many of them, and some these people desperate to leave will continue to try to escape by boat. Recently som have found their way across Kampuchea to Thailand by bribing rides on truck bullock carts, and bicycles.

We would hope that those who wish to leave Vietnam would be able to depart i an orderly fashion, without risking their lives, under the program negotiated with the SRV by the UNHCR in May of last year. So far, this Orderly Departure Program has not produced the desired results. Through the UNHCR, we have repeatedly worked to reach agreement with the Vietnamese on procedures and candidates for the program, but Hanoi has been unwilling to implement the agreed procedures. The major point on which we have not been willing to compromise i that persons destined for the United States must meet admissions criteria similar t those estalished for higher category Indochinese refugees in the refugee program Now that we have finally agreed on a list of over 1,000 names, in addition to proposing an additional 10,000 names from our own files, we hope that the program may get under-way at last. The President has determined, following our consultations with the Committees on the Judiciary last month, that the prospective beneficiaries of the Orderly Departure Program meet the definition of refugee under the new law. Therefore those leaving Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Program will be counted against our quota of 14,000 Indochinese admissions a month.

Despite the continuing decline in camp populations in Southeast Asia, we have no plans to reduce our monthly intake of Indochinese this year or in fiscal year 1981. There are still 230,000 refugees in camps throughout the region—many of whom have been awaiting resettlement offers for five years, and almost none of whom can expect to be absorbed by the first-asylum countries where they are languishing. As we noted earlier, the combined boat and land refugee arrival rate has climbed to an average of over 12,000 a month during this year, and there is no way of knowing how much higher it will go, even if there is significant progress on the Orderly Departure Program. The presence of the large numbers of refugees and the persistent refugee flow by land and boat remain a source of great concern and instability in the region.

CONSEQUENCE OF U.S. REDUCTION

Any significant reduction in the U.S. program would have serious consequences for our relations with the first-asylum countries, as well as for the refugees. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand would all view a cutback as a breach of our repeated assurances of support, and they might feel that there is no recourse but to refuse asylum to new arrivals, as they did last spring.

We would be particularly concerned about the possible effect of such a reduction on Thailand, whose new government is trying valiantly to cope with the largest refugee population in Southeast Asia. Despite occasional news stories to the contrary, the Thai authorities have indicated publicly and privately to us that they will continue their humanitarian policies toward Indochinese refugees. They have, however, linked their refugee policy to support from the international community for relief and resettlement. The Thai feel that they have already shouldered great social and economic burdens, especially along the Kampuchean border where tens of thousands of Thai villagers have had to abandon their homes to make way for large concentrations of Khmer displaced by famine and warfare. Any lessening of international, and particularly United States support could have an adverse effect on the on-going debate in Thailand on the official refugee policy and possible negative consequences for any new influx of Khmer refugees, as well as harmful repercussions in other countries of first asylum.

UNITED STATES CONTINUES LEADING ROLE

I also want to indicate again that the United States has taken a leading role within the international community in offering resettlement to these unfortunate people. This has had a positive effect in eliciting similar offers from over 25 other countries. I would fear that a reduction in the level of our resettlement effort would suggest a lessening of effort needed by all those concerned nations. Given the sensitivity of the first-asylum countries, the difficulty of predicting refugee flows, the volatile nature of the situation in Indochina, and our particular role in the international community, we believe it would be a serious mistake to plan now for a reduction in our resettlement rate in the coming year. As you know, however, the actual level of refugee admissions for fiscal year 1981 will be determined by the President after appropriate consultations in September with the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, as required by the Refugee Act of 1980. Our recommendations to the President on fiscal year 1981 admissions levels will take into consideration developments in Southeast Asia in the interim, but we anticipate that we will maintain 14,000 for the next fiscal year. Thus, our budget requests for fiscal year 1981 have been maintained at a level sufficient to support admissions of 14,000 Indochinese a month through next year. This reflects the deep concern of the Administration with the humanitarian challenges we continue to see facing us in this area of the world. We also find this concern mirrored in the Congress.

FISCAL YEAR 1981 BUDGET

The only cuts in our fiscal year 1981 budget include grants to resettlement agencies at the $525 per person level rather than the original projections of $535 per person (a savings of $1.5 million), and the elimination of $12 million for further construction of Refugee Processing Centers (RPCs). We agreed to the RPC cut because of the sharp decline in the boat flow from Vietnam last fall and winter, which significantly reduced the need for the additional camp capacity. After considerable delays, construction has begun on the Galang Refugee Processing Center in Indonesia, scheduled to hold 10,000 persons. The Refugee Processing Center on Bataan in the Philippines currently has a capacity for 10,000 persons, and negotiations are being concluded for a second section for another 8,000 refugees. Unless the boat flow from Vietnam increases dramatically once again, additional RPC capacity above that currently planned should not be necessary. Should such a situation develop, the willingness expressed by the Government of the Philippines in Geneva last July to accept up to 50,000 persons would allow significant room for future expansion if funds become available.

RESETTLING KHMERS

With respect to the resettlement of Khmer who are presently in holding centers in Thailand, we face a particularly difficult problem. We believe that considerable numbers of these refugees may have ties with the United States or other countries. Thailand regards those in the influx since November 1979 to be "illegal entrants," not refugees, and with few exceptions there has been no screening of this population. This reflects the extreme sensitivity of the Thai to the flight of Khmer to the Thai-Khmer border. It has been a policy aim of the United States and of the international community generally, to seek to avoid a forcible repatriation to Kampuchea of this population by the Thai Government with all the suffering and loss of human life this would inevitably entail. It has clearly been the fear of the Thai that if a significant flow of resettlement began to occur to third countries out of the holding centers, large population movements might begin to take place from the border concentrations to the holding centers, overwhelming the ability of Thailand to deal with this situation. Thus, the United States, other major resettlement nations, and the UNHCR have accepted a situation in which the Khmer in the holding centers are not presently the subject of resettlement efforts with minor exceptions such as parents, spouses or minor children of persons in resettlement countries. Of these exceptions 68 have resettled in the United States and others have resettled elsewhere. Our program carries no inherent disqualification of Khmer and, should the Thai open the holding centers for resettlement processing, we would be prepared to consider processing other refugees with close ties to the United States. Of course the Khmer refugee population would be competing for limited resettlement opportunities with the 230,000 other Indochinese in the area.

UNACCOMPANIED MINORS

The unaccompanied Khmer minors in Thailand are a related issue. Both the UNHCR which currently cares for them, and the ICRC which has launched a program to trace possible relatives, believe that a maximum effort must be made to reunite unaccompanied minors with their families. Those whom the tracing program reveals to be orphans then have three possibilities—adoption by Khmer families in Thai holding centers on border agglomerations, an indefinite stay under UNHCR or Thai Government auspices in Thailand, or resettlement abroad. The last choice should not be made hastily. There should be ample time for family members to locate these children. For those who wish to adopt or provide foster care for an Indochinese child, there are over 200 unaccompanied Khmer, Lao, Hmong, and Vietnamese minors in regular refugee camps in Thailand and other children elsewhere in Southeast Asian camps.

Within Kampuchea, the situation is immensely complicated by both the political factors discussed by Secretary Holbrooke and well known to this Committee, and by the almost total state of collapse of the economy and the society brought about by events of the last few years.

BREAKING CYCLE OF FAMINE

An important problem for us to consider is how to break the cycle of famine and dependency on outside relief and create once again some semblance of an independently functioning society in Kampuchea. One important step is the timely delivery of seed rice, which is proving extraordinarily difficult to accomplish because of the logistical problems and the tendency of hungry Khmer to eat rather than plant seed rice.

To date, the Thai-Kampuchean border has been the most effective route for the provision of seed rice stocks. But given the primitive internal distribution system, we must also continue every effort through the international organizations to deliver seed rice stocks through Phnom Penh and whatever other routes become available to the eastern provinces.

We expect to continue to provide funds to meet one third of the cost of this program. Our ability to do so, however, will be affected by the passage of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, which includes $26 million in reimbursement to the Refugee Program, and in the passage of the Food for Peace supplemental request for about $70 million in food aid earmarked for refugee-feeding programs. With respect to fiscal year 1981, we have earmarked $40 million for assistance to victims of the Kampuchean war and famine, in addition to the Food for Peace Program. It will remain our aim to meet one-third of the cost of this program in fiscal year 1981.

As of April 30, ICRC/UNICEF sea shipments and relief flights had delivered directly to Kampuchea almost 75,000 metric tons of rice and nearly 11,500 metric tons of other foodstuffs. As of the same date, they had delivered almost 76,000 tons of rice and over 14,000 tons of other foodstuffs to the border area for cross-border feeding, for Khmer in Thai holding centers, and for those in encampments along the Thai-Kampuchea border.

Under current arrangements the regime distributes supplies and afterwards is expected to submit reports to the international agencies. Military personnel, and government workers and cadre receive much larger rations than ordinary Khmer and get them first. Logistical difficulties caused by inadequate and damaged ports, roads, and equipment contribute to the problem. As of mid-April, there was a backlog of ships, many of them from the Soviet Union, waiting to berth and discharge their cargoes at Kampong Som.

DONOR MEETING

At the March 26 New York meeting of major donors to the Khmer relief effort, the U.S. delegation stressed the need to maintain the cross-border feeding program because it is the only means whereby the average Khmer without any special status can get a fair share of food. We also stressed the need for greater numbers of relief personnel to be allowed into the country and the need for more freedom of movement for such personnel so that they may more effectively monitor the distribution of relief goods to the Khmer population. Sir Robert Jackson, the UN Secretary General's Special Coordinator for Kampuchean Humanitarian Relief, raised many of the above issues in Hanoi and Phnom Penh during his April visits there. On May 18, at a donor's meeting in New York, the international agencies will report as to whether political authorities in Kampuchea have permitted greater latitude in relief efforts.

While the cross-border programs of the international organizations and voluntary agencies have provided a welcome opportunity to bring relief to needy Khmer, the operation within the country has been disappointing to date and insufficient to meet the full scale of the humanitarian need which exists. Concerned about this, the ASEAN countries, with our support, took the initiative to propose that a humanitarian conference be convened to permit a prompt high level review of this serious situation. As a result of these efforts, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) decided on May 1 to convene such a conference in Geneva in late May.

It would seem inconceivable to suspend present efforts because they have not reached the volume, efficiency and accountability that the international community had hoped they might by this time. With reports of renewed famine in April, there is no alternative but to continue our humanitarian endeavors regardless of the shortcomings. It is our hope that at the Geneva conference, and during the days leading up to it, steps can be taken to help correct the deficiencies which have been impeding the international relief effort within Kampuchea.

Mr. Chairman, I think that this litany of problems, and uncertainties tells us clearly that we must be prepared for prompt and vigorous action in concert with our friends and the international organizations, to resolve the problems of refugees and displaced persons in this area. The challenge is not likely to ease until there is greater political stability in the region. Unfortunately, this does not appear likely in the foreseeable future. The Administration remains most grateful for the support and cooperation this Committee has consistently given us in dealing with these problems, and we look forward to continuing these reviews with you as necessary.

Mr. HALL. Are there questions of the witnesses?

Mr. Solarz.

PLEDGING CONFERENCE

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I gather there is going to be a pledging conference on Cambodia in the next week or so, at which they are asking for contributions, I am told, about $100 million. What kind of pledges are we prepared to make at that time?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. May I ask Ambassador Palmieri to respond to that?

Mr. SOLARZ. Fine.

Mr. PALMIERI. First of all, Mr. Solarz, let me clear up the status of the pledging, because I think there is some confusion that has arisen around the March 26 meeting, which seemed to have disappointing results. The fact was that it had been agreed beforehand by most of the donor countries that the March 26 meeting should really concentrate on some hard questions for the international organizations, and on the question of what kinds of guidelines they would accept as a basis for evaluating performance and distribution of food, what kinds of monitoring and distribution systems we could expect to get.

The pressure was laid on. It was laid on heavily, and it was laid on deliberately.

In the context of that objective, namely, to get better distribution and better monitoring, there was only about $26 million announced at the March 26 meeting, including an $8 million new pledge on the part of the United States. I might add that we had previously contributed about $10 million after the Secretary General's call for that March 26 meeting, and hence really had a credit of about $18 million.

Now, the fact is that since that time two things have happened. One, the international organizations have sought to report to us a lot more in detail on their distribution activity, on their monitoring activity, on the problems they are encountering with the Phnom Penh authorities and what they consider their successes, and, as a result, there has been about a total of about $100 million in pledges since that point.

DONORS' MEETING

We are now going to a new set of meetings. One would be the next donors' conference, which is tentatively scheduled for May 13 at this point. At the same time, the international conference that the Secretary talked about has also been scheduled. So that we will be probably in a position of reserving our pledge for the international conference at this point.

I think a number of other countries will be.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is the conference on May 13 the international conference?

Mr. PALMIERI. No, that is a regular donors' meeting in New York. The international conference that has been called has been tentatively set for May 27.

Mr. SOLARZ. What is the objective at the donor conference?

Mr. PALMIERI. That is a regular course of business meeting of the donor countries.

Mr. SOLARZ. It is not a pledging session?

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, they are regularly collecting pledges, but in light of the fact that the Secretary General has agreed to convene the ECOSOC meeting, my guess is that most countries will reserve their new pledging for the international conference.

Mr. SOLARZ. Did someone set a $100 million target to be raised somewhere by the international community?

Mr. PALMIERI. The target is bigger than that.

Mr. SOLARZ. What is it?

Mr. PALMIERI. The first phase target is $120 million for the initial period of the so-called second phase effort. The total for that second phase effort is $284 million.

Mr. SOLARZ. And of that $284 million, you say——

Mr. PALMIERI. About $100 million has been accumulated so far.

U.S. CONTRIBUTION

Mr. SOLARZ. I gather we have been providing about a third of the contributions to the Cambodian relief program. Is that correct?

Mr. PALMIERI. That is correct.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would you anticipate that we would more or less maintain that level of giving?

Mr. PALMIERI. We will probably be able to maintain that counting our food aid and counting on the passage of a third budget resolution which would permit release of the food-for-peace supplemental.

Mr. SOLARZ. With the adoption of a third budget resolution you anticipate it will be in the vicinity of one-third?

Mr. **Palmieri**. Yes, sir.

PRINCE SIHANOUK

Mr. **Solarz**. Mr. Secretary, let me say, by the way, I had an opportunity to read the speech you gave at the Council on Foreign Relations, and I thought it really was a very commendable and admirable statement. I agreed with most of what you said.

When Prince Sihanouk was in town, he spoke with you about his assessment of the situation and his prospects, and at the time you advised him to see Lee Kuan Yu in Singapore. I would be interested in finding out whether he met with Lee Kuan Yu and, if so, whether he got any help that we seemed unwilling to provide ourselves.

Mr. **Holbrooke**. I think what actually happened is that at a dinner Prince Sihanouk attended the day I saw him, he said I had recommended he see Lee Kuan Yu. The situation was somewhat more complicated than that. We greeted Prince Sihanouk here with respect for his past and potential future role. He is not an American candidate, but we hope and believe he may be able to play a role in the future.

In order for him to play a role in the future, despite the fact he symbolizes, from an international point of view, Cambodia, and the fact that he is enormously popular with the Cambodian peasantry and the people in the refugee camps, he must shed himself of some very heavy burdens. One is that the ASEAN countries, in general, and Thailand in particular, have strong reservations about Sihanouk. He has problems with the Thai which go back to the 1950's. A second is that he has had increasing difficulty with his friends in China in recent years. A third is that neither the Vietnamese nor the Soviet Union wish to deal with him any more, and a fourth is that other Cambodian movements from the region, including non-Khmer Rouge movements, also don't trust him.

In that context, Mr. Negroponte and I called on him at the Madison Hotel on his arrival and suggested to him that it was in his interest to improve his relations with ASEAN and particularly Lee Kuan Yu.

Mr. **Solarz**. Since the meeting, has he made any progress in assuaging the concerns of the ASEAN countries and the other Asian nations?

Mr. **Holbrooke**. He has gone from the United States to China to North Korea, where he has begun to talk more about the humanitarian aspects of the issues, something that Victor Palmieri and I both thought appropriate. He has put out some tentative feelers to Singapore and other countries; he has continued to talk about a possible trip, although the date keeps receding, and I believe there are some signs, but only very tentative, that he is beginning to slightly improve his relations. However, I don't want to leave you or anyone else in the room with the impression he has solved those problems which led to those discussions.

KHMER INSURGENCIES

Mr. **Solarz**. What is the state of the Pol Pot insurgency at this point? Is that growing in strength, diminishing, or remaining at a stable level?

Mr. **Holbrooke**. I almost hesitate to answer the question because our data base and our intelligence information is so weak. My own view, Mr. Solarz, is that they have not broadened their base of popular appeal, internationally or domestically in any significant way in the last year, but militarily they have done somewhat better than most people expected, and they have strengthened internal command and control structures. They will survive as a military force past the end of the dry season.

Mr. **Solarz**. Do any of the other Khmer insurgencies, Son Sann, the Khmer Serei, compare in military significance to what Pol Pot is doing?

Mr. **Holbrooke**. No.

Mr. **Solarz**. The Pol Pot insurgency is more effective?

Mr. **Holbrooke**. If you were a Vietnamese planner discussing the continuing occupation of Cambodia, you would conclude that the only significant organized opposition is Pol Pot.

Mr. **Solarz**. If Vietnam were to withdraw tomorrow from Cambodia, would it be fair to assume Pol Pot would move back?

Mr. **Holbrooke**. If Vietnam were to withdrew all troops tomorrow, Pol Pot forces would walk down the main road and return to Phnom Penh.

Mr. **Solarz**. I assume while we want Vietnam to withdraw, we want it in such a way as to facilitate arrangements that preclude the return of Pol Pot, except insofar as the Cambodia people freely determine that is what they want.

Mr. **Holbrooke**. I think you put your finger on the absolute essential conundrum of the tragedy. You are absolutely correct we don't wish to see a situation develop which permits Pol Pot and his group to return to power.

EMIGRATION FROM VIETNAM

Mr. **Solarz**. At the Geneva Conference, I recall vividly how much criticism was leveled against Vietnam for forcing out all of the people to sea, many of whom were dying as a result and I gather to some extent as a consequence of that criticism the number of people leaving on boats from Vietnam has dramatically declined. Could you give us a sense of what the emigration arrangements are in Vietnam now? Are people still leaving by boat? Are the Vietnamese authorities still forcing people to leave, or are they preventing people from going?

Mr. **Holbrooke**. At the time we were in Geneva, the monthly exodus rate was running 55,000 to 60,000 per month, reaching safe haven alive, and if you assume one-third drowned, you have a stunning number. The Vietnamese at the time wanted us to believe this was involuntary. However, after the Geneva Conference, after they had announced, through Waldheim, that they would move to what they called a moratorium—a concept I personally find offensive, but which nonetheless had enormous practical effect—the number dropped to an average of only about 3,000 so-called boat people a month and the composition changed completely.

Mr. **Solarz**. Are the Vietnamese preventing people from leaving who want to leave?

Mr. **Holbrooke**. I believe that at that time we went through several phases, Mr. Solarz. During the phase which led to the emergency meeting in Geneva, the Vietnamese were actively organizing and allowing to be organized large boats carrying sometimes thousands of people paying their way to leave. This was an induced exodus.

I believe now these are genuine escapees. I think that is the key difference. Ethnically they have changed from almost entirely Chinese to entirely——

Mr. **Solarz**. If someone in Vietnam wants to leave, do they have to elude the authorities; in other words, are the authorities trying to prevent people from leaving?

Mr. **Holbrooke**. They have to do it in a covert way, although I believe from the information we have received, that it can sometimes be done with the connivance of the authorities. It is no longer what I would have called an induced government-sanctioned massive pogrom of sort.

Mr. **Solarz**. Keeping people in against their will is in its own way as bad as forcing people to leave who want to remain. I am trying to determine, have they now gone to the other extreme whereby they are preventing people from going who would like to go?

NEGOTIATING ORDERLY DEPARTURE

Mr. **Negroponte**. If I could add a point in response to that, Mr. Solarz, which is that we have not yet been able to successfully negotiate the implementation of the so-called orderly departure program which may be part of what your question was driving at.

We do have a list that we have provided to them of people we have identified that we would be willing to take into our country, and we have not yet been able to implement that program. The next step is to get an official from the UNHCR down to Saigon, down to Ho Chi Minhville, to inteview the candidates, and we have not yet been able to implement that.

CREATING A "GAZA STRIP"

Mr. **Solarz**. One final question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, how would you characterize the attitude of the Thai Government at this point toward the Cambodian refugees and their county, and what are the possibilities that they might decide to force them back into Cambodia?

Mr. **Holbrooke**. The Thai Government remains deeply concerned about the short- and long-term effects of this permanent minority on its eastern border, deeply concerned. There are some people who think it may be a Palestinian situation in the making, a kind of a Gaza Strip. There are people within the Government at very high levels and certainly outside the government at very high levels and certainly outside the Government, who think Thailand should have closed its border or should ship the people back. That is, I think, one of the main reasons why the policy we have followed is so important. Without it, the people who take that position would probably gain the upper hand within the Government.

May I also, Mr. Solarz, make one more point about the so-called boat people, and that is while the average, since the Geneva conference, has been 2,000 to 3,000 a month, the number has begun to rise in the last few months, partly because of the season, and is up over 6,000 for the month of April. That is still a far cry from 40,000, 50,000, 60,000, a year ago. On the other hand, it is an important increase.

Mr. **Solarz**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Wolff** [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, I want to apologize to you and to the other witnesses here today for being late. However, we were dealing with a new surge of boat people, the Cubans, and we were talking about that in a meeting with the parliamentarians from Mexico; so I hope you will excuse me.

Mr. **Palmieri**. I was late for the same reason.

Mr. **Wolff**. Now, the refugee situation sems to be going throughout the world in epidemic proportions.

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 310

Since there is a quorum present, the Chair would like to say that we could take up the question of House Concurrent Resolution 310.

Mr. **Guyer**. I so move; so we have the vehicle to proceed with our statute.

Mr. **Solarz**. Can we have a chance to read it?

Mr. **Wolff**. Yes. In fact, we are going to ask the Secretary if he would comment on the resolution.

I take it, Mr. Secretary, you have had an opportunity of looking at this resolution.

There are two technical amendments that should be made in the resolution. The seventh paragraph reads, "Whereas the United Nations has called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchea and for a United Nations Conference on Kampuchea," this is an inaccuracy, and it should read, "The United Nations calls for international conference" actually. And, therefore, I will ask unanimous consent to amend the resolution to that point. If there is no objection, it is so ordered.

The another technical amendment is involved in line 11 on page 2, where No. 4 calls for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia and the interference in the international affairs of that country. I would recommend that the word "the" on the second line of that paragraph be changed to "their" interference in the internal affairs of that country, and ask unanimous consent to change that accordingly. If there are no objections, it is so ordered.

Mr. Secretary, this is a resolution that has been put in by a number of the women Members of the Congress who journeyed to Kampuchea, and is being taken up by this subcommittee, and I should just like the administration's comments on it, if we could have them.

ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT

Mr. Holbrooke. Mr. Chairman, I concur, as do my colleagues in the executive branch, in the substance and intent of Resolution 310, and we would support it.

I might just comment on the bottom of page 2, I wonder if No. 4 might be phrased a little more precisely. This is a minor point, but even with your change of the wording to the word "their," it is unclear to me you are calling for the immediate withdrawal of the interference of the foreign forces in the internal affairs of the country. What we are really thinking about in Cambodia as a desirable outcome, of course, is that the people of Cambodia can get a government which is representative of their wishes, and that is nonalined.

I know that is implicit in this phrasing, but I am wondering if the words, as written, are a little unclear. Otherwise, we have nothing but support for both the intent and substance of the resolution.

Mr. Wolff. We can include that in the legislative history and the report on the bill to clarify that position. We find it difficult from time to time to get a quorum, and to rework this would involve—unless we have our Parliamentarian over here.

Mr. Solarz. I have a suggestion. I think it is a useful suggestion. I think maybe the way to handle it is in subparagraph 3, beginning on line 7, on page 2, perhaps we could put in on line 9, after the words "and brings about the establishment of a representative government in Kampuchea," "of a neutral and nonalined representative government in Kampuchea"?

Mr. Holbrooke. That is fine, Mr. Solarz. My actual question went to the syntax of No. 4. I really defer to you on this, but it seems to me it is very unclear, if you look at that phrase carefully, what it says. I would have thought it would have said "calls for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia and the end to foreign interference," or something like that, instead of "their interference." The change that the chairman suggests does not remove the lack of clarity in that phrase.

Mr. Wolff. I think you have solved our problem by the terminology you have used, and I would ask unanimous consent to withdraw my recommendation and to insert the Assistant Secretary's recommendation.

Mr. Guyer. How does his phrase read, then?

Mr. Wolff. "Calls for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces in Cambodia and the end to foreign interference in the internal affairs of that country."

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Wolff. Yes.

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

Mr. Solarz. I think that is constructive, but I would like to make one additional suggestion. I am somewhat concerned about paragraph 4 simply calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, because while that is desirable, it does have the implication, without some additional phraseology, that if the Vietnamese withdraw, that Pol Pot will move in. I would suggest that we might consider at the end of that line 13, after the new phrase, adding the following words: "together with arrangements to provide the people of Cambodia with an opportunity to freely determine their own future."

Mr. **Wolff**. Do you mean free elections?

Mr. **Solarz**. No, I mean some way in which you could say there was a representative and free expression of the will of the Cambodian people, which would, in my judgment, be incompatible with a forced march by Pol Pot to Phnom Penh and declaration of Kampuchea No. 2.

Mr. **Holbrooke**. I also think, Mr. Solarz, that the suggestion I have made, and the chairman has heeded, actually addresses your concern quite directly.

Mr. **Solarz**. How?

Mr. **Holbrooke**. Because it talks about the end to foreign interference in the internal affairs in the country.

WILL OF CAMBODIAN PEOPLE

Mr. **Solarz**. Whatever you want to say about Pol Pot, he is from Cambodia, unfortunately.

Mr. **Holbrooke**. I still stick with my statement. I think it addresses your problem.

Mr. **Guyer**. Could we have the staff work this out, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. **Wolff**. I don't think we can have the staff work it out and pass a resolution.

Mr. **Solarz**. My suggestion doesn't require free elections. It does require opportunity for the free expression of the will of the Cambodian people. It could be a conference; it could be in a variety of ways. I don't think we should have something which calls for the withdrawal of the Vietnamese and leaves it at that, because we all know who will come in if that is what happens.

Mr. **Guyer**. Mr. Chairman, if you would yield, I think we should be cautious how we describe whatever government it is, because there is a hooker. If you say a representative government or government acceptable, you get into all kinds of nebulous ground, and to say it must be thus-and-so kind of government, we could be here all day trying to describe what kind of government that would be.

Mr. **Solarz**. If the gentleman would yield, I am not suggesting that we prescribe any particular form of government; that would clearly be inappropriate. I am simply suggesting that we call for an opportunity to the people to determine their future, which leaves open the question of the kind. If they want Pol Pot, they can have him.

Mr. **Guyer**. I would go back to the Secretary's original statement and say our goal is to humanitarianly help these people and to exclude the interference of outside interests in this regard, and not define the kind of government they are going to arrive at.

Mr. **Wolff**. May I try to simplify the remarks that you made? I don't see how we are going to get everything into this resolution that we so desire, and achieve every point; however, let me just try this out: "Calls for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia and the end to foreign interference in the internal affairs of that country and a new government acceptable to the people of Kampuchea."

Mr. SOLARZ. OK.

Mr. WOLFF. I ask unanimous consent that that be included as an amendment. Are there any questions?

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I assume the committee report and the legislative history of this resolution will reflect that it was the assumption of the committee that any government acceptable to the people of Cambodia would presumably not include Pol Pot.

Mr. WOLFF. Well, I might disagree with the gentleman, because I think that we should leave it to the people of Kampuchea and not try to select the government here. This committee has no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of another government. We have had much too much experience in that connection.

Mr. GUYER. I so move.

Mr. WOLFF. The question is on the resolution as amended. All in favor, say aye. Opposed?

The resolution is adopted. And I take it that someone will move that we report a clean bill.

Mr. HALL. I so move, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you.

Mr. Holbrooke, I understand that you have to leave for a meeting at the White House, and you are going to leave Mr. Negroponte and Mr. Palmieri?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. With your permission.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Hall.

FOOD DISTRIBUTION

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In hearings in the past I have always been somewhat confused relative to the food distribution in Cambodia. What is the status of it now? What is happening to it? Are food and medical supplies getting to the people?

Mr. PALMIERI. I think the answer is that we are confident we are getting a lot of food through the border. We are confident we are putting a lot of food into the country through Phnom Penh and Kompong Som, and while we are doing better—through the international organizations in getting food out to the countryside—that isn't saying much.

This has been a protracted problem. For months the stockpiles built up at Kompong Som and Phnom Penh, and we got no distribution, although Russian grain was being distributed. Beginning in mid-January, we began to get movement of supplies out of Kompong Som and Phnom Penh at some reasonable rate into the provinces, but we were then learning that the ration was being very heavily skewed toward government cadre, toward the cities rather than the countryside.

There are only about 60 international organization officials now within the country. In response to the demands, I think it is right to call them that, of the donor countries at the March 26 meeting and subsequent, the distribution activity and the monitoring activity has been stepped up substantially, but still, I think, there are many, many thousands of people throughout Kampuchea who are receiving little, if any, food.

I think the situation with medical assistance is, if anything, worse than the food situation.

Our concentration with the international organizations has been both through the border and in Phnom Penh and Kompong Som with the airlift and sealift through those ports, to get seed rice in along with food in order to get a planting for the December-January wet season harvest. That has been a race against time. At this point, I can't tell you that we have won that race.

So I think we have a desperate situation within Kampuchea. I think the Phnom Penh authorities, for whatever reasons they may have, have made it extraordinarily difficult to do what might otherwise have been a relatively simple job. It is a small country. Its logistical system is destroyed, but we could have, for the investment we are making, fed far more people with far more food than we have been able to do trying to get through the ports of Kompong Som and Phnom Penh.

Incidentally, the quay at Phnom Penh has broken down, and while there are emergency repairs being made and a military quay being made available up the river, it has impaired our ability to get material out of Phnom Penh.

So the situation is better than it was, but it is still bad.

VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. **Hall.** First, what are the voluntary organizations? Second, is the food still building up and still sitting idle in the warehouses? And, third, what kind of communication do we have internally within Cambodia?

Mr. **Palmieri.** First, the voluntary organizations consist of organizations like OXFAM, like Church World Service, World Vision, World Relief, and certain others, which have relatively small programs, some of which have been affected. The major organizations are international organizations; they are UNICEF (the U.N. Children's Fund) and the International Committee of the Red Cross. That is what we call the joint program. At least 85 percent of all the supplies going into the country are handled through the joint program.

Now, second, the food is moving out to the provinces. We had in March the bulk of the food in the stockpiles moving out to the provinces. The problem is that we are dealing with about 5 million people. We are dealing in a country still at war; we are dealing with a government that is either incompetent or indifferent to assist with respect to the distribution activity, and we are dealing with a destroyed logistical infrastructure. Roads, communications, are essentially nonexistent. What there is, is preempted by Vietnamese military priorities. So that the problems are greater than they should be, and they start out being great. But they are made greater by either indifference or incompetence on the part of the authorities.

Finally, our communications are very, very limited. They consist of cable communication from the joint commission in Phnom Penh to the mission office in Bangkok, to New York and Paris. There is no telephone.

Mr. **Hall.** That is all for right now.

Mr. **Wolff.** Thank you. Mr. Guyer.

REFUGEE EXODUS

Mr. GUYER. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, has the flow and exodus of refugees seriously abated now since our last discussions? At one time, it was almost epidemic, but now have they trickled down to a stable amount?

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, sir, we have Indochina refugees from three countries of origin. From Laos they have increased in the past few months. At least for 2 months now, we have run between 6,000 and 7,000 a month out of Laos. We have refugees from Vietnam still reaching Thailand by land across Kampuchea—about 1,800 in the past few months.

We have boat people, mostly ethnic Vietnamese, as Dick Holbrooke was saying, leaving the Vietnam coast, mostly on a clandestine basis, sometimes through bribery, able to buy their way out and reaching first-asylum countries at the rate of what was for several months about 2,000 to 3,000 and has now doubled in the past 2 months, to about 5,000 to 6,000.

And, finally, we have the Kampucheans, who are not strictly speaking, as you know, refugees. The Thai Government and UNHCR classified them as displaced people awaiting repatriation, and they consist now, after some shuffling that has gone on in preparing the holding centers west of the Thai border for the rainy season, we probably have about 130,000, I would say, in the holding centers.

Tom Bains thinks it is nearer 150,000. One interesting thing that has happened is that the vast concentrations on the border, as a result of a combination of circumstances—one, the disruption in the border concentrations from the fighting among the Khmer factions; two, the nearby Vietnamese military activity; three, mostly the availability of rice rations from the border feeding program to carry into Kampuchea has led to a dramatic decline in the border concentrations, which were so worrisome to the Thai Government.

We had several hundred thousand people there 3 or 4 months ago; we have a fraction of that now perched on the border in those squatter settlements. What may happen if the worst occurs and renewed famine sets in in Kampuchea is another matter, but for the moment there has been a very substantial repatriation from the border back into Kampuchea.

HOLDING CENTERS

Mr. GUYER. How would you describe the receptivity and semipermanent assignment of the people from the holding centers? Has it been successful pretty much? After classification and remedial care, has the final chapter been resolved in pretty good fashion with regard to those seeking permanent homes?

Mr. PALMIERI. The Khmer in the holding centers, because they are not classified as refugees, are not within the resettlement pool, which is activated by the international resettlement effort. In fact, one of the major reasons why the Thai and the UNHCR do not regard the Khmer in the holding centers as refugees is to allow the existing pool of Laotian and Vietnamese refugees who are in the camps in first-asylum countries to be resettled. Many of them have been there many years. They are the first in line for the resettlement program, and, second, the thought is that these Khmer in the holding centers may, like those on the borders, be led to return to their homeland.

INVOLUNTARY CONTRACEPTIVES

Mr. GUYER. Which group of people are receiving the anticontraceptive drugs?

Mr. PALMIERI. Those are the Khmer at Kamput.

Mr. GUYER. In one area?

Mr. PALMIERI. Yes, in one area; right. And I might add only a few of those were involuntary, although who knows, when you are dealing with people who are really not clear what is happening to them.

But the contraceptive that is used as part of the planned parenthood program in Thailand has generally been administered. They have about 11,000 women in control groups using it for quite a long time. No adverse effects have been noticed, and it is accepted by the international agencies, the World Health Organization, so forth, and it is a candidate for use in the United States.

THAILAND'S ATTITUDE

Mr. GUYER. My final question: Has the attitude of Thailand, itself, moderated considerably, more compassion than there was a while back when there was hostility, since the internal change in Thailand?

Mr. PALMIERI. I would hate to say the Thais have changed. In the face of what I think is a very troublesome domestic outcry, I think that government has maintained a very solid humanitarian stance. They have made it clear, and I think they have to for domestic purposes, that they are not inviting the Khmer people into Thailand. But it is not really fair to say, I think, that they have shown hostility. They have borne a tremendous burden with the refugee camps within Thailand.

Just to give you an example, the ration that the refugees get within the Thai camps is better than the Thai populace in the rural regions. There are 11 million Thai farmers existing at a level that the UNHCR says is below that in the refugee camps.

SENDING IN CONTRIBUTIONS

Mr. GUYER. When people come to us, as they do, for advice as to how to help in dollars, and so forth, you did mention there were about five or six voluntary and international agencies that are at least getting through. Would you narrow that down to the most reliable, when people ask us where to send funds or how to help the best.

Mr. PALMIERI. I would meet you on a dark night in a very secret place and whisper my views about who is best at it.

But I would hand you or release which in public consists of our recommended list, sir. I could not make a recommendation.

Mr. GUYER. When this thing first broke, people wanted congressional assistance, and we don't take it lightly that people wanted to know how rapidly they could help and where to go, because some were not reliable, and we had narrowed it to six or eight we thought were the most effective. I won't say they were in any way untrue to their calling, but——

Mr. Palmieri. Let me see if I can clarify this. The voluntary organizations within Kampuchea are relatively few, and I don't know of any who are rip-off artists. On the other hand, there are operators within this country who are collecting money under auspices which are dubious, related to the Cambodian crisis——

Mr. Guyer. That is what I am getting at.

Mr. Palmieri. They are a menace to our whole voluntary system.

Mr. Guyer. We were receiving hundreds and hundreds of letters from people who wanted to help in some spirit of compassion and did not know where to go.

Mr. Palmieri. They are not on our list, and everybody else is.

Mr. Wolff. Without objection, I would like to put that list in the record at this point, and let people know to which organizations you——

Mr. Palmieri. That would be fine.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. VOLUNTARY AGENCIES INVOLVED IN KAMPUCHEAN RELIEF EFFORT[1]

Action for Relief and Rehabilitation in Kampuchea (ARRK), 475 Riverside Drive, Room 678, New York, NY 10027, 212/870-2177, Mark Schomer.

American Baptist Churches in the USA, Board of International Ministries, Valley Forge, PA 19481, 215/768-2200, Dr. Robert G. Johnson.

American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry Street, Philadephia, PA 19102, 215/241-7154, Dave Elder.

American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc., 60 East 42nd Street, Suite 1914, New York, NY 10017, Michael Shor.

American Red Cross, National Headquarters, 17th and D Streets, NW., Washington, DC 20006, 202/857-3591, Dorothy Taaffe.

American Refugee Committee, 310 Fourth Avenue South, Room 410, Minneapolis, MN 55415, 612/332-5365, Stan Breen.

Assemblies of God, Foreign Service Committee, 1445 Boonville Avenue, Springfield, MO 65802, 417/862-2781, Nelda Ammons.

Baptist World Alliance, 1628 16th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20009, 202/265-5027, Dr. Ronald Goulding, Erna Redlich.

CARE, Inc., 6600 First Avenue, New York, NY 10016, 212/686-5110, Donald Sanders.

Catholic Medical Mission Board, 10 West 17th Street, New York, 10011, 212/242-7757, Rev. Edwin Brooks.

Catholic Relief Services/USCC, 1011 First Avenue, New York, NY 10022, 212/838-4700, Monty Sonaggere.

The Christian and Missionary Alliance, Division of Overseas Ministries, P.O. Box C, Nyack, NY 10960, 914/353-0750, Fred Polding

Christian Children's Fund, P.O. Box 26511, Richmond, VA 23261, 804/644-4654, Dave Herrell.

Church World Service, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10027, 212/870-2079, Larry Hollon.

Compassion International, 7774 West Irving Park Road, Chicago, IL 60634, 312/456-6116, Donald Smith.

Direct Relief Foundation, P.O. Box 1319, Santa Barbara, CA 93103, 805/966-9149, Kathryn Cody.

Food for the Hungry International, 3331 North Hayden Road, Suite Number 1, Scottsdale, AZ 85251, 602/998-3100, Bill Moy.

Friends of Children, 14 Brookside Road, Darien, CT 06820, 203/665-2218, Constance Boll, Dene Hill.

Heifer Project International, P.O. Box 808, Little Rock, AK 72203, 501/376-6836, Terry Ford, Gordon Hatcher.

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[1] List provided by the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service.

Holt International Children's Services, P.O. Box 2880, Eugene, OR 97402, 503/687-2202, John Williams.

International Catholic Migration Commission, c/o U.S. Catholic Conference, 1312 Massachusetts Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20005.

International Human Assistance Programs, 360 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10010, 212/684-6804, Myles Ren.

International Rescue Committee, 386 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016, 212/679-0010, Robert DeVecchi.

Lutheran World Ministries, USA National Committee Lutheran World Federation, 360 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10010, 212/532-6350, Rev. Rolland Shaffer.

Lutheran World Relief, 360 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10010, 212/532-6350, Ove Nielsen.

MAP International, P.O. Box 50, Wheaton, IL 60187, 312/653-6010, Calvin Williams.

Meals for Millions/Freedom from Hunger Foundation, Eastern Office, 815 Second Avenue, Suite 501, New York, NY 10017, 212/986-4170, Peter J. Davies.

Mennonite Central Committee, 21 South 12th Street, Akron, PA 17501, 717/859-1151, Joyce Bratton.

Operation California, 386 Foothill Road—Number 40, Beverly Hills, CA 90210, 213/858-8184, Richard Walden, Llewellyn Werner.

Oxfam-America, 302 Columbus Avenue, Boston, MA 02116, 617/247-3304, Joe Short, Bob Hohler.

The Salvation Army, 120-130 West 14th Street, New York, NY 10011, 212/620-4911, Col. G. Ernest Murray.

Save the Children Federation, 48 Wilton Road, Westport, CT 06880, 203/226-7271, David L. Guyer.

Seventh-day Adventist World Service, 6840 Eastern Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20012, 202/723-0800, Howard Burbank.

Southern Baptist Convention, Foreign Mission Board, P.O. Box 6597, Richmond, VA 23230, 804/353-0151, Wm. Eugene Grubbs.

Wisconsin Indochina Refugee Relief, P.O. Box 26509, Milwaukee, WI 53226, 414/257-8347, Dr. William Colman.

World Concern, Division of CRISTA Ministries, P.O. Box 33000, Seattle, WA 98133, 206/546-7201, Terry Bruce.

World Medical Relief, 11745 12th Street, Detroit, MI 48206, 313/866-5333, Irene Auberline.

World Relief Corporation, P.O. Box WRC, Wheaton, IL 60187, 312/665-0235, David Chambers.

World Vision Relief Organization, 919 West Huntington Drive, Monrovia, CA 91016, 213/357-7979, Robert Ash, Paul Goddard.

YMCA's of the U.S., International Division, 291 Broadway, New York, NY 10007, 212/374-2284, Boris Kazimiroff.

Mr. GUYER. I have narrowed mine to six, but you can take your choice.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we should keep the record straight. The vast majority of money that has been collected by voluntary organizations in this country has gone for proper use, and I don't think we should leave the record in doubt here that there has been a great deal of money raised in this country and not spent; is that right?

Mr. PALMIERI. I welcome that comment. In fact, the response to the Cambodian crisis has been one of the proudest chapters, I think, in American voluntary effort. The matters I am referring to involve some mail solicitation operations which use the Cambodian crisis as a tag on their advertisements.

SUPPORT FOR THAIS

Mr. PRITCHARD. I think sometimes we focus on one small part; and we don't want to tarnish the main effort.

It is terribly important that the Thais be supported in their effort and there is no way we can make this work in those camps if we don't continue to draw down on those camps.

If you are getting 6,000 out of Laos and you are getting another 5,000 or 6,000 coming in both and you said you had 1,800 that came all the way through Cambodia, we are not then making a great deal of gain, are we?

Mr. PALMIERI. Our total resettlement effort worldwide, all 21 countries, runs about 23,000 a month. We are staying way ahead of the arrivals so far.

Mr. PRITCHARD. In Thailand?

Mr. PALMIERI. That is in all Southeastern Asian countries.

Mr. PRITCHARD. My understanding is you split those about 50-50.

Mr. PALMIERI. That is correct. It is a good question because I thought the question was directed to arrivals in first asylum countries. The bulk of those numbers from Laos come to Thailand.

RESETTLEMENT

Mr. PRITCHARD. I realize that. My concern is it looks like we are doing very well in drawing down those camps outside of Thailand, but in the camps in Thailand, if we are drawing down half of it and getting an influx in there of 10,000 to 12,000 then we are not making much progress.

Mr. PALMIERI. Let's go over the ground again. I am delighted to try to clarify. The answer is the total arrivals over the last 2 months are about 11,000 to 12,000 split roughly between land and boat arrivals.

Most of the land arrivals come to Thailand, most of the boat arrivals go to the other first asylum countries.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I was mistaken. I thought the boat arrivals were now coming into Thailand.

Mr. PALMIERI. No, most go to other first asylum countries. We have an off-take of about 23,000 a month being maintained total.

I can give you the figure. In the last 7 months we have reduced the camp population in Thailand—we don't mean Khmer holding centers—about 18 to 20 percent.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I guess my concern was as the influx starts in again, my feeling is it is terribly important we continue to make progress in Thailand. I know it is important for the other states but I think Thailand is a particularly sensitive place.

It seems we are in real trouble if we don't continue to make progress there.

Mr. PALMIERI. Let me respond to that because the way we allocate the numbers on resettlement is one of the toughest questions we have. We face it month to month. The biggest threat that we have faced or thought we would face in the spring when the good weather came in the South China Sea was whether Vietnam would let the boats go again on a massive scale.

With that in mind we have taken the populations down in the camps in Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, by about 50 percent over the past 7 months. So we have a situation there which gives us some possibility of being able to respond if they let the boats go again most of them would go to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Hong Kong.

We are in the process now if we can get this refugee processing center built—which hasn't been easy—of being in a position perhaps to increase our off-take from Thailand.

Mr. **Pritchard**. I think I understand what you are saying. It is just that our ability to maneuver on the border there becomes very difficult if we don't continue to draw down in the camps in Thailand.

Mr. **Palmieri**. You are absolutely right.

EFFECT OF CUBAN SITUATION

Mr. **Pritchard**. The question I have to ask you is what policies are being formulated down in the White House and the administration and in your shop that deal with the Caribbean that will have an effect on the policies that we have over in Asia?

Mr. **Palmieri**. Let me be completely frank with you. The policy we have right now directed toward the current Cuban influx is strictly a crisis management operation designed very simply: (*a*) to save lives by deploying the Coast Guard; and (*b*) to try to get the processing of these arrivals who are undocumented aliens. They are not refugees within the tenor of the Refugees Act of 1980—not like the Indochinese processed abroad and brought in on a funded basis—they are just coming in. Our policy right now is to protect lives, whether or not it makes complete sense on any other basis.

Mr. **Pritchard**. You are very frank.

Mr. **Palmieri**. I am not embarrassed by the fact that we live in a world of contradictions. We have taken the position that Castro ought not to be misled by the fact that the Cuban community is in a frenzy over family reunification to think that he can call the turn on our immigration laws.

We have said we will issue a citation against boatowners, which will subject them to fines, and try to protect the integrity of our immigration laws.

We are going to seek to save as many lives as we can. What else would you do? You try to save lives, No. 1. You try to keep a stance that is respectable as far as boatowners are concerned. You try to take the people who reach our shores who you can't keep from coming and you can't make leave—we don't have a picket fence between Cuba and the United States. The last time I was at Key West I couldn't see one. So they will come.

INTERNATIONALIZING PROBLEM

Our problem is to get the flow in a managed stance, to internationalize the problem, which we are doing. We are in Costa Rica this week at a conference of our Latin neighbors and also European countries to discuss ways to deal with the Cuban authorities, as has happened twice before.

This is not the first time that Mr. Castro has felt that he had to unload a certain number of people who were in some way becoming a threat to him, given the conditions in his country. He has a failed revolution. He is trying to distract attention from the fact. I think he succeeded but I think those boats going across the straits are pretty eloquent witness to the problem of human rights and economic opportunity in Cuba.

So I think it is being said a lot that we have the problem. I think Mr. Castro has the problem. I think we will manage our problem. Don't ask me to make complete sense right now.

Mr. **Pritchard**. I realize it is difficult. I think we have not helped the problem by the President's latest statement because it isn't just the Cuban problem you have, it is the Haitian and the other one, 40 million people who can come here as economic refugees, and because of the problems in the law we seem unable to send anybody back.

I think that what is going on there is going to affect our ability to handle refugees in Southeast Asia. I think it is a very serious question and I am sure you are aware of it.

Mr. **Palmieri**. Mr. Pritchard, let me be clear. The President was not, I think, aptly or even fairly quoted. If you look at the statement, which was an answer to a question in the session he was having with the League of Women Voters, you can see what he was saying, look, this country has always stood as an asylum and refuge for persecuted people. This is our tradition, this is what we are doing with the Cubans.

I think to make of that a policy statement that we are going to accept unlimited numbers is just not a fair rendition of what he said. We have done our best with the press to have them go through a re-education camp. But we will see what happens.

OPEN-ARM POLICY

Mr. **Pritchard**. It presents very serious questions. The perception out in the Caribbean was that we will open our arms and accept them and we have to make some very hard decisions here on economic refugees vis-a-vis political refugees and what type of stance we are going to take and what kind of laws we are going to make.

You have the problem. I don't have to tell you. I only hope before they speak down there at the White House they would have thought not just next week but where we go a year from now.

Mr. **Palmieri**. May I tell you something?

Mr. **Pritchard**. Yes, I would be happy to hear.

Mr. **Palmieri**. I have the problem and you have the problem, right.

Mr. **Pritchard**. We are in it together.

Mr. **Palmieri**. We are in it together.

Mr. **Pritchard**. I am aware of that. I say you are working on it day to day.

Mr. **Wolff**. Thank you, Mr. Pritchard.

I think we are faced with an anachronism that defies any solution. Before our colleague from New York talked about the fact that we not only want to stop the refugee problem but we also want to assure freedon of immigration.

WORLDWIDE REFUGEES

What is happening in my mind is somewhat of a change of policy in some of the totalitarian states whereby they are now instead of putting that curtain, whether iron, bamboo, or whatever kind you want to call it, lifting the curtain and letting the people come out underneath the curtain and see the populace, so to speak.

I am concerned at the fact that we have over the years encouraged countries to come and now we are facing a situation whereby if one particular country or another were prepared to innudate the world, they could open that floodgate—what do you want, 10 million, 50 million?

Suppose the Chinese decided they wanted to do the same thing the Cubans are doing and set 100 million people out in boats, say, we will give you the boats and take off.

CHOOSING REFUGEES

One of the factors involved in all of this is that I do not feel the nations of the world have accepted their responsibility. We cannot. We are going to be faced with some very political problems here. It is not going to be a choice of 100,000 immigrants coming into the country but a choice of which ones we are going to be able to accept.

The point that was made by Mr. Pritchard I think is a very important one. As the flow of immigrants increases from Latin America, 50,000 Haitians in Florida, today I understand another 6,000 in from Cuba——

Mr. **Palmieri**. We have 17,000 as of today.

Mr. **Wolff**. We had only 10,000 when I was there Saturday. If this keeps up I don't know how this is going to impact upon the number of people that we can accept here on our shores.

HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS

I think this is a serious humanitarian question. I do think the resolution we passed here today is very important to get the United Nations to realize that this question was not resolved at the last conference, that we need more money from the rest of the world as well as more spaces for these people.

There is just not sufficient space here to able to accept everyone who wants to come in.

There is another anachronism in the fact that wherever you travel around the world you see, maybe not written in signs that say "Yankee go home" anymore, but, we have people in some areas of the world who do not think the United States is adopting the policies they subscribe to.

Yet, what seems strange is the fact that in every refugee outflow they want to come to the United States. So we can't be all that bad if they all want to come here.

REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER

In line of the question of what is happening to the rest of the world, what is happening to that resettlement operation in the Philippines? Where is that now?

Mr. **Palmieri**. The refugee processing center?

Mr. **Wolff**. Yes.

Mr. **Palmieri**. It has had a tough road. The construction costs on the second phase to take it from 10 to 20 thousand-person capacity simply want out of sight in part because of a 30-percent inflation in

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construction costs in the Philippines, in part maybe because of other factors involved with the contractors.

Mr. **Wolff**. You are not referring to anything at all.

Mr. **Palmieri**. No, I am simply trying to give the committee an opaque picture of a transparent situation.

Basically it has been a tough problem to try to get that thing built and get it within reasonable money limits. At this point we are still fighting the problem.

JAPANESE CONTRIBUTIONS

Mr. **Wolff**. What has happened to the money Japan was to put in?

Mr. **Palmieri**. Japan put in $5 million but that was marked from their UNHCR contribution.

Mr. **Wolff**. Japan had volunteered to pay for 50 percent of the costs?

Mr. **Palmieri**. That is Galang. They volunteered to pay for the RPC at Galang, and they made an initial statement that could be interpreted to extend to the Philippines also. They have not carried through with that. I met in Tokyo with the Foreign Ministry people over there. We had a long discussion. They told me about their budget problems and I told them about ours.

At this point we are still seeking additional contributions.

But I would say for the Japanese that they have made significant financial outlays this year, about $100 million for the situation in Southeast Asia. That is approximately what we have done in this situation, although we have taken 14,000 people for resettlement each month.

Mr. **Wolff**. What about the present resettlement in Japan?

Mr. **Palmieri**. I would say it is approaching 500. There is a pledge of 500. The difficulty is they can't find 500 refugees who want to live there because it is a very tradition-bound society. The Indochinese refugees who have settled there, all 270 of them, are not that happy. I would rather have the Japanese continue to be generous in the financial contributions than to seek to turn around a resettlement policy which probably wouldn't stick with the refugees.

Mr. **Negroponte**. In a number of other areas this year and during the past year where we faced challenges around the world such as in Pakistan, the Japanese have been very forthcoming and very prompt to take positions which parallel our own interests. They, for example, have mounted a $130 million aid program to Pakistan. So if you look at the global response, Japan has undertaken during the past year, I think the conclusion would definitely have to be they have been extremely helpful.

CAMBODIAN STARVATION

Mr. **Wolff**. I don't question that at all. Where do we stand now as to the people, the Kampuchean refugees? At one time there was great malnutrition. Can you address yourself to the number of deaths that are occurring in the area?

We had a catastrophe at one time. What is the situation today?

Mr. **Palmieri**. It is markedly different than it was in September and October, when we had death and destruction as the prevailing condition for all the human beings coming out of Kampuchea. You remember when Mrs. Carter went there in November how horrifying the situation was.

I think as a result of the international relief effort, as a result of the efforts made by the Thais and the UNHCR with the camps, that situation really was checked and in mid-January the people were coming back to live in the refugee camps and also on the border.

The death rate went down in 2 months by a factor of 10 times. It was a tenth, I should say, of what it was in March or February of what it had been in December.

Mr. **Wolff**. Can you give us any figures now?

Mr. **Palmieri**. I can give them to you for the record.

[The following was subsequently submitted:]

KHMER REFUGEES MORTALITY RATE PER 10,000 POPULATION IN THAI HOLDING CENTERS

Time period	Sakeo		Kampot		Khao I Dang	
	Actual deaths	Percent	Actual deaths	Percent	Actual deaths	Percent
Oct. 28 to Nov. 7, 1979	320	73.5	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Nov. 8 to Nov. 14, 1979	85	30.6	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Nov. 15 to Nov. 21, 1979	60	21.7	14	70.0	(2)	(2)
Nov. 22 to Nov. 28, 1979	29	10.4	7	34.3	24	8.7
Nov. 29 to Dec. 5, 1979	15	5.4	2	9.6	20	4.0
Dec. 6 to Dec. 12, 1979	10	3.6	0	0.0	21	2.8
Dec. 13, 1979 [1]	6	2.4	2	7.7	23	2.4
Apr. 2, 1980 [1]	1	0.8	0	0.0	9	1.2

[1] Dual figures indicate the decrease in numbers of deaths per week and percentage of total holding center population from Dec. 13, 1979 to April 2, 1980.

[2] Not open.

[3] Not available.

Source: Report No. 7 of C.D.C. team in Thailand.

Mr. **Palmieri**. Basically, the death rate went down from an astronomical figure to a relatively manageable figure, if I can use that term with a death rate. Forty-eight last fall and it is now down to one.

Mr. **Wolff**. It is still unacceptable.

Mr. **Pritchard**. You have 100,000 people there.

Mr. **Wolff**. I understand that but we were talking about dying of malnutrition.

Mr. **Palmieri**. I think we are going to be seeing death from malnutrition from increasing numbers from within Kampuchea, not holding centers, in the camps; not even on the border. The malnutrition problems we have are in the outlying regions, the regions that are not reached by our border feeding programs. They are not big cities that are being reached from the distribution from Phnom Penh.

AIRLIFT PROPOSAL

Mr. **Wolff**. Whatever happened to the airlift idea that was proposed?

Mr. **Palmieri**. Mr. Chairman, that has been one of the phantoms of the whole debate. There has been about a monthly reaffirmation of the hope and expectation that we could use provincial airports and that there would be aircraft from East Germany available or from Laos available. But every time that has been made it has disappeared in a succession of vague explanations.

As near as I can discover—and I don't have intelligence on this point—I think the Vietnamese simply have overriding military priorities for those airfields.

Mr. **Wolff.** There was a proposal made there would be charter aircraft made available to some of the voluntary agencies and that we would provide the funding for some of those charters. Has anything ever happened on that?

Mr. **Palmieri.** We have provided funding for charters. Let me ask Tom Barnes. I don't recall specifically for voluntary organizations, but we have provided just recently another aircraft.

Mr. **Barnes.** An American Hercules of Alaska Airlines is currently flying for the International Committee of the Red Cross and has been doing so since April 15, and will fly through May 14. We provided approximately $714,000 for that program.

Mr. **Palmieri.** That is Bangkok-Phnom Penh you are talking about?

Mr. **Barnes.** Yes.

Mr. **Palmieri.** If the chairman was asking about provincial airports, no, sir.

Mr. **Wolff.** Is that sufficient, that one aircraft to do the job?

Mr. **Palmieri.** No, sir.

Mr. **Wolff.** Why don't we do more?

OPERATING IN PHNOM PENH

Mr. **Palmieri.** It is all the traffic will bear to get into Phnom Penh. There are no unloading facilities there. Why aren't we doing more?

Mr. **Wolff.** I understood that we took into Phnom Penh equipment, trucks, unloading equipment. What has happened to all that?

Mr. **Palmieri.** So far as I can tell between the equipment from the Socialist countries and our own there must be about 600 trucks delivered into that country in the last 3 months.

Mr. **Barnes.** There is a total of over a 1,000 in the country altogether that have been delivered by various sources, but the international program has gotten in about 600.

We did provide a Hercules earlier this year, which flew for 40 days and brought in a great number of trucks from Singapore.

Mr. **Palmieri.** But the question of why aren't we doing more is strictly a question of how we respond to the international organizations, that is the joint program, the ICRC and UNICEF, who have the arrangement with the Phnom Penh authorities.

We have supported them at every stage. Anything they have asked for we have delivered.

Mr. **Wolff.** I understand OXFAM can operate in Phnom Penh and that Catholic Relief Services can operate in there.

Mr. **Palmieri.** Right, they are operating.

Mr. **Wolff.** They operate with greater ease than perhaps UNICEF because of the political problem.

Mr. Palmieri. They operate with greater ease than UNICEF does because they have relatively small programs. For instance, they go down to the docks, cull over the boxes, find their shipments, shove it into their own pickup truck. You can do that dealing with a few hundred tons, perhaps. You can't do it when you are dealing with thousands of tons like the international program.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, we have deliberately made grants to these small voluntary organizations just so we could see that money gets through when there was this blockage going on at Phnom Penh and Kampong Son. You are right, they have been able to operate simply on a smaller basis fairly effectively.

Mr. Wolff. Could they expand their operations?

Mr. Palmieri. I don't know.

OBSTACLES

Mr. Wolff. Has there been any consultation with them, regarding expansion or is it a political problem?

One of the things that I see is the fact we get involved in political problems over there and it seems to me that the voluntary agencies have better access than governmental agencies many times. In fact, the first access was through the voluntary agencies, if I recall.

You do have a situation with any U.N.-related operation because of the recognition of the regime that we do in Kampuchea and Vietnam.

As a result of that you have a situation where there are obstacles put in your way, whereas, the voluntary agencies do not suffer that same hardship.

Mr. Palmieri. That is right, Mr. Chairman. On the other hand, to get a program of the scope we are talking about through the voluntary agencies I don't think is a practical scale for them to operate.

The reason they can operate more effectively is they have small, discreet targeted projects. For instance, one we funded in the past 60 days consisted of redoing an orphanage and of starting a pig farm outside Phnom Penh. You know that is something that they could negotiate and they could work on but that is different from trying to move 200,000 tons of food through a devastated society, through layers of bureaucrats who don't have papers and pencils, don't have telephones. Many of them don't speak French. They don't have gasoline for the trucks.

The Vietnamese can intercept any program that we have that is involving logistical facilities with their military priorities.

So I would say that—and I have talked to the Chiefs of the Joint Mission, as you have—they are very able people. I think if you raise the scale and involvement of the voluntary organizations so that they put as much pressure on the local authorities on the Phnom Penh people as the joint program has to do—because the joint program gets the pressure from us—then you would find voluntary organizations were not having such great relationships either.

UNHCR IN THAILAND

Mr. **Wolff**. Can you tell us about how many people the U.N. has now in to supervise the activities in Thailand? Do you have any idea?

Mr. **Negroponte**. You mean the relief operation?

Mr. **Palmieri**. The total complement of the UNHCR in Thailand today?

Mr. **Barnes**. Approximately 300.

Mr. **Wolff**. Where did they get all those people? They had three there the last time I was there.

Mr. **Barnes**. It is the largest UNHCR program.

Mr. **Wolff**. They told us they were not able to rotate those people because of restrictions at the U.N., they didn't have the number of people to be able to put into the field.

Mr. **Palmieri**. I think we are talking about their total complement, including Thai nationals who are under contract to UNHCR. But you know the UNHCR has really geared up in Thailand. They have appointed a regional coordinator and brought on staff. They do not see themselves as an operational agency, so they had to do a real change in their approach to cope with the scale of the Thailand operation. They had to gear up in terms of their bureaucracy. It has taken them some time, but they have done it. They have responded.

Mr. **Wolff**. Could you get us, for the record, the number of U.N. personnel and the number of contract employees they have in the area?

Mr. **Palmieri**. Certainly.

[The following was subsequently submitted:]

The number of United Nations personnel in Kampuchea and Thailand working on Khmer relief:

Thailand	352
Kampuchea	34

Mr. **Wolff**. Mr. Hall.

THAI-CAMBODIA RELATIONS

Mr. **Hall**. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.

Concerning the relationship between the Thais and the Cambodian refugees and possibly the Pol Pot force, when I was in the Peace Corps in Thailand quite a few years ago, I was always told by the Thais that there was tremendous dislike historically for the Cambodians.

As a matter of fact, if you wanted to put somebody down or humble somebody, you would say, are you a Cambodian? And you would also do that to a friend if you were trying to be funny if he was being deceitful or whatever, because there was a historical dislike of one for the other down through the years.

So my question is: What is the relationship between the Thai Government and the Cambodian refugees, and is there any kind of direct contact between the Thai Government and the Pol Pot force directly or indirectly to try to get the refugees back into Cambodia? Are they working together?

Mr. **Palmieri**. Why not let Secretary Negroponte take that.

Mr. Negroponte. As far as trying through Pol Pot or anybody else, I am not aware of any efforts to relocate Cambodian displaced persons back into Cambodia by the Thai Government.

I have heard, and I am prepared to be corrected by others from the department who are here today with me, that a camp, a village of persons loyal to a Cambodian political leader by the name of Son Sann has tried to reestablish itself inside of Cambodia.

Mr. Palmieri. There was a repatriation on a voluntary basis of about 1,300 to a Son Sann camp.

Mr. Negroponte. On the broader question of Thai-Cambodian friendship or lack thereof, you know the history as well as I do, Mr. Hall, but I would say that in our judgment the real focus of the Thai with respect to the Cambodian issue is really the fact that as a result of Vietnam's invasion, Thailand lost an important buffer between itself and the Vietnamese threat.

I think that is the predominant concern because I don't think Thailand feels in any way threatened by any Cambodian force that could marshal itself against them.

So I think they keep their eye very much on the Vietnamese threat.

Mr. Pritchard. May I?

Mr. Wolff. Yes.

SUPPLYING VIETNAM'S FORCES

Mr. Pritchard. We have heard testimony of trucks hauling rice and food and supplies in from Vietnam. There are 200,000 Vietnamese soldiers there. How are they fed? That is a fairly heavy load for them to maintain. Do they try to have those Vietnamese soldiers be sustained by the countryside? Is that part of their job of getting supplies in there?

Mr. Palmieri. Mr. Pritchard, I think in general the Vietnamese forces are supplied from Vietnam. It is quite clear from our intelligence reports. On the other hand, I think the Vietnamese are compulsive entrepreneurs and they have been sharing in the market system in Western Kampuchea. To that extent we may be indoctrinating a whole generation of young Vietnamese soldiers with the benefits of the profit motive. In fact, they have, I think, lived off the land to a certain extent in that way.

Mr. Negroponte. But they do have their own logistical system. They even fly in supplies.

Mr. Pritchard. The other question was: I think you said in your statement a large number of those so-called squatters on the border have drifted off. Have they gone back to Cambodia?

Mr. Palmieri. Yes, sir.

Mr. Pritchard. That is a hopeful sign, isn't it?

Mr. Palmieri. I think from the Thai standpoint it is a resolution devoutly to be prayed for. They didn't want those people coming into Thailand. They have really melted away largely because they were able to get food into the western part of the country from the border.

PLANTING OF RICE SEED

Mr. Pritchard. What kind of success can we hope for in seed rice getting in there and actually being planted?

Mr. **Palmieri**. I think more than we had thought perhaps a month or two ago and less than we need by far.

Mr. **Wolff**. Thank you very much, Mr. Palmieri. We not only thank you for appearing here before us today but we thank you for the work all of you are doing.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

1980—THE TRAGEDY IN INDOCHINA CONTINUES: WAR, REFUGEES, AND FAMINE

TUESDAY, JULY 29, 1980

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester L. Wolff (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Wolff. The subcommittee will come to order.

This hearing is called on the Cambodian refugee relief. This past April and May, we heard from the administration, and private witnesses as well, in a hearing entitled "The Future of Indochinese Refugees and Cambodian Famine Relief."

The picture was uncertain then. With the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand on June 23, the future for the Cambodian refugees is bleaker now. The land bridge is presently receiving only a trickle of people, and international food aid south of Aranyaprathet has stopped. The amounts of food and rice seed being delivered from Phnom Penh to the outlying areas are slowly reaching the people. However, the amounts they receive are reported as inadequate in order for them to survive through the monsoon season.

Today, appearing before the subcommittee, is our U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, the Honorable Morton Abramowitz, who has been directly involved with the Indochinese refugee crisis and Cambodian famine relief since 1978.

The purpose of our hearing is to have Ambassador Abramowitz report to the subcommittee on the recent events that have taken place along the Thai-Kampuchea border. We particularly look forward to his assessment of what effect the Vietnamese incursion has had and will have on aid to distribution to those refugees who come to the border in search of sustenance.

Specifically, the subcommittee is concerned with the following key questions:

One. What are the prospects for another Vietnamese incursion into Thailand? Is a full-scale invasion aimed at control or dismemberment of portions of Thailand considered likely?

Two. What is the current Vietnamese troop strength in Kampuchea and particularly along the Thai-Kampuchea border?

Three. What is our current estimate of DK resistance forces? How long, at current levels of fighting, can we expect the civil war in Kampuchea to continue?

Four. What role has the Thai military played, past and present, in the distribution of food aid? Specifically on their role in the camps south of Aranyaprathet.

Five. What would be the impact on starvation inside Cambodia and on the flow of refugees into Thailand, should the ICRC and UNICEF stop their border feeding operations?

Six. What is the current status of the Thai/UNHCR repatriation program, and will it differ from the repatriation program that took place in June?

And one more question, and that is the whole question of our continuing recognition of Pol Pot and the future that it holds for us, and I welcome, with that final question, Ambassador Abramowitz. We are delighted to have you with us.

STATEMENT OF HON. MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THAILAND, ACCOMPANIED BY DESAIX ANDERSON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND VIETNAM AFFAIRS; AND PAUL CLEVELAND, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THAI AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am accompanied here today by Desaix Anderson, Director of the Office of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam Affairs; and by Paul Cleveland, who is Director of the Office of Thai Affairs in the Department of State.

I have prepared a relatively brief statement. Do you want me to read it, or how do you want me to proceed?

Mr. WOLFF. At your convenience.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I think it might be useful to read. I will skip some parts which I think are more detailed than necessary. I think many of the questions you asked are answered in the testimony, but a number are not, and I would be prepared to speak to them directly.

I am pleased to be here today and to have this opportunity to talk with you on the situation along the Thai-Cambodian border and in Cambodia. I have welcomed this committee twice in Bangkok and genuinely hope to see it again in Bangkok at an early time. It is important for our own interests that we understand what is happening in Indochina; it is important that Thailand and the other ASEAN nations know that we are deeply interested and concerned about what is going on in the region and are prepared to play a constructive role there. Our continued involvement in Khmer relief remains a life-or-death matter for the Khmer people.

Let me briefly review the principal elements of the present situation:

VIETNAMESE INVASION

The Vietnamese in December 1978—3 weeks after creating their Heng Samrin puppet authority—invaded Cambodia, quickly took Phnom Penh, and drove on to the Thai border. In the process, the country's population was dislocated and the 1979 harvest doomed, with consequences starkly seen in subsequent months of hunger and refugee wanderings. The Vietnamese forces, however, have failed to destroy the Khmer Rouge and other small resistance efforts, such as Son Sann's Cambodian nationalist movement.

The Vietnamese Army—PAVN—has garrisoned Cambodia with about 180,000 troops and perhaps 20,000 more support personnel.

They impose authority in the name of Heng Samrin on all the key cities and along the main roads. Insecurity and conflict are most prevalent in the stretch of Cambodian territory along the Thai border. There, Khmer Rouge and Son Sann units carry out their struggle against Vietnamese forces, taking advantage of rugged territory and a porous, often poorly marked border that is unsealable by either side.

We have little good information on the composition of the Democratic Kampuchean or Pol Pot forces. We do not know their strength but realistic estimates range from 20,000 to 40,000. Their forces, Khmer Rouge forces, badly decimated in 1979, have recovered. They are a cohesive, disciplined fighting force with strong organization and good communications. They are concentrated along the border on the Cambodian side, but with some strength far into the interior of Cambodia.

Given the bloody history of their short rule in Cambodia, it is questionable whether they can recruit more forces. They hope to capitalize on Khmer nationalism and the strong anti-Vietnamese sentiments of the Khmer people. The Son Sann forces, which is the only other significant organized force, total about 5,000 and have focused more on political proselytizing than fighting.

BORDER FIGHTING

The next section reviews basically the four areas where the bulk of the fighting along the border, most of those areas are contested by the Khmer Rouge with a principal one of great concern because of the location of the refugees is the area north of the Thai border town of Aranyaprathet, which, as you know, is the shorthand we used for dividing up the fighting and the location of the refugees.

North of Aranyaprathet are intermingled over 100,000 refugees with small numbers of petty Khmer Serei warlords—mostly a collection of ragtag anti-Vietnamese units who have spent more time fighting each other than the Vietnamese and profiteering on the relief effort—one substantial Khmer Rouge area—Phnom Chat—and the bases of Son Sann's forces. The Vietnamese have sought with limited success to strike at military opportunities here directly north of Aranyaprathet, until the recent incursion, exercised considerable restraint with respect to the civilian concentrations which are no military threat.

JUNE 23 INCURSION

The most dramatic recent event has been the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand June 23. Our best reconstruction of that event is as follows. Early that day, the Vietnamese sent several hundred troops into the Thai village of Ban Non Mak Mun, enveloping the perhaps 20,000-person refugee concentration, camp 204, on the border east of that Thai village. Elements of three Vietnamese regiments were involved in the full operation: One in a blocking position just north of the attack point; the other just south, while the third, in the center, provided most of the troops which moved against the refugees and the Thai village.

A newly dug antitank trench, located between the border and the Thai village, was crossed by the Vietnamese, who thus could have no question about their location. The nearest Thai Army unit responded quickly, but the platoon was ambushed on the road to the village with heavy casualties.

By midmorning, the Thai moved against the Vietnamese positions using artillery support and air force helicopters and planes. The Vietnamese withdrew from the village that afternoon and some fighting continued in the area until the 24th. Thereafter, the two sides disengaged but exchanged mortar and artillery fire for another day.

Our available intelligence indicates that Vietnamese commanders told their troops they would be going into Thailand; that they would stay for a well-defined, if short space of time; and that they would contest, if necessary, Thai Army efforts to move into the area they occupied. It seems, therefore, that the operation was planned in advance and not a result of vague demarcation of the border, hot pursuit, or local commander initiative.

I would emphasize that this was not a major military action. It did not extend over a large area, the number of Vietnamese involved was limited, and they employed no armor or air. In short, it was an incursion, not an invasion.

Nevertheless, an armed incursion is not a trifling matter. Consider if such an incident had happened to us along the DMZ in Korea with the casualties involved—22 for the Thais and 86 Vietnamese killed and 1 captured, according to the Thai reports. The greatest sufferers were actually the Khmer refugees caught in the artillery crossfire.

It appears that some hundred were killed, several hundred wounded, and thousands forced from the camp into the interior of Cambodia. Overall, the major significance of the event lies in its demonstration of Vietnamese disregard for Thai sovereignty and its disruption of refugee congregations.

U.S. RESPONSE

Our response to the Vietnamese incursion was swift and welcomed by the Thai. Secretary Muskie's condemnation of Vietnamese action and support for Thailand was unambiguous. I, myself, called on the Vietnamese Foreign Minister visiting in Bangkok and underlined our deep concern and our ties to Thailand. We also made strong representations to the Soviet Union.

Simultaneously we accelerated delivery of arms purchased by the Thai to defend their borders, providing a timely airlift of howitzers and other items direct to Thailand. We are continuing close consultation with the Thais on political and military measures appropriate to deter further Vietnamese aggression and strengthen Thailand's defenses.

I might note that the question of sending U.S. troops is not at issue, by Thai desires as well as our own assessment of the situation.

Vietnamese leadership appears to have miscalculated the impact of their incursion on the ASEAN countries. Whereas Hanoi strategy has attempted to sow division among ASEAN countries, the incursion in June on the eve of the ASEAN ministerial conference in Kuala Lumpur united the ASEAN countries firmly in support of

Thailand. That support was reflected in the ASEAN communique, which strongly condemned the Vietnamese incursion.

VIETMAN'S DENIAL

The fact that Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach in Jakarta denied that any incursion had occurred underscored the cost to Hanoi's credibility caused by the crossing of Vietnamese troops of the second international frontier for the first time in history—I should add despite repeated promises to the contrary.

While a Vietnamese invasion of deep incursion into Thailand is unlikely, the situation remains very serious. The Vietnamese have mounted in this rainy season a concerted campaign all along the Thai-Cambodian border. Seven Vietnamese divisions—some 60,000 or so troops—are involved in the effort.

They appear to be intent on destroying the Khmer Rouge along the border and certainly at a minimum depriving them of any military initiative during this rainy season. Their efforts—the Vietnamese efforts to clear out the Khmer Rouge—raise again the possibility of further incursions into Thailand and action against the restored refugee concentrations.

The Foreign Minister of Vietnam swore both publicly and privately in Bangkok in late June that the Vietnamese would not transgress Thai territory. We hope his credibility obviously will not be impaired again.

CAMBODIAN PLIGHT

Let me now turn to the plight of the Cambodian people. Their sufferings and the holocaust visited on them since Pol Pot's rise to power in 1975 are well known to all of you. They don't need to be repeated. From your trips to Thailand many of you are personally familiar with the starvation and disease that wracked the Khmer people in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion.

The situation has improved, if far too slowly, since the massive international relief effort began last November, and I think we can take pride in our role in that humanitarian endeavor. The United States has been the catalyst and prime contributor to an effort which I believe has thus far saved large numbers of Khmer people. The support of the American people and Congress has been gratifying, and I would personally add that the support of this committee and the 70 or 80 Members of Congress who have visited Thailand in this past year has been extremely helpful to all of us in maintaining the Khmer relief effort and increasing our support to maintain Thai security. I want to express my personal thanks to the committee.

Nevertheless, the situation is still tenuous. The first question remains whether a good portion of the Khmer people will have enough food to eat until the coming harvest some 4 months away—the question which you raised quite correctly at the beginning of this session, Mr. Chairman.

Our interviews over several months of hundreds of Khmer farmers appearing at the Thai border produce a depressingly unanimous response: Rice supplies from the previous harvest—nature conspiring with invasion to produce an extremely poor one—have been exhausted.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

The subject of international assistance is a difficult one to assess. There have been different perceptions of how effectively the programs have been carried out. There have been limitations on both the channels through the Heng Samrin administration in Phnom Penh and across the Thai-Cambodian border. Given the enormity of the requirements and the limited means for achieving delivery, we have sought to maximize the infusions of aid through every channel.

Assistance through Phnom Penh has had myriad problems: the devastation of the infrastructure during the Pol Pot years; lack of vehicles, cargo landing facilities, destroyed bridges, a road net left untended for years; and near total lack of personnel with either the technical or administrative expertise to manage an assistance program. These problems were compounded by the earlier general debilitation of the Khmer people and new deprivations following the Vietnamese invasion.

Moreover, at least until recently, the priorities of the Vietnamese/Heng Samrin administration essentially ignored the rural Khmer, most of whom at best received a kilogram or less of food per person per month from the Phnom Penh administration since relief efforts began last November. Finally, the Vietnamese held the relief effort hostage to their political purposes

CROSS-BORDER FEEDING

The cross-border feeding operation from Thailand obviously also has had serious limitation. The arduous and long trek across Cambodia and back for sustenance is a terribly inefficient means of achieving relief for the already weakened Khmers. It has also hampered agricultural activity, but without food or seed for the farmers, most of which came from the border or at least had come from the border, agriculture is seriously inhibited. Moreover, transients who come to the border have been subjected to harassment, robbery, and physical jeopardy by a variety of both Khmer and Vietnamese.

Despite these hazards, prior to the Vietnamese attack on the refugee camps June 23, an estimated 60,000 Khmers a week turned up for food distribution at the main food point at Nong Chan, where they were given 30 kilos of rice per distribution. These figures are rough, but we estimate that 500,000 to 1,000,000 people, principally in western Cambodia, benefited from this cross-border feeding operation. We think it was the principal avenue for keeping the people of western Cambodia alive and in western Cambodia.

Despite the difficulties and vagaries of both aspects of the program, we estimate that roughly 100,000 tons of relief, including 22,000 tons of rice seed, were distributed across the border, until it was closed on January 23. Some 100,000 tons of food and some 20,000 tons of rice seed have been sent via the Phnom Penh administration.

THAI GOVERNMENT

I would be remiss if I did not express my appreciation to the Thai Government and people for their cooperation in this and all other aspects of the relief and refugee programs for the people of Cambodia and all of Indochina. Thailand has had up to 1 million people running in and out of its borders since 1975.

It now has the burden of granting asylum to almost 300,000 Indochinese refugees. It has received over 10 percent of the population of Laos. The people of Laos are still coming out at the rate of 2 to 3 percent a year. Thai support for the whole relief operation has been essential in keeping alive a goodly portion of the people of Cambodia and Indochina.

As I have indicated, despite faults and controversies, the first phase of the effort has been a success in saving countless lives from starvation and disease. A limited crop is now in the process of being planted. Our knowledge of its extent and prospects are limited, and there are still 4 months to go. In any event, the acreage will certainly be short of the need. Nevertheless, a corner toward self-sufficiency will have been turned. Relief agencies and donors must also start to plan now, that is, in terms of purchasing rice seeds, for the 1981 planting season.

SHORT- AND LONG-TERM PROBLEMS

The short- and long-term problems faced by the international relief agencies to provide aid to Cambodia are obviously complex and very difficult. I have alluded several times to the restrictions placed on operations from the Phnom Penh side. We all welcome the recent news from the international organizations of significant relaxations of restrictions and a successful effort to clear Cambodian ports of relief commodities.

But, given past history, it seems wise to see what they mean in practical terms of feeding the rural Khmer. I do not believe we can rest until a comprehensive system permitting broad, reasonably monitored distribution to the countryside is achieved.

Controversy continues as to the best means to do this—the keys, in terms of Cambodia, are obviously in Hanoi and Moscow. The Vietnamese excuse of noninterference in the internal affairs of the Heng Samrin government does not wash in the face of the urgent needs of the Khmer people and Vietnam's massive influence in all other aspects of Cambodian life.

Conceivably recent reports of improvement reflect a Vietnamese perception that there are more political benefits to be gained from cooperation with the international relief effort rather than from obstructionism.

BORDER SITUATION

On the border, the international relief effort has also faced multiple frustrations. Most discouraging perhaps has been the repeated outbreak of fighting between the so-called Khmer Serei groups whose disreputable leaders seek to maintain their petty positions of personal power and the undoubtedly lucrative cut from diversions and sales of relief supplies.

There is no simple solution, but the Thai Government and international organizations are working within their limitations to overcome the problems by both separating out the armed elements in the camps and trying to develop direct distributions which would make black market profiteering more difficult.

The second major border dilemma is assuring that relief supplies go to the needy civilians in Khmer Rouge controlled areas and not to soldiers. Their number of civilians are uncertain: some put it as low as 20,000; some as high as 55,000. Insecurity and the constant fighting in the area make monitoring here nonexistent. International relief supplies to this area have been recently suspended. They were suspended on June 17. This issue is under the urgent consideration of the Thai Government and international organizations, and we have a cable in from Bangkok indicating that at the moment it looks like a solution has been reached. It has to be ratified by the senior officials of the international organizations, and this resolution would provide for continued feeding to women, that is, the women in the area would receive directly, on a retail basis instead of the wholesale basis under which aid was previously delivered to the area, a daily ration sufficient to feed three people. Hopefully, in that way the supply of goods to the combatants will be reduced, or more appropriately the supply of food to the civilians will be increased.

The dilemmas of the relief effort, both on the border and through Phnom Penh, have been caught up in the political objectives of the countries involved. This has been principally reflected in the debate which has frequently broken out in the press and sometimes been acrimonious about relative priorities to be given to the Phnom Penh versus border program.

IMPORTANCE OF BORDER-FEEDING

But the important thing to me, and what must not be forgotten, is that cross-border feeding and large concentrations of Khmer refugees at the border developed because of the absence of an adequate food distribution program within Cambodia.

Once that is in place, the border operation should wither away in any event. Until that takes place, until we have a system to feed the rural Khmer as long as they are not growing a sufficient amount of food, both avenues of relief have to be pursued as vigorously as possible. We simply cannot risk the cessation of cross-border feeding which puts food into the hands of those who need it, notwithstanding the associated uncertainties, on the basis of hopes out of Phnom Penh that all is well.

NORTH OF ARANYAPRATHET

Since the Vietnamese invasion a month ago, the refugee and relief situation north of Aranyaprathet, as you pointed out in your statement, Mr. Chairman, has changed significantly. The number of refugees at the border is down and is now very crudely estimated at from 100,000 to 150,000. The armed Khmer elements of all stripes in the area are a small fraction of this amount—some 5,000 to 10,000.

The bulk of the refugees are at the two camps of Nong Samet and Nong Chan, being cared for by international and voluntary agencies, and I might add the condition of those camps are not very good. There are, of course, another 150,000 Khmer in refugee camps within Thailand.

The cross-border feeding situation remains seriously disrupted. Only small amounts of food have been distributed in recent weeks at two border points by international agencies. The international agencies are trying, but have not yet reestablished the previous major mechanism of cross-border feeding that was in place at Nong Chan.

Most significant, only very small numbers of people are now appearing at the border to seek food, although on the basis of some recent cables we have received from Bangkok in the past few days, the numbers coming to the border on foot have increased.

Some of this reduction may be due to the present absorption in planting in Cambodia, but the main factor seems to be that the Vietnamese are stopping at least some and perhaps many Khmer from going to the border. The situation, frankly, is confused as to what the Vietnamese are doing. Khmer may also simply fear going to the border for fear of hostilities. The possible impact of all this can be catastrophic. In the months of April and May some 12,000 to 16,000 tons of food were going into western Cambodia. That supply has been cut off for over a month, and there is no evidence that food distributions from Phnom Penh have made up that deficiency.

FINAL SETTLEMENT

Finally, we must recognize that while the world has saved millions of Khmer, the end of the Khmer relief problem and some serious reconstruction in Cambodia can derive only from a political resolution of the struggle for control in Cambodia.

The resolution passed by the last United Nations General Assembly provides, I believe, a solid basis to pursue a settlement of the Cambodian problem. But, unfortunately, nothing has so far been achieved, and the prospects for a political solution are hardly promising.

Thus far, the Vietnamese have shown no flexibility on their part over substantive issues involved in the Cambodian problem. Their insistence on keeping its troops in Cambodia indefinitely and on the outside world's acceptance of the Heng Samrin regime remain the nub of the problem.

Their recent statement on the subject—the Indochinese ministerial statement of July 18—artfully seems to indicate some flexibility, but in effect offers us again only the Heng Samrin government and a continued, indefinite Vietnamese occupation.

We simply cannot achieve peace in Cambodia, given the attitudes of the parties, if the Vietnamese insist on a peace exclusively on their own terms. Without some flexibility, there can be no hope for resolution of the problem.

In addition to the Vietnamese attitude other major uncertainties remain. The situation inside Cambodia is still ambiguous. Khmer Rouge capabilities to harass the Vietnamese and make trouble for them are unclear. The border situation continues to be tense and dangerous. Thai security remains a major concern of the United States amidst all this uncertainty, we cannot lose sight of the near total dependence of the Khmer people on outside sources for their very lives.

I would conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that despite the ambiguities and difficulties, the United States has no choice but to continue its vigorous relief efforts to save Cambodia and the Khmer people from extinction while at the same time remaining vigilant for possibilities of a satisfactory negotiated outcome—however remote that outcome appears at this time.

Thank you.

[Ambassador Abramowitz' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THAILAND

I am pleased to be here today and to have this opportunity to talk with you on the situation along the Thai-Cambodian border and in Cambodia. I have welcomed this Committee twice in Bangkok and genuinely hope to see it again in Bangkok at an early time. It is important for our own interests that we understand what is happening in Indochina; it is important that Thailand and the other ASEAN nations know that we are deeply interested and concerned about what is going on in the region and are prepared to play a constructive role there. Our continued involvement in Khmer relief remains a life or death matter for the Khmer people.

Let me briefly review the principal elements of the present situation:

The Vietnamese in December 1978 -- three weeks after creating their Heng Samrin puppet authority -- invaded Cambodia, quickly took Phnom Penh, and drove on to the Thai border. In the process, the country's population was dislocated and the 1979 harvest doomed, with consequences starkly seen in subsequent months of hunger and refugee wanderings. The Vietnamese forces, however, have failed to destroy the Khmer Rouge and other small resistance efforts, such as Son Sann's Cambodian nationalist movement.

The Vietnamese army (PAVN) has garrisoned Cambodia with about 180,000 troops and perhaps 20,000 more support personnel. They impose authority in the name of Heng Samrin on all the key cities and along the main roads. Insecurity and conflict are most prevalent in the stretch of Cambodian territory along the Thai border. There Khmer Rouge and Son Sann units carry out their struggle against Vietnamese forces, taking advantage of rugged territory and a porous, often poorly marked border that is unsealable by either side.

We have little good information on the composition of the Democratic Kampuchean or Pol Pot forces. We do not know their strength but realistic estimates range from 20,000 to 40,000. Their forces badly decimated in 1979 have recovered. They are a cohesive, disciplined fighting force with strong organization and good communications. They are concentrated along the border on the Cambodian side, but with some strength far into the interior of Cambodia. Given the bloody history of their short rule in Cambodia it is questionable whether they can recruit more forces. They hope to capitalize on Khmer nationalism and the strong anti-Vietnamese sentiments of the Khmer people. The Son Sann forces total about 5,000 and have focused more on political proselytizing than fighting.

The Thai-Cambodian border is roughly divisible into four segments of military activity:

-- The most active combat is taking place in Khmer Rouge-dominated area south of the Thai border town of

Aranyaprathet anchored on Phnom Melai on the north and extending into the Cardamon Mountains in the south.

-- The southwestern corner where the Thai border meets the sea is also an area of Khmer Rouge operations and presents considerable security problems for the Vietnamese, who have not extended strong control over Koh Kong province and the shoreline.

-- The northern border of Cambodia is a sparsely populated area with the border formed by mountains sharply dropping to the Cambodian plain. Its rugged territory provides protection for both Khmer Rouge and small Son Sann units.

-- The less-rugged land north of Aranyaprathet has received most of the news coverage. Here are intermingled over 100,000 refugees with small numbers of petty Khmer Serei warlords (mostly a collection of ragtag anti-Vietnamese units who have spent more time fighting each other than the Vietnamese and profiteering on the relief effort), one substantial Khmer Rouge area (Phnom Chat) and the bases of Son Sann's forces. The Vietnamese have sought with limited success to strike at military opportunities here, and, until the Mak Mun incursion, exercised considerable restraint with respect to the civilian concentrations which are no military threat.

The most dramatic recent event has been the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand June 23. Our best reconstruction of that event is as follows. Early that day the Vietnamese sent several hundred troops into the Thai village of Ban Non Mak Mun, enveloping the perhaps 20,000 person refugee concentration, Camp 204, on the border east of that Thai village. Elements of three Vietnamese regiments were involved in the full operation: One in a blocking position just north of the attack point; the other just south, while the third, in the center, provided most of the troops which moved against the refugees and the Thai village. A newly-dug anti-tank trench, located between the border and the Thai village, was crossed by the Vietnamese, who thus could have no question about their location. The nearest Thai army unit responded quickly, but the platoon was ambushed on the road to the village with heavy casualties. By mid-morning the Thai moved against the Vietnamese positions using artillery support and air force helicopters and planes. The Vietnamese withdrew from the village that afternoon and some fighting continued in the area until the 24th. Thereafter the two sides disengaged but exchanged mortar and artillery fire for another day.

Intelligence indicates that Vietnamese commanders told their troops they would be going into Thailand; that they would stay for a well-defined if short space of time; and that they would contest if necessary Thai army efforts to move into the area they occupied. It seems therefore that the operation was planned in advance and not a result of vague demarcation of the border, hot pursuit, or local initiative.

I would emphasize that this was not a major military action. It did not extend over a large area, the number of Vietnamese involved was limited, and they employed no armor or air. In short, it was an incursion not an invasion. Nevertheless, an armed incursion is not a trifling matter. Consider if such an incident had happened along the DMZ in Korea with the casualties involved -- 22 for the Thais and 86 Vietnamese killed and one captured according to the Thais. The greatest sufferers were actually the Khmer refugees caught in the artillery crossfire. It appears that some hundred were killed, several hundred wounded, and thousands forced from the camp into the interior. Overall, the major significance of the event lies in its demonstration of Vietnamese disregard for Thai sovereignty and its disruption of refugee congregations.

The U.S. response to the Vietnamese incursion was swift and welcomed by the Thai. Secretary Muskie's condemnation of Vietnamese action and support for Thailand was unambiguous. I myself called on the Vietnamese Foreign Minister visiting in Bangkok and underlined our deep concern and our ties to Thailand. We also made strong representations to the Soviet Union. Simultaneously we accelerated delivery of arms purchased by the Thai to defend their borders, providing a timely airlift of howitzers and other items dirct to Bangkok. We are continuing close consultation with the Thais on political and military measure appropriate to deter further Vietnamese aggression and strengthen Thailand's defenses. I might note that the question of sending U.S. troops is not at issue, by Thai desires as well as our own assessment of the situation.

Vietnamese leadership appears to have miscalculated the mpact of their incursion on ASEAN. Whereas, Hanoi strategy as attempted to sow division among ASEAN, the incursion in June on the eve~~p~~ of the ASEAN ministerial conference in Kuala Lumpur united the ASEAN allies firmly in support of Thailand. That support was reflected in the ASEAN communique, which strongly condemned the Vietnamese incursion. The fact that Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach in Jakarta denied that any incursion had occurred underscored the cost to Hanoi's credibility caused by the crossing of PAVN troops of the second international frontier (for the first time in history) despite repeated promises to the contrary.

While a Vietnamese invasion of deep incursion into Thailand is unlikely, the situation remains very serious. The Vietnamese have mounted in this rainy season a concerted campaign all along the Thai-Cambodian border. Seven Vietnamese divisions - some 60,000 troops -- are involved in the effort. They appear to be intent on destroying the Khmer Rouge along the border and at a minimum depriving them of any military initiative during this rainy season. Their efforts raise again the possibility of further incursions into Thailand and action against the restored refugee concentrations. The Foreign Minister of Vietnam swore both publicly and privately in Bangkok in late June that the Vietnamese would not transgress Thai territory. We hope his credibility will not be impaired again.

Let me now turn to the plight of the Khmer people. Their sufferings and the holocaust visited on them since Pol Pot's rise to power in 1975 are well known to all of you. From your trips to Thailand many of you are personally familiar with the starvation and disease that wracked the Khmer people in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion. The situation has improved, if far too slowly, since the massive international relief began last November and we can take pride in our role in that humanitarian endeavor. The U.S. has been the catalyst and prime contributor to an effort which I believe has thus far saved large numbers of Khmer people. The support of the American people and Congress has been gratifying.

Nevertheless, the situation is still tenuous. The first question reamins whether a good portion of the Khmer people will have enough food to eat until the coming harvest some four months away. Our interviews over several months of hundreds of Khmer farmers appearing at the Thai border produce a depressingly unanimous response: Rice supplies from the previous harvest--nature conspired with invasion to produce an extremely poor one--have been exhausted.

The subject of international assistance is a difficult one to assess. There have been different perceptions of how effectively the programs have been carried out. There have been limitations on both the channels through the Heng Samrin administration in Phnom Penh and across the border. Given the enormity of the requirements and the limited means for achieving delivery, we have sought to maximize the infusions of aid through all channels.

Assistance through Phnom Penh has had myriad problems: the devastation of the infrastructure during the Pol Pot years; lack of vehicles, cargo landing facilities, destroyed bridges, a road net left untended for years; and near total lack of personnel with either the technical or administrative expertise to manage an assistance program. These problems were compounded by the earlier general debilitation of the Khmer people and new deprivations following the Vietnamese invasion. Moreover, at least until recently the priorities of the Vietnamese/Heng Samrin administration essentially ignored the rural Khmer, most of whom at best received a kilogram or less of food per person per month from the Phnom Penh administration since relief efforts began in the late fall. Finally the Vietnamese held the relief effort hostage to their political purposes.

The cross border feeding operation from Thailand obviously also has had serious limitation. The arduous and long trek across Cambodia and back for sustenance is a terribly inefficient means of achieving relief for the already weakened Khmers. It has also hampered agricultural activity, but without food or seed for the farmers, most of which came from the border, agriculture is seriously inhibited. Moreover, transients who come to the border have been subjected to harassment, robbery, and physical jeopardy by a variety of both Khmer and Vietnamese. Despite these hazards, prior to the Vietnamese attack on the refugee camps June 23, an estimated 60,000 Khmers a week turned up for food distribution at the main food point at Nong Chan. These figures are rough, but we estimate that 500,000 to one million people, principally in western Cambodia, benefitted from this cross-border feeding operation.

Despite the difficulties and vagaries of both aspects of the program, we estimate that roughly 100,000 tons of relief, including 22,000 tons of rice seed were distributed across the border. Some 100,000 tons of food and some 20,000 tons of rice seed have been sent via the Phnom Penh administration.

I would be remiss if I did not express my appreciation to the Thai government and people for their cooperation in this and all other aspects of the relief and refugee programs for the people of Cambodia and all of Indochina. Thailand has had up to a million people running in and out of its borders since 1975. It has the burden of granting asylum to almost 300,000 Indochinese refugees at this point. It has received over ten percent of the population of Laos. Thai support for the whole relief operation has been essential in keeping alive a goodly portion of the people of Cambodia and Indochina.

As I have indicated, despite faults and controversies, the first phase of the effort has been a success in saving countless lives from starvation and disease. A limited crop is now in the process of being planted. Our knowledge of its extent and prospects are limited. In any event the acreage will certainly be short of the need. Nevertheless, a corner toward self-sufficiency will have been turned. Relief agencies and donors must also start to plan now for the 1981 planting season.

The short and long term problems faced by the international relief agencies are complex and very difficult. I have alluded several times to the restrictions placed on operations within Cambodia. We all welcome the recent news from the international organizations of relaxations of restrictions and a successful effort to clear Cambodian ports of relief commodities. But given past history it seems wise to see what they mean in practical terms of feeding the rural Khmer. We cannot rest until a comprehensive system permitting broad, reasonably monitored distribution to the countryside is achieved. Controversy continues as to the best means to do this -- the keys are obviously in Hanoi and Moscow. The excuse of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Heng Samrin government does not wash in the face of the urgent needs of the Khmer people and Hanoi's massive influence in all other aspects of Cambodian life. Conceivably recent reports of improvement reflect a Vietnamese perception that there are more political benefits to be gained from cooperation with the international relief effort rather than from obstructionism.

On the border, the international relief effort has also faced multiple frustrations. Most discouraging perhaps has been the repeated outbreak of fighting between the so-called

Khmer Serei groups whose disreputable leaders seek to maintain their petty positions of personal power and the undoubtedly lucrative cut from diversions and sales of relief supplies. There is no simple solution, but the Thai government and international organizations are working within their limitations to overcome the problems by both separating out armed elements and trying to develop direct distributions which would make black market profiteering more difficult.

The second major border dilemma is assuring that relief supplies go to the needy civilians in Khmer Rouge controlled areas not to soldiers. Their number are uncertain: some put it as low as 20,000, some as high as 55,000. Insecurity makes monitoring here non-existent. International relief supplies to this area have been recently suspended. This issue is under the urgent consideration of the Thai government and international organizations. I understand from recent reports that direct distributions to civilians in these areas as well is being considered.

The dilemmas of the relief effort both on the border and through Phnom Penh have been caught up in the political objectives of the countries involved. This has been principally reflected in the debate about relative priorities to be given to the Phnom Penh vs. border program. But it must not be forgotten that cross border feeding and large concentrations of Khmer refugees at the border developed because of the absence of an adequate food distribution program within Cambodia. Once that is in place the border operation should wither away in any event. Until then both avenues of relief have to be pursued as vigorously as possible. We simply cannot risk the cessation of cross border feeding which puts food into the hands of those who need it, notwithstanding the associated uncertainties, on the basis of hopes out of Phnom Penh.

Since the Vietnamese invasion a month ago the refugee and relief situation north of Aranyaprathet has changed significantly. The number of refugees at the border is down and is now very crudely estimated at from 100 to 150 thousand. The armed Khmer elements of all stripes in the area are a small fraction of this amount -- some 5 to 10 thousand. The bulk of the refugees are at the two camps of Nong Samet and Nong Chan being cared for by international and voluntary agencies. There are of course another 150,000 Khmer in refugee camps within Thailand.

The cross border feeding situation remains seriously disrupted. Only small amounts of food have been distributed in recent weeks at two border points by international agencies. The international agencies are trying, but have not yet reestablished the previous major mechanism of cross border feeding that was in place at Nong Chan. Most significant only very small numbers of people are appearing at the border to seek food, although in the past few days numbers coming to the border on foot have increased. Some of this reduction may be due to the present absorption in planting in Cambodia, but the main factor seems to be that the Vietnamese are stopping at least some and perhaps many Khmer from going to the border. Khmer may also simply fear going to the border for fear of hostilities. The possible impact of all this can be catastrophic. In the months of April and May some 12 to 16,000 tons of food was going into Western Cambodia. That supply has been cut off for over a month and there is no evidence that food distributions from Phnom Penh have made up that deficiency

Finally, we must frankly recognize that while the world has saved millions of Khmer, the end of the Khmer relief problem and some serious reconstruction in Cambodia can derive only from a political resolution of the struggle for control in Cambodia. The resolution passed by the last United Nations General Assembly provides a solid basis to pursue a settlement of the Cambodian problem. But nothing has so far been achieved and the prospects for a political solution are hardly promising.

Thus far, the Vietnamese have shown no flexibility on their part over substantive issues involved in the Cambodian problem. Vietnamese insistence on keeping its troops in Cambodia indefinitely and on the outside world's acceptance of the Heng Samrin regime remain the nub of the problem. Their recent statement on the subject -- the Indochinese Ministerial statement of July 18--artfully seems to indicate some flexibility but in effect offers us again only the Heng Samrin Government and Vietnamese occupation. We cannot achieve peace in Cambodia if the Vietnamese insist on a peace exclusively on their own terms. Without some flexibility, there can be no hope for resolution of the problem.

In addition to the Vietnamese attitude other major uncertainties remain. The situation inside Cambodia is still ambiguous. Democratic Kampuchea capabilities to harass the Vietnamese are unclear. The border situation continues to be tense and dangerous. Thai security remains a major concern of ours. Amidst all this uncertainty, we cannot lose sight of the near total dependence of the Khmer people on outside sources for their very lives.

I would conclude Mr. Chairman by saying that despite the ambiguities and difficulties, the U.S. has no choice but to continue its vigorous relief efforts to save Cambodia and the Khmer people from extinction while at the same time remaining vigilant for possibilities of a satisfactory negotiated outcome - however remote it appears at this time.

SUPPORT OF KHMER ROUGE

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, very much, Ambassador Abramowitz. Since you did answer most of my questions, you left the last question for resolution, and we continue to wonder why, if the situation has been what it has been with Pol Pot, why we as a nation continue to support Pol Pot when there seems to be difficulties that exist in providing for the safe access of food and medical supplies for the Cambodian people.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think I would slightly differ with your characterization that we support Pol Pot. I don't think there is any doubt that the United States does not support Pol Pot. It has stated so publicly on numerous occasions, and I can assure you privately there is no U.S. Government support whatever for Pol Pot, and no U.S. Government involvement in any way in the internal affairs of Cambodia other than to do our best to get relief commodities in.

What I think has to be considered, and what we are talking about, is not U.S. support or recognition of Pol Pot, of course, but the question of the continued seating of the Khmer Rouge Government in the United Nations—we never recognized the Khmer regime, as you know—the continued seating of the Khmer Government in the United Nations, and what that involves, and I think particularly from the perspective of Bangkok, it is useful to set forth some of the complexities.

The first complexity is that from the standpoint of the countries of the area, their major preoccupation is their own security, and they see—and particularly Thailand—they see their security threatened not by the Khmer Rouge or by the other small anti-Vietnamese resistance elements in Cambodia, but by the Vietnamese, and their principal concern is to see the Vietnamese removed from Cambodia.

None of these governments, including the Thais, support the Khmer Rouge in terms of what they have done, obviously, but clearly they recognize that the Vietnamese are not going to just remove themselves from Cambodia.

From the ASEAN standpoint, they look upon the Khmer recognition issue as a case of how do you put pressure on the Vietnamese to move toward a political settlement. In their view, to accede to the Vietnamese request to kick the Khmer Rouge out of the United Nations and seat the Heng Samrin government is foregoing any possibility that the Vietnamese will be willing to proceed to any consideration of a negotiated solution.

That is their attitude, and the attitude shared by many, and it is a consideration that I think we all have to weigh. It is a principal question I think should be resolved.

It is clear that everybody in the world has a complete and fundamental dislike for what the Khmer Rouge government was like, and I don't think there is any doubt about it, and that should be put to rest.

U.N. VOTE

As you know, basically we all held our noses and voted for the Khmer Rouge government to maintain its seat in the United Nations last year, but the question that has to be resolved, as I see it, is how does this issue relate to the prospects for negotiation. Does voting for the Khmer Rouge increase the prospects for negotiation, that is, voting to maintain the Khmer Rouge seat increase prospects for some sort of settlement, other than on Vietnamese terms, or does voting against them——

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA INFLUENCE

Mr. **Wolff.** There is one point, Mr. Ambassador, that concerns a number of us, and that is it is not only the question of the ASEAN desires, having spoken to a number of members of ASEAN; they continue to pursue the position of maintaining the Pol Pot seat in the United Nations, but the concern that I and others have, is that the U.S. policy not be dictated by the People's Republic of China, who have a concern in this area as well.

I am playing the role of devil's advocate in this position, because I may not subscribe to the idea of supporting either Pol Pot or the Heng Samrin forces. I wonder if you could tell us the position the People's Republic of China has with relation to the overall policy considerations that affect us?

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** Let me say first that I don't think that the U.S. policy in Southeast Asia is being determined by the Chinese. Obviously we consider Chinese views, but some of our views on the situation in Southeast Asia are significantly different, particularly their support of the Pol Pot government.

The Chinese view basically is that the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia is not only a local bit of hegemonism, as they call it, but has significant worldwide repercussions, being part of the broad Soviet world, including the Vietnamese effort to take over a significant part of Asia, and particularly threaten western oil supplies.

The Chinese see a necessity for opposing this in every way and using every mechanism to make this more costly and more difficult and hopefully over time to force the Vietnamese in this case to remove themselves from Cambodia.

The Chinese policy is to bleed the Vietnamese, is to make them over time, by a combination of pressures and continued fighting in Cambodia, effect significant internal political changes so that the Vietnamese are willing to change their policies and change their Soviet orientation.

The Chinese look upon the situation in Cambodia as a fundamental strategic problem which they are prepared to contest for a long period of time. The big problem with the Chinese position is that those who are going to be ground up over a long period of time, of course, are the Cambodians, in any event, the Chinese see that there is not much likelihood for a resolution to the Cambodian problem or any Vietnamese flexibility if the Vietnamese can impose their own will.

SECOND LESSON

Mr. **Wolff.** What are the prospects for a second lesson?

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** That is a very good question, and it obviously is a question we ask ourselves frequently. I think that the Vietnamese problem is a major preoccupation of the Chinese. There is no question about that. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia touched off the only time in the past 20 years that the Chinese engaged in military action, so that gives you the depth of Chinese feeling——

Mr. **Wolff.** Were we in contact with the Chinese at the time of the incursion into Thailand? Did we have any joint discussions with them relative to meeting this challenge?

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** I know that near that time the Vice Prime Minister of China was in the United States, Deng Xiao-Ping, but of the nature of those discussions——

Mr. **Wolff.** I am talking about the recent incursion.

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** I thought you were talking about the first lesson.

Mr. **Wolff.** I am talking about the recent incursion, as you characterized it, into Thailand. Were there any conversations or discussions held with the Chinese relative to meeting this challenge?

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** Well, certainly since the incursion there have been discussions held with the Chinese about the situation in Cambodia—there is no question about that—and the situation on the Thai border, as we have had similar discussions with a number of other countries. I am certain that took place.

One thing I wanted to finish on the prospects for a second lesson.

Mr. **Wolff.** The first lesson didn't work out too well?

OBJECTIVES OF FIRST LESSON

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** Well, it depends on what the objectives of the first lesson were. If the objective of the first lesson was to drive the Vietnamese out of Cambodia, that did not work out too well, but if the objectives of the first lesson were to maintain Chinese prestige and to put some limits and some constraints on Vietnamese activity and to embarrass the Soviets, then conceivably the Chinese might term their effort successful. It depends upon in what framework you are evaluating lessons.

Obviously, the Vietnamese are not the best of all students, if that is the point you are making. But going on to the question of a second lesson, I think the things that can be said is, that the Vietnamese are a major preoccupation to the PRC. The Chinese see the situation in significant strategic terms. The Chinese are deeply concerned about the situation on the Thai border. Their relations with Thailand have improved enormously over the past 5 years, and any incursion, serious incursion, of Vietnamese into Thailand would be a very dangerous thing in terms of a possible Chinese response.

I certainly am in no position to predict what the Chinese would do.

Mr. **Wolff**. Thank you.

Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. **Pritchard**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess what we are all looking for is what you call the light at the end of the tunnel here.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. It is a long tunnel, sir.

MAJOR CHANGE NEEDED

Mr. **Pritchard**. It seems that unless there is some major change, we and the refugees and the people in Cambodia and all the players are stuck in the role that they have.

To start with, what do you think of the possibility of this war escalating out there, and spilling over into Thailand?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Well, I think a major Vietnamese invasion of Thailand is very unlikely. Certainly there is no evidence that that is being considered.

On the other hand, given the fighting along the border and given the Vietnamese determination to try to eradicate the Khmer Rouge, and given their own deep interest in maintaining their domination of Cambodia, I cannot preclude that we won't have a repetition of the incident of June 23. I think it is highly possible.

Mr. **Pritchard**. But that is really border action, isn't it?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. That is border action, but we can't preclude that it might be a little deeper; it might be a little longer, and that raises all sorts of repercussions, particularly, I think, along the Chinese-Vietnamese border.

In any event, it is a very worrisome situation. I certainly would not deny that. On the other hand, the Vietnamese have behaved with a certain amount of circumspection until that last incident. They have proclaimed loudly that they will not violate Thai territory. The Russians have also indicated that. This does not preclude them doing it. There are inhibitions against the Vietnamese doing it.

CHINA'S PRESENCE IS DETERRENT

Mr. **Pritchard**. Would you agree with me, that China's presence there is one of the large deterrents to their further aggression?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. No question, but I can't say it is adequate, though. I can't say it is sufficient. I think it is sufficient—as well as our treaty commitment—I think it is sufficient to rule out any massive invasion of Thailand. I certainly could not preclude, as I say, these sorts of border incidents.

I don't think they are likely, but I just do not predict they won't reoccur. It is a worrisome situation.

Mr. PRITCHARD. How do you explain the timing of this last border incident, and was it part of an overall plan? It appears to me it wasn't very good timing.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, the simple answer is I can't explain the timing. I can only speculate on what was involved here, and I think there may well have been a disconnect—and here I am purely speculating—a disconnect between the military commanders in the field and Hanoi and the foreign ministry, which doesn't exercise much power in Hanoi, anyway, and the timing of an incident coming before the ASEAN ministerial meeting may have just conceivably been a case of very bad coordination.

It also is possible that the Vietnamese may have felt they could carry out this operation without some engagement with the Thais, that they could destroy the element they were going after, destroy the refugee concentrations and get out without any military engagement with the Thais and therefore without a blatant transgression of the Thai border. That is possible. I just don't know. It is clear, however, as I said, that they knew that they were transgressing the border of Thailand.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Considering the meeting of the ASEAN nations at that time, and statements by the foreign minister, or whoever it was that was in Thailand——

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. The Foreign Minister. You know he is a very, very astute man, and he knows how to handle the press, and he handles himself with very great aplomb. I think he was deeply embarrassed by the coincidence of his being in Thailand and having to face a clear violation of Thai territory, Vietnamese troops dead on Thai territory, when he had proclaimed that Vietnam would not transgress the Thai border. His credibility has been lessened.

Mr. WOLFF. If the gentleman will yield, we have noticed that as well in recent statements he has made against me.

KHMER ROUGE FORCES

Mr. PRITCHARD. To start with, what successes have been made in this latter drive?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. The Khmer Rouge forces?

Mr. PRITCHARD. Yes.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. As far as I can tell, they have had very little success. And before this current Vietnamese offensive began, which I would point out is taking place in the rainy season, a period when you are not supposed to fight——

Mr. PRITCHARD. Yes, I remember that in Vietnam, that old story.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ [continuing]. Is that it was expected that the Khmer Rouge would significantly step up their harassment of Vietnamese or bother their supply lines and just give them a generally bad time. In fact, as far as I know, that has not occurred, and the past month has been spent trying to survive against a fairly heavy Vietnamese onslaught all over Cambodia; so it is difficult to say what will be their impact.

At the present time, their impact has been, in the terms of the Vietnamese, to generate a cost for them in terms of operations, but not a cost in terms of creating confusion, destroying supply lines, et cetera. It is a significant cost to carry out an operation involving seven divisions.

Mr. PRITCHARD. This is part of the bleeding process?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. This is the way the Chinese see it, yes. It is an effort to bleed the Vietnamese. That is the only way they see that the Vietnamese might be persuaded to talk political compromise.

Mr. WOLFF. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. PRITCHARD. Go ahead.

SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Mr. WOLFF. Could you give us an estimate how much in the way of military supplies the Soviets have put into Vietnam?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, I think there is no question, Mr. Chairman, that the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the continued operations of the Vietnamese in Cambodia could not continue without Soviet support. The Soviets have underwritten certainly the military components. Indeed, as you all are probably aware, the Soviets have a military aviation unit in Ho Chi Minh City, which does most of the high value military cargo supply for the Vietnamese to the provincial airports of Cambodia.

We don't have a good estimate. The bulk of the Soviet equipment and aid was in 1979 when they were fighting both the Chinese and in Cambodia. I think the estimate is about $1 billion delivered this year. The military is running slightly less.

Mr. WOLFF. Do you know what we are estimating roughly now?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Mr. Anderson says it is an average of $3 million a day military, $3 million a day economic.

The Soviets have substantially built up the Vietnamese forces in terms of equipment, for example, giving them some very late bomber equipment, like the SU-22. It is a very significant investment and the Soviets see it as a strategic investment; one, as a very strong anti-Chinese bastion in Southeast Asia, and, two, as a strategic opportunity for a Soviet military base in the area.

Mr. PRITCHARD. So it is a general escalation?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I wouldn't say it has escalated again. It has the possible seeds of escalation, but it has not escalated. The level of fighting has varied over the past 20 months, but certainly the seeds of wider fighting are possible. They are there.

CATCH 22

Mr. PRITCHARD. Well, put it this way. One, the Chinese are not going to back off on Pol Pot. Those forces are not being eradicated. As far as we can tell, it would take a major increase to actually wipe them out.

The Vietnamese are in there, and the Russians have made such a big investment that there doesn't seem much way they are going to back out of the situation. We are sending material to the Thais, and, at least at this point, they are being pretty strong on maintaining that border and their strength. It is hard to see any way out of this thing.

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** Well, I can't argue with you when you say the situation is difficult. Given the attitudes of the parties, given the virulent nature of Chinese-Vietnamese animosity, and behind that the Sino-Soviet animosity, it is difficult to see in the short term a resolution of the problem.

Nevertheless, with all the parties involved, or some sort of resolution of the Cambodian situation is going to be the only way to reduce tensions in the area.

You are not going to reduce tensions in the area if the solution is defined on the basis of one party's interests. So that some resolution of interest is absolutely essential. I cannot say it is likely, and I cannot say it is at hand.

On the other hand, there are very serious constraints to all the parties on raising the level of hostilities. I don't think any party wants it. I don't think the Vietnamese want it. I don't think the Chinese desire any second lesson. They had an ample opportunity if they wanted to.

So, there are clear constraints on the parts of all the parties. So while the situation is dangerous and has the seeds of wider war—and it certainly contributes to decimating the Cambodian people—in the wider political military terms I don't necessarily see anything but a continuation of a general situation of hostilities at relatively low level.

Mr. **Pritchard.** Everybody is locked into this position.

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** Yes, but many things change. The international environment changes. The costs to the Vietnamese may change.

Take the Vietnamese situation. I think it is a useful thing to compare the Vietnamese situation now to what it was during the Vietnamese war.

CHANGED FACTORS

I do not mean to understate the Vietnamese capacity to endure and to persist, despite costs. But three fundamental factors have changed.

First, the Vietnamese strategic situation is totally different. They fought the United States and they fought the French with the aid of the Russians and the Chinese. They now face a situation, not of a country which is 10,000 miles away in the Western Hemisphere or in France, but a country which is on their border, which has a deep hostility, a long-term historical hostility, and which has the capacity to destroy them.

The Chinese will not go away. The Americans may depart, the French may depart, but the Chinese are eternal. They are going to sit on them. So that is one aspect of the strategic position which has changed.

The second aspect is that the Vietnamese are on the opposite side of the nationalist issue. In the war against the Americans, in the war against the French the Vietnamese had the nationalist banner. The Vietnamese are an occupying power in a country which has been violently anti-Vietnamese, which has had Vietnamese pogroms, in which the attitude toward the Vietnamese is not good. So, they are an antinationalist force now.

Third, the Vietnamese position in the world has significantly changed. When they fought the Americans, and the French, the Vietnamese had the respect of at least a substantial portion of the non-Communist world, a lot of support, economic assistance, et cetera.

That is ended now. Their clear antihumanitarian policies, their expulsion of large numbers of people, their occupation of Cambodia has to a great extent isolated them.

Those are three significant factors that are different than before. I cannot say that those factors will be translated into a change in Vietnamese policy. But the Vietnamese position is different.

Mr. **Pritchard**. What about their economic situation?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. By all accounts, let me say our analysis of this has deteriorated badly. We don't pay enough attention to it. We don't devote enough resources to it.

But what we do know indicates a continuing bad situation, and particularly in the southern part of Vietnam, which has not been successfully integrated into the rest of the country, which is one reason why a lot of people still want to leave.

Mr. **Pritchard**. I am sorry to take up so much time. I appreciate it.

Mr. **Wolff**. Thank you, Mr. Pritchard.

You know, it is somewhat of a deja vu except for role reversals.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. I am afraid you are right.

Mr. **Wolff**. Recently when this committee was in Pakistan, we were told that the Chinese had supplied $20 billion to the Vietnamese in their war with us. That figure never really did surface until just recently; $20 billion is a lot of money. They don't have that anymore. Maybe the Soviets will supply that.

I would turn to Mr. Guyer.

Mr. **Guyer**. I defer to Mr. Bowen. He was here first. Go ahead.

VIETNAM'S MOTIVATION

Mr. **Bowen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the hospitality of your subcommittee on which I do not formally serve. But I certainly enjoyed traveling with you and the committee last summer to Southeast Asia and appreciated the hospitality of Ambassador Abramowitz in Bangkok.

I have simply a couple of questions I would like to ask, pursuing the line of questioning Mr. Pritchard brought up.

I would like to probe a little further into the issue of the motivation for the behavior of the Vietnamese and their incursion into Thailand. If I might, I would like to direct this to my fellow Mississipian, Mr. Anderson, your colleague.

It seems to be a little baffling that they would take that action, as you pointed out. The response of the ASEAN nations, the negative response here and in other parts of the world, countries where they hope to see normalized relations; the fact that they also gave the Thais an opportunity to demonstrate a greater degree of military competence than they themselves and many others believed existed, all contribute to our surprise.

I know from our visit in Hanoi last summer that Minister Thach and others were inclined to belittle the military competence of the

Thais. They seem to have lost in every way by this military adventure.

I am still anxious to try to perceive what the motivation was in that and what the miscalculation, whether they can make similar and larger miscalculations in the future.

Mr. ANDERSON. Well, Mr. Bowen, I cannot explain the timing because in the background, right before the Kuala Lampur ministerial—the timing is almost inexplicable, right before the Kuala Lampur ministerials.

Mr. BOWEN. Not just the timing, but the very concept itself, the action.

Mr. ANDERSON. The concept itself I think resulted from two or three things which were occurring. Underlying it all was a deep irritation with what the Vietnamese regarded as an interference on the part of the Thais and the rest of the international community in the internal affairs of Kampuchea, ignoring of course their own role in Kampuchea.

REPATRIATION

I think that the things that precipitated it directly were probably the repatriation, which they saw as a device through which the international community was directly interfering with what was going on in Cambodia. They also feared probably resistance fighters were being infiltrated, I believe.

Many of the people who were going back, I think, probably were going back to rejoin their relatives, who were on the other side of the border.

They also have been very frustrated in their attempts over the past year and a half to eliminate both Democratic Kampuchean forces and also the non-Communist resistance.

I think because of this frustration, having built for such a long time, they decided that the role of the Thais, both in the repatriation and in their perceived support for the non-Communist forces, the anti-Vietnamese forces, that they were trying to intimidate the Thais by this military action.

As you pointed out, I think they probably failed in that regard, and the Thais did perform quite well.

FUTURE INCURSIONS

Mr. BOWEN. The question I was going to ask, could it be in any way regarded as a successful action. Apparently militarily it was not successful. Politically it was not successful. It was simply a miscalculation in that sense.

If that is true, do you think they would then be deterred from similar incursions in the future? How would you see that?

Mr. ANDERSON. I agree with what Ambassador Abramowitz has said, because of the volatile nature of the situation on the border, their concern about the role of the refugees, and what they are doing, they are concerned—there is essentially a capitalist element functioning from the Thai border—and what the Vietnamese regard as an impediment to their consolidating control inside Kampuchea, that the chances of another incursion, a similar one, are certainly quite possible.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Let me just add to that. I think one has to look at what the Thai-Cambodian border represents to the Vietnamese—a source, first of all, for refuge, for their anti-Vietnamese elements. It is a source of where relief is provided to the Cambodian people, demonstrating the inability of the Vietnamese Government to deliver food.

It is a source of capitalist infection in the reconstruction of Cambodia. The Thai border is a major sore point for the Vietnamese. They have not been able to control it, they don't dominate it, and there are great frustrations.

Mr. **Bowen**. So in a sense it is to let the Thais know they are there, They are capable of crossing it if they feel like doing it, even though this particular action wasn't especially successful.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. I think certainly it had elements of a warning.

FOUR-POINT PROPOSAL

Mr. **Bowen**. One other question I would like to ask, if I might, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder what your evaluation might be of the four-point proposal for the negotiated settlement offered by the Foreign Ministers of Indochina at their meeting in Vientiane earlier this month. Would you class this as an evenhanded proposal?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Well, it is an evenhanded proposal on Vietnamese terms.

No; that proposal is, as I have seen it and analyzed it—and I think this view is shared by a lot of my colleagues—is that it is an enormously artful proposal designed to help refurbish the Vietnamese image in the world, designed to make the Vietnamese appear flexible and the United States, Thailand, and everybody else inflexible.

The fact is that what they have done is to decide that the Kampuchean issue is one that involves the problems on the Thai border, and that the Heng Samrin government is willing through a variety of devices to settle these problems at the Thai border with the Thai Government.

The statement says absolutely nothing about the two principle elements of the United Nations resolution. One, the ultimate removal of foreign forces, Vietnamese forces, and two, the reconstitution of a broad-based Khmer government.

So, from my perspective, while it has a few interesting elements, such as a willingness to negotiate some things through third parties and an ostensible effort to appear forthcoming in the creation of a demilitarized zone along the Thai border, which of course would eliminate Pol Pot forces, it is not in any way a really step forward, and not in any way a sign of the Vietnamese flexibility. It is rather a sign of Vietnamese artfulness.

Mr. **Bowen**. It struck me as a one-sided proposition, a complete Vietnamese solution.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. There is no question.

Mr. **Bowen**. What has our response been to it?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. We have not officially responded. We have pointed out, much as I have said here, what we think are the major elements to friendly countries. But we have not issued any public statements to my knowledge.

Mr. Bowen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Guyer.

U.N. RESOLUTION

Mr. Guyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, you have been enormously helpful. I think that most of the people in America are bewildered by an absence of concrete knowledge as to that part of the world to begin with.

My first recollection of Cambodia was they were a very gentle people, very easy to get along with, they were not aggressive people. After the Vietnamese nightmare, they have been the most trampled and downtrodden people, wild horses have been turned loose against them from all sides. The average American does not know the good guys from the bad guys, with these revolving musical chair regimes going back and forth.

On page 13 of your statement you did mention the U.N. resolution. What did all this really spell out?

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** Well, that resolution was the resolution passed last November, I believe, by a vote of 91 to 24. That was the vote, after a U.N. Assembly debate on the situation in Cambodia.

That resolution pointed out or proposed two critical elements to a resolution on Cambodia's problem: One, that all foreign forces must leave Cambodia, and two, that a broad-based government acceptable to the Khmer people——

Mr. Guyer. At that point, what is the bottomline? What do you do if they don't?

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** The problem is, as we have done, we persist. We have not achieved that objective. We are certainly not much closer to it, but it doesn't mean that we drop the objective.

Mr. Guyer. I don't know what the alternatives are, the alternate routes you have, when you tell people you must do this with a mandate and the only way to enforce it is another war, from which we have just emerged.

A war to enforce a war is not a very good solution. The U.N. charter, as I remember, has the power to use any kind of weaponry in the world as a punitive weapon to put down any member nation that ceases to be a humane member of that family of nations.

PROMISED LAND

I am just curious. There has been so much corruption—and this idea of survival. I have a mental picture that the Thai border is almost like the promised land to some people. Those that have made it have reported, "Gee, there is hope and help," even though maybe only 40-percent effective.

To Thailand it must be a horrible experience because they are in the geopolitical situation that they cannot escape. Yet, we get stories of the corruption of many Thai people, maybe unbridled, by the government.

Well, your testimony has stated food and medicine, things just don't get through. I think the people here are torn between compassion and fear. People come to us on the streets, they come to us through the mail, they come to us over the phone, they want to help anybody in distress.

Then they read these stories of counterproductivity, where troops take it away from these people, they are shoved out, told not to come in, shut down.

Do you think there is any real hope that we can settle this part of the world peacefully without getting back into the jungles and rice paddies? Can we ever come to the table and solve this in a reasonable way among reasonable people? I think that has to be the end line someplace.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Well, let me try to answer some of them.

Mr. **Guyer**. I made a comment more than a question, I understand that.

FOOD DISTRIBUTION DIFFICULTIES

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. I understand. I certainly understand and appreciate your concern. I think we all share a lot of concern about this situation and its implications.

But in the case of food, and food aid to the Cambodian people, there is no question that there have been abuses to this program which——

Mr. **Guyer**. What is the batting average of the average agency, the volunteer groups that are doing such a noble job under very difficult conditions—what is the batting average of getting through to the people?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Well, this is the point I wanted to dwell on. There is no question that the relief effort in Cambodia has been beset with all sorts of problems—at the Thai border with fighting, with Khmer fighting among themselves, with black marketeers from Cambodia, with obstructionism and a variety of other problems.

But nevertheless, with all these limitations, I think the bottom line is that a people who are and remain desperately in need are fed. They were not fed in the easiest way. We don't control the situation.

Mr. **Guyer**. Do they have to come to a point to be fed?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. They were fed in two ways. They were fed at the Thai border, which is not a very efficient way of feeding people, but it was an effective way. They came to the Thai border. They carried the food back into Cambodia.

There has been food distributed near Phnom Penh, but not as much or as efficiently as we like. Nevertheless, I don't think there is any doubt in the world that without this 200,000 tons of grain which has gone into Cambodia for the past 10 months, Cambodia would be a tremendous disaster.

Mr. **Guyer**. It is almost genocide now.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. It is a bad case now, but it could have been far worse without this.

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES

Mr. **Guyer**. I am particularly on your side in this. I am a great believer, being a church member—I think the churches should set the example before governments do. I have always been a believer in that.

It is easy to spend somebody else's money. Never call us cheap politicians because we are very expensive. It is so simple for anybody to come in here and talk about $1 billion. As I said the other day, we have a $600 billion budget, and there is not a person in Washington who knows how much that is.

In one dollar bills that would go to the Moon and back 118 times, end to end. In silver dollars, it would make 3 million Empire State Buildings. But this is not a subject for you.

I am a great believer that we should never abandon humanitarian responses that are coming from people from all walks of life. I want to see this continue, but I think there is this eternal question.

These poor people out there, under whatever regime, you may have some ignoble people to go down in infamy, and yet some wonderful people had to live under them. Our job is a job of sorting out values and priorities and having confidence in people like yourself.

U.N. RESPONSE

Incidentally, I see where Kurt Waldheim is going to Hanoi August 2. Now, does he plan to stop over on his way back?

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** He is going to Bangkok also.

Mr. **Guyer.** Is he going to give a report to you on their attitude?

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** He wouldn't necessarily give a report to me.

Mr. **Guyer.** You are going to see him.

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** I saw him last week. I will not be back in Thailand when he visits. I am sure my deputy, the chargé, will have an opportunity to meet with him however briefly. But we will, of course, have further discussions with him when he comes back.

Mr. **Guyer.** I have a lot of confidence in the framework of the United Nations and its ability to reach people we cannot reach. For example, Mr. Wolff—I have enormous faith in the United Nation's effort, even though at times they are very disappointing. But they do have the potential framework to resolve problems.

Nothing works in "committee-ites" and "amendicitis." These are two of the worst things that can happen in legislative circles. Anybody who has respect for the law and likes sausage should not watch either one being made.

But seriously, this is a lingering problem. The Vietnamese should not be pitied so much. They picked up $5 billion worth of leftover weaponry and goods we left there when we had to leave the scene, like the Arabs, steal away.

CITIZEN ACTION

At any rate, I am concerned—and your testimony can mean a great deal to us—as to what can be accomplished from where we sit and what are some of the immediate steps we could take as citizens, as legislators, as Americans, to help a people that certainly have borne the throes of hell as far as I am concerned.

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** I am pleased you asked me that because I have very definite ideas of what can be done. The United

States does not have the capability to change the situation on the ground in Indochina at this time.

The United States has been working to try to reach a solution that reconciles opposing interests through political and diplomatic means. We have not gotten very far. We may never get there. It seems to me a worthy effort. In the absence of being able, we are not going to involve ourselves militarily in Cambodia. There is no reason to, there is no way, and we shouldn't.

The question is, however, one, how do we try to find a reasonable solution, however difficult, and whatever the limitations, which I think we are pursuing.

Second is to do what we can and to aggressively pursue the humanitarian ends. I think we have done so. I think we can be proud. We have done so in terms of feeding the Cambodian people. We have put up over $100 million. Private organizations have put up over $46 million.

That is a considerable outpouring by the American people, which I think generally are concerned with the welfare of the Khmer.

Third, we have made a major contribution to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia by our refugee programs. Our refugee programs—the political value of them has never been appreciated. We have saved a hell of a lot of people from dying, and we have preserved political stability, helped preserve it, and we ought to be proud of that—as well as the humanitarian side of it.

I think given the nature of the situation, we must pursue all those purposes. However limited the prospects of political success, we still have to pursue the humanitarian ends.

Mr. **GUYER**. That is a sad part of the world. What I don't understand—and not being an authority on either the Oriental or the Russian mind—is why that is so important to them as surrogates to keep on fueling the fires of human misery for a part of the world they cannot even handle; in other words, they cannot even feed the people they are trying to dominate, they don't want to.

I think sometime or other—Russia loses very few people in battle. They are great at having somebody else do their fighting. There have been very many powers like that, who like to say you and him fight it out, I will hold your coats, and while they are going at it, they steal the coats.

I know there is no simplistic answer as we have heard in the recent political debates—these things are complicated. But people's lives are involved. And our little committee, I think it does a great job, considering that we deal with one-half the population of the world, and only half a dozen people to do it.

MIA/POWS

But if you have any last word to send back home to our people, it would be very helpful. Incidentally, are you acquainted with Col. Paul Mather?

Ambassador **ABRAMOWITZ**. Yes, sir, he works in the Embassy.

Mr. **GUYER**. Did he ever report to you they asked him to come back to Hanoi since we were over there.

Ambassador **ABRAMOWITZ**. I haven't talked to him for about a month.

Mr. **GUYER**. He was given an invitation while we were there.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. No, he is still in Bangkok.

Mr. GUYER. Do you have any word on the 400 American remains that——

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. No, but I have been following your colloquy with Mr. Thach.

Mr. GUYER. I asked too many questions.

Mr. WOLFF. Regarding the colloquy with Mr. Thach, Mr. Thach claims we have been politically motivated in trying to secure these remains. He still, however, proceeds to talk about healing the wounds of war, which seem to come up each time. That healing the wounds of war I think could be solved by about $5 billion.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. They "may accept" $2 billion, perhaps $3 billion.

POLITICAL SOLUTION

Mr. WOLFF. We appreciate, Mr. Abramowitz, you keeping us informed of what is going on in the area.

You seem very concerned about the future. You asked us to continue our aid program, which I am sure the Congress in its wisdom will continue. But really that doesn't seem to be the answer at all.

I think there has to be some political moves made. I am wondering whether or not the recent incursion into Thailand was prompted by difficulties they are having elsewhere in the world—the Russians, for example—taking some of the pressure off the problems they are having in Afghanistan, to create some little problem someplace else in the world.

Do you see any connection?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. No, I cannot say for sure, but I don't see that as one of the factors precipitating this effort. I cannot preclude that, but it is not one I would list as a high possible factor.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND

Mr. WOLFF. One final question.

Concerning the Thai military and their ability to defend themselves against further incursions, are you satisfied that their requests for additional equipment have been met? Have they any additional requests that have not been met as yet?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I will have to give you an ambiguous answer there, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Your personal opinion.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I think that we have responded significantly in terms of accelerating the delivery of equipment to Thailand. I think that has been a critical factor in improving Thai defenses and in helping maintain stability in the area.

I do feel that given the Thai economic situation, and their continuing needs to improve their defenses, given the continued presence of 200,000 Vietnamese troops on their border, that the level of military credits should be raised. That is my personal view.

Mr. WOLFF. Do you have any idea how much?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. There is no precise answer. You cannot devise a formula, whether it should be $60, $70, $80 million.

Mr. WOLFF. You know this committee did increase the request that was made by the administration.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Yes. We have increased it somewhat. I feel that the situation does require a further increase. There are obvious limitations. We, for example, have run into the CRA this year, in which fiscal year 1980, the level of aid is $40 million, but the CRA permits only $35 million.

We have no bill. That is obviously a hindering factor in providing an adequate level of credits. But by and large, I feel that the United States must be in a better position of providing aid, including military aid, to its friends who have some trouble, rather than employing its own forces.

So, therefore, I would like to see us over time, be able to provide a higher level of military credits to Thailand. I think they need it, and I think the situation requires it.

Mr. **Wolff**. We have an agreement with Thailand to provide for common defense. At the time of the incursion, did the Thai Government appeal to us in any fashion whatsoever?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. No. We have discussed the situation with them. We are in constant touch with the senior Thai officials. They certainly wanted many of the things we have done. I think the Thai Government was particularly pleased with our decision to airlift aid, but there was no request for any U.S. Forces no.

REAFFIRMATION OF U.S. SUPPORT

Mr. **Wolff**. One factor I think is important, to preclude any mistaken opinion by the Vietnamese, is a reaffirmation of our support for the Thai Government and Thai people, which I think will preclude adventurism.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Yes. That, of course, was done, and most notably by Secretary Muskie, a very strong statement issued right after the event.

Mr. **Pritchard**. Mr. Chairman, I think that the speed with which we responded was excellent. So often these things are protracted, and we do a lot of talking.

What do they say—someone that comes to help you quickly gives you twice as much help?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. I agree with you. I think the airlift was significantly beneficial, not only for the equipment it provided, but for the clear demonstration that the United States had the capacity to respond quickly to a friend who had some problems.

I am saying that I think there are other areas as well where I feel our response should be a little greater than it has been.

U.N. SPECIAL FUND

Mr. **Guyer**. If I could ask one more question. Back in May I believe at the Geneva conference they set up a Cambodian fund Sir Robert Jackson is administering. What is the status of that fund?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Well, as I understand it now, Congressman—and I may be wrong, but as I understand it now—they are in the process of setting up his office. There were two recommendations, one to set up an office run by Sir Robert Jackson and one to set up a fund which he could administer as he saw fit and use the fund to better coordinate the international relief mechanism.

The first is in the process of being accomplished. The second has not gone very far.

Mr. **Guyer**. Not many countries have contributed?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. No. The problem really has been a reluctance on the part of the international organizations, like UNICEF, FAO, World Food Program. They are concerned about having a separate source of funding.

Mr. **Guyer**. Unilaterally.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. They prefer keeping the same existing mechanisms for the use of relief funds. So that basically, that fund hasn't gotten off the ground.

Mr. **Guyer**. I see.

U.S. REFUGEE BUSINESS

Mr. **Wolff**. A question prompted by staff, which I think is an important question. The refugee program now has become so institutionalized that it serves in some cases to draw out refugees from the countries of Laos and Cambodia.

I am wondering whether or not the refugee program now has become the "refugee business," so to speak.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. I don't really think so, Mr. Chairman. I don't think that is true at all. I cannot say that there are some people who do not come out for reasons other than political persecution, religious, or something of this sort.

But I don't think people of Indochina come out largely to sit in refugee camps, many for 4 or 5 years, or that their life in those camps is so good. I think they come out for a variety of reasons, which it is very difficult to sort out, and that most of them are legitimately refugees, largely because of the very bad internal situation that exists in many of the countries of Indochina.

For example, one of the problems is how do you sort out economic and political refugees. How do you sort out the case of a kid whose father was in the Vietnamese Army and the only job he can get in Vietnam is to go to one of the new economic zones to be a farmer. Is he an economic refugee or political refugee? There is really no way to make any easy decision.

My experience—and I am obviously partial on this score—is that the bulk of the refugees come out because they find life in their countries intolerable for a variety of reasons.

The other side of the coin was even if there was some truth to that, which by and large I don't think there is, what do we do—stop the ships from picking up refugees, close the camps and tell everybody to go home?

RESETTLEMENT

Mr. **Guyer**. Hasn't resettlement been very sluggish, though?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Resettlement? Well, it depends. There are a number of countries of resettlement which have been very forthcoming. The United States, of course, is one. France, Canada, Australia, have all been very helpful. Hopefully they will continue their resettlement efforts.

There are somewhere around 250,000 people resettled last year. That is pretty damned good. We are talking about Indochinese refugees.

Mr. **Guyer**. We have had about 275,000 so far.

CORRUPTION

Mr. **Bowen**. Mr. Ambassador, I saw a story, which I am sure you did as well, this morning in the Washington Post which had some disturbing points in it.

For example:

> Relief workers sometimes complain that funds are siphoned off by corrupt Thais using some of the same ruses that plagued the former government of South Vietnam. Rice shipped to the camps is sold and replaced with substandard varieties. Guards charge refugees for permission to leave the camp to work.

A lot of these things I am sure are inevitable in any sort of chaotic human situation, in which people are thrust together, the kind of black market conditions which inevitably develop.

It does weaken obviously assistance efforts, when stories such as this are circulated. It doesn't reflect well, of course, upon the Government of Thailand.

Our distinguished Thai Ambassador is present. I am sure his Government is aware of this kind of adverse publicity and doing all they can to correct it.

I wonder if you might comment about this kind of story, which our constituents are reading and which sometimes makes our job a little more difficult in terms of the actions we are called upon to take here.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. I think you have characterized it very well, Mr. Bowen. There are these reports, and I am sure in the camps there are elements of corruption which occur in any sort of program of this nature.

These concerns have been repeatedly brought before the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who is in charge of administering the camps. So that there is a concern about it and some effort to deal with it.

I don't say the effort has been successful. Also, while there may be some Thai officials who benefit from corruption, diversion, this is certainly not the policy of the Thai Government to condone it or to utilize it.

It is a very difficult situation to get at. It is principally the responsibility of the international organizations, and they are aware of the problems. I think generally they are trying to deal with them. But I would be not honest if I say these problems have been resolved. They exist.

Mr. **Bowen**. Is this more or less being left to working arrangements between the Thai Government——

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Mainly this is an effort which has been repeated, when these things occur between Thai Government and the United Nations Commissioner, to try to work out procedures, methods, et cetera, to try to reduce the problem. Sometimes the reports are not true.

One thing in this business. I don't mean to lecture, but in the 18 months I have seen more false stories propagated about this whole refugee business on the border, in Cambodia. You can get anything.

The problem is one of constant attention and a certain amount of intellectual honesty and dispassion. The problems in that article I think do exist. They have got to be addressed as they arise.

PRESS INACCURACIES

Mr. **Pritchard**. Would the gentleman yield at that point.

Isn't part of it the fact that there are a whole variety of camps where there is a good, able, strong, honest camp commander and it runs pretty well. If you have one that is either weak or crooked or for a variety of reasons can be had, then the thing goes down, and then you people and everybody gets pressuring them, and they get a different camp commander in there.

Then the writers go out write a story that is accurate, but it is accurate to that particular situation, and that is just one of many 1,000 different areas.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. I think you are certainly correct, that a strong camp commander makes a lot of difference. We should remember that the bulk of the food and relief goes to the people. We are talking about abuses, we are not talking about people not getting the bulk of what is being provided for them through the international relief effort.

So, the point is to work on the abuses, the Thai Government, the international agencies, the United States, to the extent that we can help. But not to lose sight of the fact that most of the people in the camps are being fed.

Mr. **Bowen**. Of course, there is nothing approaching the massive black market that existed in South Vietnam when all kinds of American equipment and supplies were being siphoned off completely away from the normal channels.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. I am not familiar with that situation, but if that is the way you describe it, no.

UNHCR EMPLOYEES

Mr. **Wolff**. How many people does the UNHCR have in Thailand now?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. How many employees? I don't know the answer. They have an awful lot, mainly because of the vast expansion of the Khmer relief.

Mr. **Wolff**. They did not have.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. At an earlier time——

Mr. **Wolff**. They had two or three people there.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. You are quite correct. We were very concerned about the inadequacy of the U.N. presence in the camps. That is absolutely correct. That still may be the case in a few of the camps.

The UNHCR currently has 110 employees permanently stationed in refugee camps in Thailand. There are an additional 20 to 30 employees who rotate among 4 camps. The UNHCR has a total of 234 personnel in Thailand, including local hire employees. In addition to UNHCR personnel, UNICEF has approximately 20 employees working in the border area, and several personnel in Bangkok. There no longer appears to be a shortage of U.N. workers in Thailand.

NO-SHOW RATES

Mr. **Wolff**. One other factor, Mr. Ambassador. It has been brought to our attention there is a no-show rate of about 40 percent of those who are scheduled to be resettled in the United States in the major Hmong refugee camp. A no-show rate of about 20 percent in Ubon.

Why is there this high rate of no-shows among these refugees?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. I am not aware of those figures. I was aware at varying times of the problem of no-shows, particularly as to Hmong. My people accounted for it by two reasons: One, they simply don't want to go to an alien land. They want to stay with some prospect of going back to Laos. Two, they may have been encouraged by some of their leaders to stay with the prospect of going back to Laos to fight.

I cannot explain it. I have discussed it with the members of my staff, and this is what they were hypothesizing.

Mr. **Wolff**. Are there any further questions?

Mr. **Pritchard**. Except we are delighted to have the Ambassador here.

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Thank you.

VIETNAM'S ECONOMIC SITUATION

Mr. **Wolff**. We are very pleased you have come. I want to take this opportunity for a moment.

When we were in Vietnam I saw conditions in Hanoi that were pretty pitiful situations, if you want to pity them. I don't particularly do that. But by the same token I think the situation there economically, they were in pretty bad shape.

Does that situation still remain?

Mr. **Anderson**. Since you were there the situation has continued to deteriorate. This is talk from journalists, diplomats, others who have been to Hanoi. It is worse, of course, in the south.

The Vietnamese adopted some economic reform measures in the fall which helped superficially in some areas. But basically the direction is still down. It is faster in the south than the north.

Another thing we are hearing very much about is the malaise of the people, and here again it is particularly in the south. But there are also reports of bad morale in the government, government cadre in Hanoi.

But particularly in the south they were very unhappy with the invasion of Cambodia and the fact that their sons and brothers and husbands and so forth have to go to fight. Many of them have been there since the invasion a year and a half ago, have not come back, they have not heard from them, and they don't regard the imposition of the Government in Cambodia by the Hanoi government as a desirable thing.

So all of that has made the morale of the south noticeably worse over the last 18 months.

SOVIET BASES

Mr. **Wolff**. One point they have made with us is that they have not permitted the Soviets to use Cam Ranh as a base, Cam Ranh Bay. I do note that Soviet ships have called at Cam Ranh Bay.

Is there any move in that connection that you know of in utilization of base facilities for the Soviets? The Soviets are using both Danang and I think actually Hanoi for their long-range air surveillance, and sea surveillance flights. The U-95's are landing in there.

You have virtually a sort of a base of sea surveillance and operations.

They have also set up signal communication facilities. They are using Cam Ranh Bay sporadically. There is no evidence of a buildup of a Soviet shore establishment. That, as far as I know, has not occurred, although I have not checked for a while.

There has been what I would call a slow but steadily increasing Soviet use of facilities in Vietnam. It is not on the order obviously of Subic Bay, but it is a slow growth of their involvement.

We have now been joined by Mr. Solarz, a distinguished member of this committee. Do you have any questions?

Mr. **Solarz**. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know you are neither encouraging nor discouraging me from asking any questions, but since you registered no objections, I think I will proceed.

U.N. VOTE

Mr. Ambassador, have we made any decisions yet on how to vote when the question comes up in the U.N. again about whether to seat the Pol Pot delegation as the legitimate representatives of Cambodia?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. My answer is that that matter is still under consideration in the executive branch.

Mr. **Solarz**. You mean a final decision has not been made?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. A final decision, as I understand, has not yet been made.

Mr. **Solarz**. It could be either way?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. It is my understanding they have not made a decision.

Mr. **Solarz**. Is the administration aware of the extent to which there are many Members of the Congress who feel that our decision to vote to seat the Pol Pot delegation last time, whatever the diplomatic or political arguments in favor of such a vote may have been, was a moral abomination?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. I think there are many people that certainly know we are concerned. But I don't think we voted to do a moral abomination. I think that is an unfair way of putting it.

Nobody voted for the Khmer Rouge, quite clearly, for the Khmer Rouge seat, with any liking for it. It was voted on for a variety of reasons. That vote may be wrong, but I don't think it makes the people who voted for them moral reprobates, which is what you seem to be implying.

Mr. **Solarz**. Far be it for me to suggest that you or any of your colleagues are moral reprobates. Some of my best friends in the State Department——

Ambassador **Abramowitz** [interrupting]. Are moral reprobates.

Mr. **Solarz**. That may be true, but I know in your case you are a deeply moral fellow. Even if we don't always agree, I never question the decency of your intentions.

In all seriousness, there are many of us who feel what Pol Pot did is so far beyond the pale of what is acceptable or even understandable that to in any way associate ourselves, even if we disclaim such an association by voting to seat his representative, is something that from a moral point of view we don't think it is appropriate for our country.

I recognize the political problems in voting another way, but surely if we were to abstain, which is an alternative, we wouldn't have to vote to seat Heng Samrin, thereby legitimizing the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** Certainly that is an alternative that has been put forth. The considerations that have to be balanced is the political impact, as you clearly pointed out, with a variety of countries who are very strongly opposed to doing anything which they feel constitutes a Soviet Vietnamese victory, and which they would think that a vote for an empty seat, would do.

The second consideration is what does the impact of either an empty seat or a positive vote for the Heng Samrin government do on the prospects for negotiations. That is what you have to balance.

BLOCKING A SETTLEMENT

Mr. **Solarz.** Let me ask you to elaborate on that. It is hard for me to understand how our decision to vote to seat Pol Pot's representatives in any meaningful way whatsoever contributes toward the possibility of a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem.

The Vietnamese appear to be deeply entrenched in Cambodia. Their Foreign Minister has said that their course of action is irreversible. China is committed to helping Pol Pot.

Could you tell us in what way does a vote by us to seat Pol Pot contribute to the possibility of a negotiated settlement? If it did——

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** I cannot say that a vote to seat Pol Pot is going to contribute to a negotiated settlement. The only argument that can be made is that however unlikely the Vietnamese are to engage in some political flexibility, given their favorable situation on the ground, however unlikely they are to do that, nevertheless that likelihood is to be further reduced by giving the Vietnamese what they seek, which is a recognition of their occupation of Cambodia and a condoning of it.

Now, that doesn't mean they will negotiate. It means that the vote to give them what they want reduce the likelihood.

Mr. **Solarz.** I quite agree if the U.N. voted to seat Heng Samrin it would reduce the Vietnamese incentive to negotiate. But isn't there an alternative to seating Heng Samrin on the one hand and Pol Pot on the other. That is to seat no one and, leave the seat open?

Ambassador **Abramowitz.** That is certainly a possibility. I think that is not perceived particularly well in Asia. I am trying here to give you my own view of the impact on how this is perceived in the area, particularly, and how it is perceived in its impact on Vietnam.

It is perceived that a vote to an empty seat would be a vote for the Vietnamese and the Soviets because then it would be a matter of time that—the first step in what the Vietnamese want.

I think what the Vietnamese will go for this year is an empty seat as a way of enhancing the likelihood of their eliminating the DK from the assembly.

INDIA'S RECOGNITION OF HENG SAMRIN

Mr. **Solarz**. Mr. Chairman, two final questions very briefly.

Mr. Ambassador, what impact has the Indian decision to recognize Heng Samrin had on the situation in Cambodia, the international viability of the Heng Samrin government, and with the attitude of Vietnam toward the situation?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Well, on the surface, the answer is very little, but I can't say for sure. I think you will have to wait a little time to see what the impact will be, but on the surface very little; but I would hesitate to say anything conclusive.

REPATRIATION PROSPECTS

Mr. **Solarz**. Do the Thai authorities still plan to repatriate the Cambodians being held in Khao I Dang and Sakeo camps, and, if not, what will happen to these 150,000 homeless refugees? Do we have any responsibility?

Ambassador **Abramowitz**. Let me briefly review that situation. As you know, the Thais, in conjunction with the United Nations High Commissioner, instituted a program of voluntary repatriation of the 150,000 Cambodian refugees in camps who had not been given refugee status. Of those roughly 150,000, only 9,000 went back; that was the extent of the repatriation. So there are 140,000 or so Khmer refugees in Thailand without any refugee status.

The Thai Government has repeatedly stated of late that it would not force these people to return home involuntarily, nevertheless their status is uncertain, and where they will go is equally uncertain. There are a number of Khmer refugees who clearly have ties to the United States who we will be considering taking, but the future of these 150,000 is, frankly, uncertain.

They clearly do not want to go back to Cambodia unless there was going to be a radical change in conditions. I don't look for a radical change in conditions. So that I can't tell you what is going to happen here, but it is obviously a subject in which we have a great humanitarian interest. The Cambodians have suffered very deeply.

Mr. **Solarz**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Wolff**. Thank you, Mr. Solarz.

Before closing, the committee should like to make note of something that has been alluded to before, Mr. Ambassador, which is we welcome you to this meeting and also would like to convey to you our Government's thanks to the Thai Government for the compassion you have shown to the refugees.

We have no further questions, Mr. Ambassador. We thank you very much for appearing here today.

The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:03 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

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APPENDIX

ANSWERS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS ON SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

Q. In your testimony you say one of the American objectives in Indochina is a sharp reduction and eventful elimination of the Soviet military role in Vietnam. You say this will be difficult to achieve and may take a long time. What steps are being taken and what initiatives do you propose?

A. Efforts to eliminate the Soviet military presence in Vietnam must address not simply the presence itself, but must also recognize that regional tensions, represented by the conflict in Kampuchea have provided the excuse for establishing and increasing this presence.

We have expressed directly to the Vietnamese our concern about the implications of the Soviet presence for regional stability. We have also discussed this with other countries of the region who share our concern. We are working to advance prospects for a peaceful political settlement in Kampuchea so as to eliminate the conditions which have created a climate favorable to the intrusion of Soviet power into the area.

Q. What is the present status of the Heng Samrin Government? Pen Sovan, who has been closely associated with the Vietnamese, seems to be emerging as the new leader. What effect will a government more closely associated with the Vietnamese have on the ASEAN nations and Thailand in particular?

A. Virtually all international visitors to the People's Republic of Kampuchea and other observers have described the Heng Samrin regime as ineffective. It has failed to develop an administrative capability and has created impediments to expanded international relief operations. It seems clear that all significant actions taken by the Heng Samrin authorities must be cleared with Vietnamese advisors who maintain a controlling influence in all government ministries. The Heng Samrin authorities have not developed any popular following except insofar as they control food distribution (with Vietnamese oversight) and insofar as they represent the only alternative to the widely feared Pol Pot-Khmer Rouge administration.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the Vietnamese are relying upon Vice President Pen Sovan and Foreign Minister Hun Sen as their executors in Kampuchea. If the Vietnamese decide to annoint new leadership in Kampuchea, there would be little practical change for Thailand and ASEAN as total Vietnamese control of the regime they installed would assure that Kampuchean policies would still reflect Hanoi's desires.

Q. Have there been any discernable shifts in Thai thinking vis-a-vis Kampuchea since the changes in government in Bangkok? If so, how will these shifts affect the policies of the ASEAN nations?

A. The new government of PM Prem has indicated and subsequently demonstrated that it will continue the humanitarian refugee policies of PM Kriangsak. To date it has been sensitive and responsive to the world community's urging that it maintain its humanitarian policies. There is significant concern, however, over the presence of Khmer refugees in Thailand and a strong Thai desire to avoid a long-term problem along the border. In their statements Thai officials have linked continuation of current humanitarian Thai policies of temporary asylum and relief assistance to the continuation of international relief and resettlement programs. A massive influx of new refugees would pose major political and security problems for Thailand, and the government's response would depend on the exact circumstances and public reaction. There has been no shift in Thai refugee policies which would adversely affect the policies of ASEAN nations.

Q. Last year, Thai officials forcibly repatriated Kampucheans from Thailand. What is the nature of the "voluntary" repatriations going on in Thailand now? How have these repatriations been handled?

The voluntary return of Kampucheans to Kampuchea when conditions permit them to do so in safety is a common goal of the Thai and U.S. Governments and the UNHCR. The Thai Government is sensitive to the criticism generated by the forced repatriation of Kampucheans from Thailand in 1979 and there has been no repeat of this incident. Some Kampucheans in response to an improved security situation in local areas have voluntarily returned to Kampuchea in order to plant rice or return to their families. The Thai Government in consultation with the UNHCR is seeking to develop a signature form for those who wish to indicate that their return to Kampuchea is voluntary and to avoid the possibility of misinterpretation of genuine voluntary repatriation.

Q. What effect will the present "Cuban" refugee crisis have on the implementation of our Indochinese refugee policy?

A. At the moment, we do not anticipate that the sudden arrival of over 105,000 Cuban exiles in the United States will have any effect on our plans for Indochinese refugee admissions for the remainder of FY 1980. We expect to continue admitting Indochinese refugees at the rate of 14,000 a month, for a total of 168,000 this year. For budget purposes, we have planned to continue this rate of resettlement in 1981, but the actual admission levels are subject to a final Presidential determination after Congressional consultation in September.